[CWG-Stewardship] Update on the Integrated model.

[Avri Doria]

Hi,

In answer to the questions:

First on Nomcom.  This model rest on a notion of subsidiarity acccording
to operational community; if a nomcom were used it should be the nomcom
of the operational community.  The idea of creating a new nomcom that
was 3 operational communities wide scares me more than the creation of
the Contracting Co. would - then again I once chaired a WG that rewrote
the rules for a single operational community Nomcom.  I share some of
the concerns Chuck mentioned.  I also worry that if a 3 community nomcom
were established, it would be uncertan who they were accountable to and
who their appointees were accountable to.  That shared Board Community
shared accountability is one of the important accountabilty anchors in
the model.  I have seen in the ICANN results an uncertainty at times of
whom Nomcom Appointees were accountable to.

In terms of the question about a different formulation of the ICANN
subsidiary configuration.  Sure, as I mentioned in a email to Chuck
earlier this is one option, ICANN can remain the contractor for the
protocols and numbers if necessary and just use the subsidiary to do the
work.   While I think that this can work, the accountability anchor,
while as strong as any internal model, would not be as strong as if the
SLA were moved to the  Post Transition IANA (PTI).  I think it is
worthwhile as a fall back positon if the model gets some degree of
traction in the CWG.    I guess I would prefer to see a higher degree of
particpation offered and to have the ICG pass on a request to consider
the invitation to share a greater degree of IANA responsibility and
accountability.   But if the more modest configuration was needed, it
could work.

In terms of the Community Board, I do not think of this Board as doing
that much more than the NTIA, except maybe the part where they oversee
IANA as a business and make sure it has sustainable financing from the
parent company(ies).  Perhaps this could be done as a independent board
(though I am not sure such really exists). As we see now with the
Congress, the NTIA does have its own accountability issues that control
its activities, so I hardly think of it as an the equivalent of an
independent board.  NTIA is a component in a system of check and
balances. I think the Community Board needs to do that as well for this
model to work.  If the ICANN CWG can decides to take an Integrated model
further, I would like to see the offer extended to the operational
communuites to share the stewardship of IANA.  I think it would have
been hard for the IETF or CRISP to come up with their own Integratede 
model where they grabbed partial control of IANA from within ICANN.  I
think that if we can produce an Integrated model that allows us to
invite them to do so, they might just give it serious consideration.

avri

On 22-Feb-15 10:44, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 02:06:08PM +0000, Gomes, Chuck wrote:
>
>>  One concern I have about your proposed variation is the use of a
>> NomCom like approach.  The NomCom as it is configured today is made
>> up of people who are selected by the multi-stakeholder community but
>> once they are selected they are really not accountability to the
>> groups that select them.  They are presumably accountable to the
>> public interest but that is an ill-defined concept that means
>> different things to different people and I am not sure that will
>> ever change and maybe it shouldn't except with regard to the issues
>> of security and stability, which I think there is broad agreement.
> I probably don't fully understand the worry here, but before I start I
> should note that this was sort of a throw-away.  The real point I was
> trying to make is that the proposal as circulated is partly gated on
> getting the RIRs and IETF to appoint people to a newly-created board,
> on hammering out agreements (across three organizations) about how to
> structure that board, and maybe even on working out new legal
> agreements and so on.  I am not convinced this will be easy.  So, I
> was suggesting that, by using the straight subsidiary approach we
> might be able to skirt all those problems, and I said "nomcom" becuase
> it's a mechanism we're all at least somewhat familiar with.  (Note
> that it needn't be the same nomcom as is used to build the ICANN
> board.  These two boards ought to have different functions.)
>
> Anyway, your worry suggests that the point of the PTI board is to
> represent the various groups.  I suppose that's one approach, but
> another is to decide that the PTI board is just a board of PTI, and
> that representativity is not that important.  This might be a
> practical answer if the IANA's remit is conceived narrowly enough.  On
> the other hand, if various groups think that representativity is
> important enough, maybe the right thing to do is direct appointment
> from all the ICANN stakeholder communities, with right of recall.  I
> wouldn't be opposed to that, _provided that_ the IANA board was
> clearly disempowered to be used as an appeals mechanism for policy
> disputes.  That is, the PTI could function the way NTIA officially
> does in asking, "Did the ICANN process follow its own rules?"  It
> should _not_ be permitted to try to re-examine the policy
> considerations that went into a decision.  This is exactly the way the
> IANA works now.  In my opinion, completely independent board
> appointments that cannot be recalled are actually more likely to
> ensure that sort of behaviour, but I can imagine an argument for the
> opposite conclusion.
>
> Best regards,
>
> A
>

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/cwg-stewardship/attachments/20150222/c294f1c2/attachment.html>