[CWG-Stewardship] Questions regarding InternetNZ's views on the IANA transition

[Paul Szyndler]

Hi Jordan,



Thanks for your considered response.



Let me take the “easy” question first.

No, auDA is not advocating a transfer of IANA management “to the private 
sector”.

I was intentionally quoting the wording used by the NTIA in 1997/8 when it 
initiated this process.

Remnants of that wording remain in the March 2014 announcement that you 
referred to: “Transitioning NTIA out of its role marks the final phase of 
the privatization of the DNS as outlined by the U.S. Government in 1997”

I was simply seeking to emphasise that the process we are undertaking now is 
the culmination of an 18 year transition and not an  isolated exercise – 
hence my preference to refer to the historical language.

But we should not distract ourselves with linguistic pedantry when there is 
no disagreement between us about the need for the multi-stakeholder 
community to inherit this “asset”.



On the other issues you raise:



·         I am concerned about your repeated capitalised references to “One 
Big ICANN” and “One And Only”, which only serve to cast the organisation as 
a malevolent entity that cannot be entrusted with the future of IANA.

It infers the centralisation of key functions within one entity. More 
directly, you claim that we support “that what is today distributed among 
many parties should be more concentrated in the one institution”.

This is not a position that has been, or ever will be, advocated by auDA. As 
a ccTLD manager, we will always support the engagement and empowerment of 
stakeholders and, above all, the fierce independence of ccTLDs.



·         Without restating the full proposal, we believe that a “Golden 
Bylaw” model could potentially avoid complex issues of jurisdiction and the 
creation and empowerment of new constructs that, until 12 months ago, were 
unknown to the community.

We also then made a subsequent proposal of an Internal Trust as an 
acknowledgement or concession that some stakeholders would/could not support 
a solution that would be perceived as fully “internalised”.

In the continuum between internal and external solutions, we felt that this 
was a step towards the middle ground: and such negotiation and consideration 
of options is critical to an open and full debate.



·         I note that, as we go back in history, the transition we are 
debating was the specific reason for ICANN’s establishment. It is here to 
“manage”, or “hold in Trust” or “execute” a role with regard to the IANA 
functions.

In my previous emails (and auDA submissions), you will note that we have 
repeatedly sought to emphasise our support for creating a system of 
accountability, transparency and checks and balances between ICANN (and its 
Board) and the ongoing management of the IANA function.

The principle of “separability” (note: not “separation”) is present 
throughout. We never infer ownership.

I believe our difference of opinion simply arises from the EXTENT to which 
separability should be codified or, more precisely, the mechanism used to 
enforce it.



·         The concepts of a “Golden Bylaw” or “internal Trust” should not be 
cast as options that advocate taking action, or developing a course of 
action, only when problems arise. Or, as you suggest, “let’s sort it out 
when it happens”.

Both models propose a delineation between ICANN and the IANA function and 
mechanisms for recourse should a negative circumstance arise. Both models 
require further extrapolation and legal advice regarding their 
applicability. But this is also true for Contract Co.

Related to this, I question why you consider it so important to have a 
standing entity that ‘owns’ the IANA functions and has the power to ‘re-let’ 
it. Is not the ability to move the function to a different operator the more 
salient point? In other words, surely the RESULT is the key and all the 
currently proposed models deliver that result.



·         At no point did I raise the issue of whether the goals of the CWG 
should be to either re-enforce or re-invent current mechanisms. We all need 
to find a solution.

Therefore, I find your categorisation of the “status quo” vs “revolution” to 
be problematic.

It is a powerful debating technique that typically draws the support of a 
majority of stakeholders that prefer continuity to change (I’ve seen enough 
Australian Federal election campaigns to recognise this!)



·         You state that the notion of “creating a point of failure with 
significant power and authority in the Internet's DNS is not one that anyone 
caring about the security and stability of the system should endorse”. 
Surely this is precisely what Contract Co would do.

We see the evolutionary path that NTIA, ICANN and the community have been 
heading down for nearly two decades as the USG originally being in control 
of the IANA function, believing that the control should transition to a 
multi-stakeholder organisation, setting up ICANN be that organisation and 
now believing the time is right to finalise the transition. And I would 
argue that the establishment of an ‘all new’ Contract Co. is a dramatic 
divergence from that evolutionary path.



In conclusion, I wanted to note that the intention of my email was to 
facilitate a debate on the alternatives that face us.

In your message, you inferred that my note may have been “misleading”, the 
points I made were “surprising and concerning”, that there was a 
“strangeness” in my assumptions, and that my email may have the “regrettable 
effect” of misrepresenting the position you advocate.

These words (along with your claims about “the status quo”) serve to 
summarily discredit proposed alternatives.



More generally,  I am observing a tone in many recent exchanges that 
suggests a defensiveness regarding the work of the CWG to-date and infers 
ulterior, disruptive motives on the part of those that raise questions.



As ever, I respect your views and your unquestioned right to express them. 
At no point have I suggested you are being disingenuous and am concerned 
that you believe I may be.

I see our exchange as part of the cut-and-thrust of an open and complex 
debate – and never anything personal, an attack on a particular entity, not 
an effort to undermine the CWG.

All along, auDA has sought to stimulate debate on a full range of options 
for the future. Although we have proposed a Trust-based model, we are not 
advocating it as our preferred solution. It is but one of a range of 
options.

We of the multi-stakeholder community will fail in our respective roles and 
responsibilities if we do not dutifully assess all possibilities.



And with that – I look forward to continuing the conversation in Singapore!



Regards,



Paul





From: Jordan Carter [mailto:jordan at internetnz.net.nz]
Sent: Friday, 6 February 2015 10:11 AM
To: Paul Szyndler
Cc: cctldworld at icann.org; ccnso-members at icann.org; 
cctldcommunity at cctld-managers.org; cwg-stewardship at icann.org
Subject: Re: Questions regarding InternetNZ's views on the IANA transition



Hi Paul, all:



Thanks for your email. This is an important discussion for our ccTLD 
community as well as for all those affected by the transition of stewardship 
away from ICANN.



In summary, for those who want the short version:



- the principles of distributed stewardship and separability are status quo 
principles that are in place today. Some seem to want to upend them in 
favour of One Big ICANN to be the steward of the DNS, and yet such people 
are claiming black is white, and that those defending the status quo are 
somehow proposing a revolution. It is the other way around.



- these principles are important to the stewardship of the DNS, not to the 
operation of ICANN per se - but they do have consequences for ICANN 
operations and structures, as set out below.



- we need to conduct this discussion in a way that is accurate, not 
misleading, and that helps the community towards a consensus rather than 
driving people apart.





Here below the longer version.





Paul, there are several surprising and concerning points made in your email, 
which Greg Shatan’s earlier reply dealt with in part.



The most significant strangeness is your assertion that distributed 
stewardship or separability are new principles.



They are not new. They are the status quo.



Today, stewardship of the DNS is distributed today: between ccTLD managers, 
gTLD managers, registrars, ICANN as a policy body, ICANN as the IANA 
Functions Operator, Verisign as the root zone maintainer, the NTIA as the 
steward of the system, Internet users as participants and more. Critical to 
these distributed roles and responsibilities is the independence of many of 
the players, and the complex web of relationships between them.



Separability exists today because the NTIA assigns the right to operate the 
IANA functions to ICANN via a contract. NTIA could assign those functions to 
another party: most easily for names, but still with teeth for the other 
IANA customers.



The question is, with NTIA stepping out of its crucial role as

a) a component of the distributed stewardship system and

b) as the core of separability, the granter of the rights to operate IANA,



What should replace it?



Our argument is the conservative one: that we should not create a Big 
Brother of Internet technical coordination by putting it all in ICANN; that 
we should retain the status quo of distributed stewardship and separability 
that we have today.



In contrast, what those critiquing the status quo seem to be proposing is a 
very significant revolution. The implicit claim in your note and in the 
arguments Chris has been advancing is that One Big ICANN is an appropriate 
outcome: that what is today distributed among many parties should be more 
concentrated in the one institution.



The CWG doesn’t agree, as Greg pointed out. I don’t agree with you. Many 
others don’t agree. The notion of creating a point of failure with 
significant power and authority in the Internet’s DNS is not one that anyone 
caring about the security and stability of the system should endorse. It’s a 
significant change to the status quo and no argument justifying this change 
has yet been advanced - other than non-arguments about convenience, or 
partially .



So in terms of the stewardship of the DNS system, that’s where the 
difference is. You want a narrowing of that responsibility to fewer players. 
I want to see it remain broad based and external to ICANN.



On operations, things are simpler I think. There’s a pretty narrow 
difference here. We seem to agree on the following points:



- ICANN is operating the IANA functions well at the moment

- There is no desire to remove IANA from ICANN at the moment

- customers should have a key role in oversight of the IANA functions

- There should be a way to remove IANA from ICANN should ICANN fail at 
operating the functions

- A decision about separating IANA from ICANN would need to meet high 
thresholds



The point of departure seems to be what vehicle allows for separation should 
it be required: an internal bylaw, an internal trust, an external trust, an 
external contract company. That’s an implementation detail in respect of the 
direct operational question, but it loops back to the broader question of 
the overall stewardship. An external-to-ICANN option is the status quo and 
is consistent with the principles we are arguing for. An internal-to-ICANN 
option is the revolution you propose, and is not consistent with those 
principles. The principles we set out relate to the transition of 
stewardship, not to ICANN’s operations.



What is represented in ICANN’s bylaws is of less interest to me because I 
don’t want it to be the One And Only steward. I want ICANN to retain its 
very limited, focused mission on coordinating global policy for a set of 
Internet identifiers and protocols. I don’t want it to massively grow its 
mission as you suggest when you say it should be concerned with “the stable 
and secure operation of the Internet.”





On the matter of a so-called “rigid separation” - it’s my view that if there 
was ever to be a need to separate the IANA functions from ICANN, it would be 
because the organisation had truly become dysfunctional. If that was the 
case, there would be a lot going on - lots of pressure on all participants 
from the ICANN community, on ICANN staff and governors, and so on.



That would be the very last time you would want to have to rally the 
community around to try and develop new institutions to take the burden away 
from ICANN. You don’t build plans for bad situations by saying “let’s sort 
it out if it happens!”.



It’s that preventive preparation concept which underpins the validity of the 
CWG’s proposal with Contract Co, or an external trust. It means that now, 
under the stability and peace of the current settlement, we put a robust 
mechanism in place should it be needed. It increases the resilience of the 
system by not leaving all the eggs in one basket. (It retains the status 
quo, in other words.)



It might be possible to blend approaches wrt an internal trust or golden 
bylaw so there is an adequate resilience here - Google made a suggestion to 
that effect with a backup operator concept in their comments to the CWG 
plan. I don’t know - I assume that’s what the CWG is working on. But it’s 
sensible to take the status quo position, which I do, without a solid case 
and proposal being made for why an alternative is better.



The argument for getting rid of the external backstop, and forcing the 
community to rely on a single institution which would be in crisis should 
this situation ever need resolving, seems to be to be inexplicable and 
dangerous.



It cannot do anything other than pose a threat to the security and stability 
of the DNS in the long run.



It assumes that ICANN can be made perfect. I don’t believe that about any 
institution. There is a reason that balances of powers and distributed 
responsibilities are common features of every constitution that governs a 
state, and of every other governance system that is able to be resilient.



[None of this deals with an earlier discussion from the last Singapore ICANN 
meeting about the desirability of the IANA department becoming, for 
instance, a wholly owned subsidiary company of ICANN, to give a clearer 
boundary between the iANA functions operator and ICANN as policy body. That 
operationally related separation seems to still be in play but I just want 
to be clear that this discussion isn’t part of it.]





On one other point: this is not a transition to the private sector.



NTIA is seeking to transition stewardship of the Internet’s DNS to the 
“global multistakeholder community” as per their comments in their release 
of 14 March 2014 and all material since. I don’t know why you think that 
translates to the “private sector” but as a ccTLD manager that blends 
technical community and civil society perspectives, I know that we in .nz 
don’t think the private sector is the destination for stewardship. I would 
be shocked if that was AUDA’s position.



Can you please clarify? Is it AUDA’s view that the stewardship of the 
Internet’s DNS should be transferred to the private sector? On the face of 
it, that would directly contradict NTIA’s requirements.





Finally: your email has the regrettable effect of portraying the orthodox, 
status quo position I am arguing for as something out of the box, novel and 
dangerous.



I ask that you avoid such characterisations in future, for two reasons.



- As set out above, they are not accurate. This discussion is hard enough 
without participants misleading each other as to the current situation.



- Such an approach makes the discussion harder to have, and reduces the 
likelihood of consensus being achievable once the discussion is over. 
Without consensus the transition will run aground.







See you soon in Singapore.



Thanks,

Jordan







On 5/02/2015, at 7:47 pm, Paul Szyndler <paul.szyndler at auda.org.au> wrote:



Hi Jordan (and all),



I wanted to follow up on a few exchanges that Jordan and Chris had over the 
last couple of weeks regarding the work of the CWG on the IANA transition.

In particular, I wanted to ask a few questions in order to get a better 
understanding of the reasons behind InternetNZ’s position and the principles 
outlined in your submission to the CWG’s consultation.



Among your key principles, there are some that I obviously wouldn’t 
question – for example, the ongoing independence and policy development 
responsibilities of ccTLD managers.

But there are a few principles upon which you base your position that don’t 
immediately appear aligned with ICANN’s core mission nor the goals of the 
NTIA’s intent to transfer the management of the DNS “to the private sector”.



As you know, the fundamental mission of ICANN is to coordinate the stable 
and secure operation of the Internet.

Supporting principles include the introduction of consumer choice and 
competition, stakeholder participation and the meaningful engagement of 
other relevant stakeholder bodies and affected parties.



But neither the ICANN Bylaws nor mission statement refer explicitly to 
Internet NZ’s proposed principles of separability and a distributed model 
for stewardship.

How then, do your proposed principles contribute to ICANN’s ongoing mission, 
and the resolution of the current transition process? Why are the principles 
of separability and distributed stewardship afforded such weight?

In particular, as a ccTLD manager, what has led you to assume and justify 
the principles of separability and distributed stewardship, when no such 
principles existed previously?



My next few questions relate to the fundamental differences of opinion we 
have exchanged regarding the future of IANA.



Even if the principle of structural separation is to be accepted, why does 
InternetNZ believe that such a significant and rigid act of separation 
(establishment of a Contract Co) is required at this stage of ICANN’s 
evolution?

Is it not equally valid to consider that the codified “ability” to separate 
in the future is an acceptable outcome?

Are models, such as a Trust, at least equally capable of delivering a 
desired result, without issues such as jurisdiction and structure, that are 
associated with establishing a Contract Co.?



I’d welcome your views – both via email and (inevitably) further discussion 
when we catch up in Singapore.



Regards,



Paul





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