[CWG-Stewardship] Input Needed: Bylaws Matrix Responses and Three Issues

[Cheryl Langdon-Orr]

Grace thank you for this... Sorry for a slight delay in reply, please see
my responses inter-spaces below...* <CLO> *


*Cheryl Langdon-O**rr ...  *(CLO)

about.me/cheryl.LangdonOrr
[image: Cheryl Langdon-Orr on about.me]
  <http://about.me/cheryl.LangdonOrr>


On 26 February 2016 at 04:41, Grace Abuhamad <grace.abuhamad at icann.org>
wrote:

> Dear CWG-Stewardship and ICANN Implementation Team,
>
> Please see attached the latest version of the responses to the Sidley
> Bylaws Matrix as well as a list of three currently unresolved issues for
> CWG-Stewardship input (also copied below for your convenience). The action
> assigned on the CWG-Stewardship call today was to share these documents
> with the group, and simultaneously with the ICANN implementation team for
> any input they may have.
>
> On the CWG-Stewardship call today, we outlined the three issues and had an
> initial, but non-conclusive, discussion about them. On the thresholds
> issue, Donna Austin suggests we go with current practices, i.e. simple
> majority, since Charter amendments will go a public comment process prior
> to approval by the ccNSO and GNSO. Paul Kane agrees.
>
> Looking forward to your input,
> Grace
>
> A recap of the three issues presented on call (also in document attached):
>
> There are three issues for the CWG-Stewardship to address:
>
>
>
> *Issue #1: Thresholds*
>
>
>
> For the CSC Charter, the CCNSO and GNSO Councils must approve amendments.
> The DT leads noted that the intention is that the respective Councils
> (ccNSO and GNSO) would vote to ratify any proposed charter amendment/s and
> the threshold would be in accordance with their respective methods of
> operation. However, the current responses further suggest that,
> “supermajority of both Councils would seem appropriate if this can be
> accommodated.”
>
>
>
> Staff would like to note that supermajority may not be consistent with
> current practice in the GNSO and CCNSO Councils. In the case of the GNSO,
> the default voting threshold is simple majority of each house. Should a
> supermajority vote be deemed appropriate for this purpose, the relevant
> section in the ICANN bylaws that details voting thresholds that differ from
> simple majority, would need to be updated.
>
>
>
> Does the CWG want to define a higher threshold for the CCNSO and GNSO
> councils or proceed with existing operating procedures within the Councils?
>
​
* ​​<CLO> ​ I  would suggest going with the existing OP's within the
Councils...​*
​


>
>
>
>
> *Issue #2: Timing of the first IANA Function Review*
>
>
>
> Paragraph (194) of the CWG Final Proposal provides that the IFR “will not
> commence” until two years after this date, but Paragraph (301) provides
> that the initial IFR must be completed by this 2-year anniversary
>
>
>
> Current response: Paragraph 301 being focused on the IFR while Paragraph
> 194 being a timetable makes Paragraph 301 the determining one. However,
> Paragraphs 267/268 seem to confirm the ambiguity. Separately, Paragraph 194
> does allow, however for a Special IFR sooner than 2 years if needed.
>
>
>
> CWG needs to choose:
>
> 1.    The first IFR will not commence until two years after the
> Transition
>
> 2.    The first IFR will be completed by the 2-year anniversary of the
> Transition
>
​
​​

​
*​<CLO> ​ I rather like the text proposed by Martin => *
​
“will commence not later than two years after the Transition”
​​
​


>
>
>
>
> *Issue #3: Use of the Empowered Community mechanisms for the Special IFR*
>
>
>
> The CWG needs to consider specifying a forum and process for the Special
> IFR. Paragraphs (125) and (303) of the CWG Final Proposal provide that
> consideration of whether to trigger a Special IFR “may” include a public
> comment period but is silent on who determines whether there should be a
> public comment period.
>
>
>
> If the CWG-Stewardship adopts the Empowered Community mechanism of the
> CCWG-Accountability, then the process for escalation includes a discussion
> forum. Would that be sufficient? If not, the CWG-Stewardship could mandate
> a standard ICANN public comment period before triggering a Special IFR.
>
​

​
​

​
*​<CLO> ​ In my view it would be best for most circumstances ( and provide
a higher degree of understanding  and predictability within the wider ICANN
Community if the CWG-Stewardship adopts the Empowered Community Mechanism
of the CCWG-Accountability, but again I am rather leaning towards also
picking up in the flexibility allowed by Martin's proposed text => *
​
​   ​
​" ...​
allow the RySG and/or ccNSO to launch a consultation process leading to a
review
​...​
"​
​


>
>
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>
>
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