[CWG-Stewardship] update on DT X Separation Process
Avri Doria
avri at acm.org
Fri May 15 09:00:53 UTC 2015
Hi,
I guess I am arguing that we should not be deciding at this point what
possible resolutions should be excluded that may be needed at some
improbable day in the future. The list of 5 goes from no action to
nuclear. For example, I am surprised that no one is arguing against the
no action option. One could argue that if the SR is invoked, taking no
action would be inappropriate. But I expect I could spin a scenario
where that was appropriate. For example:
Scenario: (again_/*total speculation*/_) The PTI board decides to
implement a new IETF protocol that would cost the Registries a bunch of
capital to implement. This would hurt profits for 2 quarters. A
registry dominated CSC and initiation process decides that it wants to
stop the PTI from implementing this protocol and invokes the SR. A full
community SR panel, simlar to the CWG or the ICG, invstigates the issue
and decides that the implementation of the new protocol is warranted and
takes no action against the PTI.
Very unlikely, I know. but possible nonetheless.
In any case, it is a list of possibilities, and I believe option 5
relates to a possible scenario, one where the PTI is competent and
trying to do its job, but the linkage to ICANN is too close, corrupting
and better dissolved.
avri
On 15-May-15 10:00, Martin Boyle wrote:
> On the fifth separation mechanism, I really wonder why we might think it appropriate to separate the IANA affiliate. This is one of many reasons why I am concerned about getting the accountability structure right: clear and simple so it is always possible to know where to fix the system.
>
> If PTI is failing *and* ICANN as the "parent" is not able to sort it out, in what way is giving the PTI added freedom a solution?
>
> There are many things that might happen that could make it worthwhile to capture the PTI - including accumulation of cash or establishing a new regime for controlling the root. Allowing a severance mechanism would then support and complete this and remove the IANA functions operator from any of the established accountability mechanisms, wouldn't it?
>
> The fifth mechanism *might* have a use, but I'd like to know what we see these to be and clearly define this. It has to be the exception.
>
> MB
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Avri Doria
> Sent: 15 May 2015 00:27
> To: cwg-stewardship at icann.org
> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] update on DT X Separation Process
>
> hi,
>
> On 14-May-15 23:17, Gomes, Chuck wrote:
>> Avri,
>>
>> Why would the recommendations of this review need to be approved by the ICANN board?
> That is one of the questions asked?
> Most reviews are approved by the Board before they have further action.
> Isn't it part of the check and balances. And if they don't agree isn't that why we have the various redress mechanisms?
>
>> The fifth possible separation mechanism is " Initiate full separation of the IANA affiliate". Does this mean separation of PTI from ICANN?
> Yes. one of the option in the various models we discussed was an independent free standing PTI depending on the circumstances, this might an option those responsible at the time might want to consider.
> As I said in the meeting today, I think the point is avoid presaging the type of decision they might need to take.
>
> avri
>
>
>> Chuck
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org
>> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Avri Doria
>> Sent: Monday, May 11, 2015 6:19 PM
>> To: cwg-stewardship at icann.org
>> Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] update on DT X Separation Process
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> I did an update on the file.
>> <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1WvBqtgXJ7rNrbN-5Tjf5-gi80aZ2oRYDt
>> F_JLrETRqg/edit?usp=sharing> and attached a pdf version to this note.
>>
>> * Received some comments which I tried to include
>> * Responded to Sibley comments, I think
>> * Largely separated the process from who does it
>> * left bracketed text on the sticky decisions, which include:
>> o who dies it:
>> + [A cross community of the SOAC would be formed, The IFR
>> would be designated]
>> o how it is initiated:
>> + on the recommendation of the IANA Review Function as
>> approved by [Board, SOAC, members council], or in the case
>> of Board rejection via escalation procedure.
>> + on supermajority recommendation of both GNSO & ccNSO
>> + on recommendation of 1 SO and 2 ACs
>> o method of operation
>> + The Separation Review would be either a(decision to be made
>> by CWG)
>> #
>>
>> A process initiated in the IFR
>>
>> #
>>
>> Function as a Cross Community Working Group and would
>> follow established guidelines for multistakeholder cross
>> community working groups. In this case the participants
>> would be either (decision to be made by CWG):
>>
>> 1.
>>
>> Each of the AC/SO would appoint 5 people to the
>> Separation Review.
>>
>> 2. Alternatively: Use the ICG community inclusion and
>> proportions to include the broader community as this
>> will affect the entire community.
>>
>>
>> Unfortunately I have another commitment during tomorrow's meeting so will miss the middle hour, but I do think this is something that the group needs to figure out at some point in the near future.
>>
>> avri
>>
>> o
>>
>>
>>
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