[CWG-Stewardship] CWG-Stewardship Chairs' Statement - Summary of ICANN 52 Meeting

[John Poole]

I may be the only one thinking this, but it seems to me the following needs
to addressed, before proceeding further--

In late January, 2015, Larry Strickling said: "The community should proceed
as if it has only one chance to get this right. Everyone has the
responsibility to participate as they deem appropriate."

Who is the *community* Strickling is referring to? It is not just ICANN nor
just ICANN stakeholders--

".... the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) today announces its intent to transition
key Internet domain name functions to the global multistakeholder
community.  As the first step, NTIA is asking the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to convene global stakeholders to
develop a proposal to *transition the current role played by NTIA* in the
coordination of the Internet’s domain name system (DNS)...." (NTIA, March,
2014)

The global multistakeholder community is broader than just ICANN or the
so-called ICANN community. Both ICANN and the US Department of Commerce
acknowledge this in the Affirmation of Commitments
<https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/affirmation-of-commitments-2009-09-30-en>
:

"... ICANN and DOC recognize that there is a group of participants that
engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent than Internet users
generally. To ensure that its decisions are in the public interest, and not
just the interests of a particular set of stakeholders, ICANN commits to...
"

Subsequent to the March, 2014, announcement, at the request of the NTIA,
ICANN convened a process led by, and comprised mostly of, ICANN
stakeholders, but nominally open to participation by other members of the
global multistakeholder community. Prior to ICANN 52, this CWG had 2
external models and 2 internal models under consideration, and was awaiting
procurement of independent legal counsel advice in order to proceed with
its work. Then ICANN 52 happened. I was not there personally, but I
attended remotely online via Adobe Connect and also followed the #ICANN52
Twitter feed. What I read and heard was disconcerting--to name but a few
examples:

a) At a Registry Stakeholders Group meeting (co-Chair Jonathan Robinson was
present), it was said by a CWG-stewardship member that external models were
"off the table" and referred to statements of Larry Strickling/NTIA at
ICANN 52.
b) Jordan Carter
<https://twitter.com/jordantcarter/status/564718002214432768>
@jordantcarter: "Pretty surprised at the intensity of #USG and #ICANN
pressure at #ICANN52 regarding an "Internal to ICANN" solution to #NTIA
stewardship."
c) Milton Mueller
<https://twitter.com/miltonmueller/status/564718886562459649>
@miltonmueller: "The US Commerce Dept is overplaying its hand in Singapore
#ICANN52. If its up to the ms community, leave us alone, stop tipping the
scales"

Therefore I can only conclude that notwithstanding the public announcements
and statements of NTIA and Larry Strickling, the US Government/Dept of
Commerce/NTIA (perhaps joined in by others within ICANN) are now trying to
control or manipulate, inappropriately, the outcomes of the CWG-Stewardship
work. Larry Strickling and his ilk do not intimidate me--I have already
addressed reports of his and other NTIA personnel inappropriate conduct in
Singapore, with my US Congressman and US Senators--House and Senate
Hearings are being planned after the current recess.

At the same time, positive and supportive feedback was given at ICANN 52
for the CWG-Stewardship work and process thus far:
Jordan Carter @jordantcarter · Feb 9 -"Impressed by the dedication,
experience and skill of the #CWG team developing the names transition for
#IANA stewardship. #ICANN52"
Mathieu Weill @mathieuweill · Feb 9 - "I called #icann Board members to act
as leaders #ianatransition : support volunteers, be clear on assessment
criteria, dont get to details."

Therefore, I request the Co-Chairs to assure this CWG that notwithstanding
inappropriate "pressure" at ICANN 52, our work can continue as before, that
neither external nor internal models are "off the table." If however, it is
the judgment of the Co-Chairs, or this CWG as a whole, that this is now a
top-down process being directed or manipulated from within NTIA or ICANN,
then I request the Co-Chairs to so inform all CWG-Stewardship
members/participants so we can end the charade--I am sure most of us have
better things to do.

External Trust Model proposed change:
All of the above said, I attended remotely more ICANN 52 sessions than
probably anyone could have who was in Singapore. I listened closely to all
of the comments made in public sessions dealing with the CWG-Stewardship
work. I heard Jonathan Robinson give so many presentations of the
CWG-Stewardship work at ICANN 52 that I thought maybe he had changed his
name to Johnny Icann :-) .  Based on all of the comments made, I propose
amending (and simplifying) the External Trust Model by providing (1)
MRT/CSC and IAP functions (if deemed still necessary), be moved "internal
to ICANN" by simply making them requirements/terms of the IANA functions
operator contract; (2) that the Trust property include the IP referenced by
the IETF proposal
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-09> ("iana.org"
and other associated marks), as well as the Internet "authoritative root
server" referenced in: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/og00033r.pdf, in
addition to all of the U.S. Government’s rights and duties included within
its “stewardship” role over the Internet and DNS, including the right to
issue the IANA Functions Contract, and its related IP--e.g., InterNIC, a
registered service mark of the U.S. Department of Commerce, licensed to the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. To reiterate, the
purpose of the Trust/Trustees is to be the "lightweight" high-level,
external contractual counter-party, ensuring a free, open, stable and
secure internet in accordance with NETmundial Statement principles and the
Affirmation of Commitments, all of which would be referenced and
incorporated within the Trust instrument, enforceable by the Court where
the Trust is registered; Trustees also accountable to/selected
by/representative of the global multi-stakeholder community. The
Trust/Trustees would have no operational role in the operation of the IANA
functions or Internet Root Zone.

In reality, the IANA contract is not going anywhere--ICANN is and will
continue to be the IANA functions operator under a long-term contract but
for insolvency, bankruptcy, or material breach such as failing to perform
the IANA functions as provided by the contract, in which event the Trustees
would be empowered to select a successor to ICANN in accordance with the
terms of the Trust instrument. The NTIA's procedural role of approving
changes to the authoritative root zone file is either not needed or could
be performed by ICANN itself, the Root Zone Maintainer, or a 3rd party
audit firm. The External Trust Model provides a minimal, but necessary,
safeguard of external accountability in place of US government oversight.

I would also note that it appears CCWG-Accountability has a lot of work to
do--I am glad that is not our job--I wish them well.

A final note: I am personally perplexed by proposals which discuss
separating IANA from ICANN. All of ICANN's authority is derivative of its
role as the IANA functions operator--including ICANN's authority to
authorize new gTLDs. While the day-to-day operation of the IANA department
should be separate internally from the policy-making functions of ICANN, if
you strip IANA from ICANN, ICANN is powerless. If I am wrong, I would like
to see some authority in support thereof.

Best regards,
John Poole
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/cwg-stewardship/attachments/20150218/ab6d4cfb/attachment-0001.html>