[gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Apologies, and some reflections on requirements
Volker Greimann
vgreimann at key-systems.net
Tue Jul 5 09:08:39 UTC 2016
Ultimately, everyone accessing the internet can be identified at the
level of the access provider. The domain name is probably the most
useless point to identify a user, as the domain name registrant may not
even have to do anything with a specific use.
Best,
Volker
Am 04.07.2016 um 19:25 schrieb Stephanie Perrin:
>
> One point here, and it is not a big one. I don't accept that accuracy
> is a sine qua non (see para 5). Contactability is, I think it ends
> there. Excessive focus on accuracy of data, when that data is not
> necessary any more is a cost and consumer burden, not to mention an
> invasion of privacy. (eg. if I have changed my mastercard number but
> my registration is paid for two years, no need to change it in the
> record)
>
> I did not comment earlier on Volker's remark that responsibility for
> accuracy of data rests with the registrant, but I agree whole
> heartedly. How can it be otherwise? Some parties would like to
> authenticate every individual and every transaction on the INternet,
> and see the registrars as the entry point and therefore the logical
> ones to bear this (enormous) burden. This is unnecessary and will
> price domains out of the range of individuals who can benefit most
> from their own place on the Internet, in my view. It would hardly be
> appropriate for the policy person to point out that in any
> authentication scheme, identifying the individual in the first place
> (prior to tying that individual to some identifier) is a big, costly
> and complex matter that has slowed down many an implementation of
> secure transactions. We need to limit our attempts to identify
> individuals to only what is necessary.
>
>
> Stephanie Perrin
> PS I wish I had taken better notes on the whole thick/thin whois issue
> during EWG. Since it took me a good while to figure out how this
> thing had developed in the first place, (and many thanks to my EWG
> colleagues who patiently explained it to me over and over again) I may
> have missed an invitation to throw it out and discuss it again from
> scratch.....but I doubt it. Anyway, we were already talking about
> tiered access by then and different configurations of the model which
> would make it much less relevant.
> On 2016-07-04 12:22, Carlton Samuels wrote:
>> Coming to this conversation late but as a member of the EWG, my
>> recollection is we took seriously the stated objective to chart a
>> next generation RDDS unfettered by existing WHOIS constraints.
>>
>> To that end, I was one of those who insisted and the group accepted
>> and grappled with the basic question; was there a need for a RDDS
>> and, to what purpose. For those mindful of the ALAC perspective, this
>> would not be new; the ALAC is on record from as early as 2009
>> insisting that for policy development purposes, the need and purpose
>> for a RDDS ought, by reason and judgment, to be the first declarative
>> act of any policy development process. You would have seen a reprise
>> of that principle here.
>>
>> We were acutely aware that some principles we espoused are contrary
>> by nature - privacy vs. security, transparency vs. confidentiality
>> and so on - and that balancing the scale between contention sets of
>> principles was not going to be for the faint-hearted. Some time ago I
>> used a metaphor to describe what was achieved; we set out to design
>> and build a sleek racehorse but with the contentions, likely ended up
>> with a two-humped camel. Naturally, some took umbrage on behalf of
>> camels.
>>
>> My recollection - and the record will show - the EWG spent an
>> inordinate amount of time looking at use cases, the thinking being it
>> would allow extraction of a set of principles grounded in facts on
>> the ground. Yes, some of us had concerns about this as starting
>> point to get to principles; use cases conflated both appropriate and
>> alleged inappropriate uses, highlighting some of the alleged noisome
>> abuses. Some of us soldiered on , embracing the idea that a
>> comprehensive problem statement provides the best indicator to an
>> improved model. This is why the gripes of current stakeholders, the
>> expert opinions and deeper knowledge of what ails the current system
>> took so much time of our deliberations.
>> The mitigation model that emerged is fairly easy to script. I cannot
>> recall any contest to the idea that data accuracy is sine qua non for
>> any RDDS. Yes, we are very much aware of the distributed nature of
>> current WHOIS and even examined a model so configured in the solution
>> set we discussed. Again, balancing the contentions, the centralized
>> database offers certain advantages - and these are listed in details
>> - at least for standard enforcement, query and access control. The
>> concept of a minimum set of RDDS data elements for global unfettered
>> display stems from privacy concerns and, coincidentally, a nod to the
>> 'thin' model. Gated access in the model addressed the concerns from
>> the perspective of a broader set of business reasons for RDDS access,
>> privacy and the evaluation of and better knowledge of purposeful use.
>>
>> I could give a lot more examples that underscore a different
>> narrative. Not just because I spent almost 2 years of my life
>> working this on a truly voluntary basis - I do not make a living from
>> the ecosystem and my day job has no connection to it - but for the
>> fact I sincerely believe that what was achieved was remarkable in and
>> of itself.
>>
>> -Carlton
>>
>>
>> ==============================
>> Carlton A Samuels
>> Mobile: 876-818-1799
>> /Strategy, Planning, Governance, Assessment & Turnaround/
>> =============================
>>
>> On Wed, Jun 29, 2016 at 8:04 PM, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes at verisign.com
>> <mailto:cgomes at verisign.com>> wrote:
>>
>> Andrew,
>>
>> I am sorry to take so long to respond to your very thoughtful
>> message but as you know I have been pretty busy here in
>> Helsinki. It seems to me personally that you make some
>> suggestions that could possibly be constructive to the work ahead
>> but I have two primary concerns:
>>
>> 1. I am pretty sure that it would require a charter change. To
>> do that would require going back to the GNSO Council with the
>> proposed changes and seeking their approval. That is something
>> that is not out of the question but it could cause some delays
>> and I would want to make sure that there is strong WG support for
>> doing so. Also, I think we need to remember that a lot of very
>> smart people spent quite a bit of time developing the framework
>> that resulted in the charter so I think we should consider
>> possible changes with that in mind.
>>
>> 2. My understanding is that EWG debated things like you are
>> suggesting quite intensely. As you know I was not a member of
>> the EWG but Lisa has provided some thoughts about that I include
>> below.
>>
>> " It might be useful to reflect upon the EWG's experience with
>> system modeling. After starting with use cases, some EWG members
>> needed a system model against which to test principles on
>> purposes, data needs, and associated privacy, access, and
>> accuracy issues. This led to the EWG's Initial Report proposing
>> both a set of principles and an Aggregated RDS system model to
>> support those principles - but without much explanation of the
>> ARDS. Over the year that followed, the EWG evaluated half a dozen
>> system models, drilling deeper into two (Federated and
>> Synchronized) to examine feasibility and costs before
>> recommending the SRDS. Both SRDS and FRDS models use RDAP;
>> neither stores data in a single physical location. While the SRDS
>> is a "thick" storage model where queries are served from
>> synchronized data, the runner-up FRDS actually uses "thin"
>> registries, querying data from registrars and validators in
>> real-time.
>>
>> "While some possible requirements may reflect a particular system
>> model - for example, those drawn from today's WHOIS policies --
>> our PDP WG has yet to consider whether to recommend a next-gen
>> system. But no matter what model we recommend, perhaps we can
>> learn from the EWG's experience. First, while envisioning a
>> possible new model early on was helpful to some, reaching
>> agreement on a recommended model was not possible until the EWG
>> was nearly finished, following feasibility and cost analysis.
>> Second, while each had pros/cons, both models were found to be
>> capable of supporting the EWG's principles. In other words, model
>> choice did not drive the EWG's principles - principles and
>> criteria such as cost drove the EWG's choice of model."
>>
>> I want to add to Lisa's thoughts my own personal opinion: I don't
>> think the issue of Federated v. Synchronized is a closed issue.
>> My understanding is that the final recommendation in the EWG
>> report could have been more the result of the desire to finish
>> the work than a strong consensus. Whether I am right on that or
>> not, our WG can consider both and make our own decision between
>> either one or some variation.
>>
>> Finally, I want to encourage all WG members to share your
>> thoughts on Andrews comments and on my responses above.
>>
>> Chuck
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org
>> <mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org>
>> [mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org
>> <mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org>] On Behalf Of Andrew
>> Sullivan
>> Sent: Friday, June 24, 2016 10:04 PM
>> To: gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org <mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org>
>> Subject: [gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Apologies, and some reflections on
>> requirements
>>
>> Dear colleagues,
>>
>> Apologies first. I'm not going to be in Helsinki. I'm in the
>> middle of a move from NH back to Toronto, and it turns out that
>> my movers'
>> understanding of, "I need to leave on $date," entails arranging
>> things such that goods will arrive after $date. Alas, in this
>> case the goods arrive Monday. I will attempt to follow the ICANN
>> meetings remotely next week, but I expect it will be tricky.
>>
>> I have been deeply dissatisfied with the way the work is going,
>> and I believe it is because I see a mismatch in what we are
>> trying to do and the kind of system we are trying to do it to.
>> In particular, I think we are trying to treat the RDS as a single
>> monolithic system, and attempting to build "requirements" that
>> match that assumption. Here is an effort to sketch why I think
>> that. I didn't have time to write a short note, &c. &c. Sorry
>> this is long.
>>
>> Since the very introduction of the competitive-registrar model
>> (and arguably before that), the RDS has been a distributed
>> database. It is far less successful than the other distrubuted
>> database we all know and love -- DNS -- but it is nevertheless
>> distributed.
>>
>> The distribution comes from different parties having various
>> parts of the data. In so-called "thin" registries, this was
>> always the case.
>> The registry has names and nameservers, and since the invention
>> of registrars knows who the registrar is. But if you wanted to
>> know certain kinds of data, you had to ask the registrar in question.
>>
>> Because in (say) 1999-2001 nobody had anything better than the
>> whois/rwhois/whois++ protocol(s) to deliver this kind of data, a
>> whole bunch of bad compromises got enshrined in policy. First,
>> we continued to use whois and its descendents (anything on port
>> 43) as the model for all of this. The plain fact is that whois
>> was obsolete nearly at birth. It's a terrible protocol, and
>> should be taken behind the ice house and put out of its misery.
>>
>> Second, in order to "fix up" whois, clients were created all over
>> the Internet that built in a bunch of assumptions about whom to
>> ask for what data. The consequence of this was that clients
>> routinely got bad data as they queried the wrong server. Old
>> registrar data hung around even after a transfer. When I worked
>> on the org transition from Verisign to PIR in 2003 (?), it took a
>> long time before whois clients stopped asking Verisign about org
>> data. And so on.
>>
>> Third, in an attempt to hack around the above technical flaws in
>> an already-obsolete protocol, "thick whois" gained popularity in
>> possibly the worst possible arrangement known to data science.
>> Instead of insisting that registries hold the data and that
>> registrars and everyone else treat the registry data as The
>> Truth, we created "thick"
>> whois in registries _without allowing registrars to stop their
>> service_. Any half-competent database person will tell you that
>> storing "the same data" in two places that don't have tight
>> connections is an excellent way to create data inconsistency, but
>> is not a good way to arrive at the truth. (Latterly, as though
>> illustrating the tendency of people to double down on bad ideas,
>> there have been suggestions that ICANN should run the One Giant
>> RDS of the Universe and hold all the data in a central place.
>> What could possibly go wrong?)
>>
>> The thread running through this history of error is the idea that
>> the RDS is one system. But like the DNS, it only appears to be
>> one system. It's actually a "distributed database", where in
>> this case the distribution is separable on organization lines.
>> That is, registries -- including ICANN, who can be thought of in
>> this case as both the registry and registrar for the root zone --
>> have some data.
>> Registrars have some other data. Resellers and privacy/proxy
>> services have yet other data. In many cases, the data does not
>> need to be shared across these organizational lines to make it
>> queryable by humans.
>>
>> The reason that isn't clear to most of us is because whois -- the
>> RDS we use today -- _was_ designed as a monolithic system. It
>> was designed that way because back when it was created -- RFC 812
>> is from _1982_! -- the database _was_ a monolithic database.
>> Whois (the protocol and the client program) continues to have all
>> the deficiencies for distributed use that you might expect of a
>> program or protocol designed to talk to exactly one authoritative
>> service.
>> Whois++ and rwhois attempted to graft on to this basic protocol some
>> distributed operation, but the graft didn't really take and the
>> ornamental shrub now looks like a weed.
>>
>> People have nevertheless internalized the whois-based thinking,
>> which is why we keep asking things like, "What data should be
>> collected?"
>> In a distributed system like this, that's barely interesting, for
>> the commercial interests in this case all militate against
>> collecting data that nobody needs for any function. Instead, we
>> should ask what data should be collected _by different actors_.
>> This implicitly involves describing what those actors are doing
>> to require the data.
>>
>> The nice thing, of course, is that protocol designers have done
>> _a lot_ of this work for us, when they were working on RDAP.
>> They did this because they were trying to come up with use cases
>> for the protocol, which finally did away with the
>> monolithic-system thinking of whois and offers us a protocol
>> designed precisely to work in the distributed-database
>> environment that is the actual registration system. That we even
>> still have a work step that involves evaluating what protocol
>> we're going to use for all this makes me a little ill.
>>
>> It seems to me that we can just say that we have to embrace the
>> distributed-database fact. For first, it's a fact of how
>> registration actually works now. If we don't agree with that, I
>> think we should give up. Second, it's consistent with how every
>> single other thing on the Internet that has not crashed and
>> burned works. The Internet cannot scale depending on monolithic
>> systems. And nobody has the power to impose one anyway.
>>
>> Once we have done that, there are still important policy issues
>> about what data ought to be collected by anyone, under what
>> conditions they might reveal it to someone else (and who that
>> someone else is), and so on. But there are empirical tests for
>> whether some of the answers people are proposing really match the
>> distributed nature of the system. If they don't, we can close
>> off those avenues of inquiry, because they'll never be productive.
>>
>> Best regards,
>>
>> A
>>
>>
>> --
>> Andrew Sullivan
>> ajs at anvilwalrusden.com <mailto:ajs at anvilwalrusden.com>
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