[gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Contactability

[allison nixon]

Hi volker, as far as i can tell, your cooperation is not required. You are
simply being notified of crime, and your effectiveness at cleaning up that
crime(for whatever the root cause was) affects your company's reputation.
Companies who refuse to cooperate simply get added to more lists.

blocklists function just fine without your cooperation.

As far as I know, a lot of spamhaus and other spam fighters get data from
spamtrap email addresses, who no real person can ever send mail to, and
those identities must remain secret- which includes the recipient email
address and any mail contents that include tracking. Sharing that data will
ruin the quality of the feeds, especially if the registrar themselves are
in on the criminal scheme, which happens too much. I don't even get that
data from my spam fighting colleagues. You certainly wouldn't. It's not
something you're entitled to, and it's not something they are obligated to
give.

I also have to note the irony here that a lawyer is accusing another
company of being criminals due to their "egregious" act of informing you
that your networks are being used for crime, and to please stop it. This is
something that I would expect coming from the mouth of Sven Olaf Kamphuis,
not a lawyer at a reputable company who is highly concerned with following
laws such as GDPR.



On Nov 30, 2017 10:04 AM, "Volker Greimann" <vgreimann at key-systems.net>
wrote:

> Hi Allison,
>
> I'd be happy to discuss our abuse handling procedures (off-list), but
> suffice it to say that any complaint must be accompanied by appropriate
> evidence that will allow us to make a determination. When someone engaged
> in fighting abuse is unwilling to provide the necessary data elements that
> will allow us to make that determination, that is suspicious to say the
> least. When you request cooperation, you must be willing to do the same.
>
> Again, we cannot simply willy-nilly take action on someones' say-so. We
> need evidence that will allow us to defend our decision to take action if
> we are challenged on that call.
>
> We have seen complaints where:
>
> a) the complaint is based solely on the mention of a domain in the "From"
> field
> b) the domain name sending the spam message is not registered through us,
> but the domain name used as a name-server for that domain is
> c) it clearly is an issue of a hacked CMS
> d) the recipient had previously opted in to receive such messages and the
> alleged spammer was able to demonstrate that
>
> and many other examples, all from well-known spam fighters or through
> their reporting engines.
>
> If you do not trust us with the data we need to make a determination, we
> will not get this issue resolved.
>
> Now, back to whois!
>
> Volker
>
> Am 30.11.2017 um 15:48 schrieb allison nixon:
>
> See this is another example of the attitude I'm describing. If you're
> going to hold the requirement for evidence so high that you're requesting
> details that they are not willing to hand over (probably the identities of
> their email addresses that received the spam, or something like that,
> right? Or a large volume of evidence that would tie up their time
> procuring?), then you aren't going to get what you want. Your company is
> just another registrar in a vast ocean of registrars that get complaints,
> and none of us have time to spend on any of them. Registrars are not
> trusted by default, either.
>
> You can classify that as blackhat behavior if you want, but where is the
> extortion? They seem to be only requesting that you reduce the volume of
> lawbreaking customers that pay you money for the opportunity. Find me a
> judge that won't sympathize with that. The spammers haven't been able to,
> in all their lawsuits filed against spamhaus.
>
> There is also the credibility issue. From the perspective of a network
> operator, when they see a conflict between spamhaus saying something is
> spam, and a registrar saying they wont do anything about it because the
> spam email doesnt literally pass through their nameservers(of course it
> wouldn't), spamhaus has far more credibility than anything your company
> says. You've already lost in the court of public opinion, which is the only
> one that matters in this situation. Your domains won't get unblocked.
>
> You can complain about blackhat activity till the cows come home but you
> won't find a judge in the civilized world that will side with you. And if
> whois goes away, you may find that spamhaus's opinions of your domains are
> going to affect you even more.
>
> Further verbal assaults against spamhaus only make your company look like
> a spam friendly organization in the eyes of network operators. It won't get
> you unblocked and will probably only make the situation worse.
>
>
>
> On Thu, Nov 30, 2017 at 4:39 AM, Volker Greimann <
> vgreimann at key-systems.net> wrote:
>
>> I can just re-iterate that any responsible registrar will take action
>> when provided with actionable evidence of abuse by their customers. Reports
>> by black-hats like Spamhouse that usually only make unsubstantiated claims
>> and refuse to provide actual evidence and instead rely on threats like the
>> ones you are making do not deserve the same consideration. We will take any
>> of their reports and if they can be independently verified, we will take
>> action, but we cannot take their word as gospel.
>>
>> The usual communication with them goes something like this:
>>
>> Them: "This domain is bad and you should feel bad for having registered
>> it."
>>
>> Us: "Well, we cannot check that ourselves since the abuse does not pass
>> our servers! Can you provide evidence?"
>>
>> Them: "Here is the link to the evidence!"
>>
>> Us: "That is not evidence, those are claims.  Can you show us these
>> claims are true?"
>>
>> Them: "We do not share our methodologies."
>>
>> Us: "As we cannot confirm the complaint and have seen no evidence that we
>> can verify, so I am afraid we cannot help you until you do give us
>> something more substantial"
>>
>> Them: "If you do not immediately take action, we will: (1) Lie to ICANN
>> about you not responding to abuse complaints; (2) blacklist your all
>> services even though they were not involved in the alleged abuse."
>> That, to me, is a black hat. They may mean well, but it makes them
>> unreliable as a source. We need evidence of abuse to take action, not
>> claims and of you cannot provide such evidence, then you have no business
>> in fighting abuse.
>>
>> Volker
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Am 29.11.2017 um 18:39 schrieb allison nixon:
>>
>> This is the exact attitude I'm referring to. Not specifically only from
>> Volker, but also from other people. This is why Internet users will
>> increasingly turn their backs on ICANN's DNS. Unless the ICANN community
>> steps outside of their bubble and actually recognizes the problems the
>> average Internet user faces. ICANN may have a monopoly on domain names, but
>> it's not immune to consequences caused by bad caretaking.
>>
>> And wholly invalidating the opinions of a blacklist provider that enjoys
>> the largest support base (AFAIK) of average Internet users is a perfect
>> example of this. It is to ignore evidence of a serious defect in your(the
>> collective you) own product, when people are actively trying to notify you
>> of such.
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 12:21 PM, Volker Greimann <
>> vgreimann at key-systems.net> wrote:
>>
>>> I think we are moving away from the topic, but suffice it to say that I
>>> do not consider their publications evidence. "Domains seen" indeed...
>>> Ignoring them is the better options unless they develop better
>>> methodologies _and_ start sharing them for peer examination.
>>>
>>> Volker
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Am 29.11.2017 um 18:03 schrieb allison nixon:
>>>
>>> Spamhaus's list IS "actual evidence"
>>>
>>> They are based on domains they have seen, which are e-mails sent using
>>> domains from that registrar. Most of the hate out there against Spamhaus
>>> comes from spammers but they are AFAIK the largest provider of blocklists
>>> out there. That only happens because their customers see the results they
>>> want.
>>>
>>> Love them or hate them, you can't ignore them. If Spamhaus listed an IP
>>> range, that range would suffer severe connectivity issues across the entire
>>> Internet. When it comes to interoperability, Spamhaus's lists effectively
>>> matter more than ICANN's accreditation. The Internet is relying more and
>>> more heavily on these services because ICANN has failed to keep its product
>>> clean.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 11:51 AM, Volker Greimann <
>>> vgreimann at key-systems.net> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Interesting statistic, but as it is coming from Spamhaus, I'll take it
>>>> with a grain of salt, especially if the "Domains seen" number does not
>>>> match the number of domains a registrar actually has under management. I am
>>>> not disputing that some of these registrars may be problematic, but will
>>>> reserve judgment until I see some actual evidence.
>>>>
>>>> Volker
>>>>
>>>> Am 29.11.2017 um 17:23 schrieb allison nixon:
>>>>
>>>> Hi Bastiaan,
>>>>
>>>> >>A question though. I understand how ’TLD blocking’ would work as an
>>>> effective albeit sledge hammer way of mitigating certain forms of spam. And
>>>> I get the concept of blocking all traffic coming from particular
>>>> hosting-providers, ignoring cases where spoofing of prefixes is involved.
>>>> But what exactly is ‘registrar level blocking’?
>>>>
>>>> >>The example you refer to is (also) a hosting/cloud-provider - but if
>>>> that were not the case, what can ‘blocked’ purely looking at the registrar
>>>> service provided?
>>>>
>>>> "registrar level blocking" isn't a feature that's available to most
>>>> e-mail inbox owners because it is a lot more complicated than writing a
>>>> wildcard for example *.xyz for an entire TLD. It would probably require a
>>>> multi step process of WHOIS querying the domain -> parse for registrar ->
>>>> check block lists. I'm unsure how the large operators do it exactly.
>>>>
>>>> But if you look at this page:
>>>>
>>>> https://www.spamhaus.org/statistics/registrars/
>>>>
>>>> you can see a list of which registrars feature most prominently in
>>>> spam. Registrars that get to the point have a business model where they
>>>> profit from these types of customers. Alpnames in particular was in the
>>>> news because leaked communications revealed they were aware of the spamming
>>>> and offered to not suspend the domains for abuse. A bulletproof registrar,
>>>> if you will. Despite this incident, and despite being on the Spamhaus list
>>>> of "worst registrars" months later, they are still an actual registrar
>>>> accredited by ICANN. An equally valid participant in the DNS as any of you
>>>> here.
>>>>
>>>> And that is barely scratching the surface.
>>>>
>>>> So you can also see how the desire to block an entire registrar's
>>>> customerbase is directly linked to ICANN's failure to decertify the
>>>> registrar.
>>>>
>>>> Compare this "not my problem" attitude to the attitude that the Google
>>>> Chrome team has towards its list of trusted certificate providers. They
>>>> have no qualms about giving the death penalty to abusers. Google is also
>>>> requiring companies to produce "certificate transparency" logs, a real time
>>>> feed of all the certs they sign, and who they are for. Instead of wringing
>>>> their hands about privacy solely on the website owner's side, they
>>>> understand that these are tools massively used for abuse and actually take
>>>> into account the rights of people being abused by these tools.
>>>>
>>>> As a result of these differing attitudes, the Chrome browser enjoys a
>>>> lot of public trust, with almost no demand for custom trust lists, and
>>>> ICANN's naming system loses legitimacy every day as the collective masses
>>>> of the Internet increasingly turn their backs on them.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 2:36 AM, Bastiaan Goslings <
>>>> bastiaan.goslings at ams-ix.net> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Thanks, Allison:
>>>>>
>>>>> > On 28 Nov 2017, at 22:30, allison nixon <elsakoo at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>> >
>>>>> > I do not believe it is off topic to consider the downstream
>>>>> implications of the actions we take. It is of critical importance!
>>>>> >
>>>>> > When the WHOIS for .amsterdam and .frl became largely obfuscated, I
>>>>> was not worried much about it, because the extremely high cost of those
>>>>> domains precluded abuse from them in the first place. For that reason,
>>>>> nothing happened.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > In the defender world, if we lose WHOIS as a reputation factor,
>>>>> other reputation factors become much more prominent. TLD blocking is very
>>>>> easy with the tools we already have, but with the loss of WHOIS we are
>>>>> going to see a strong upsurge in the demand for registrar level blocking.
>>>>> So, say Alpnames is spamming a lot of people, and as an owner of an e-mail
>>>>> inbox, I don't want to get any more e-mails from Alpnames customers.
>>>>> Multiple of my colleagues at large networks have revealed to me that in the
>>>>> past, they have done a registrar level block, and the economic pressure on
>>>>> the registrars caused them to clean up their act with an impressive amount
>>>>> of motivation. It's something that most tools don't currently support, but
>>>>> likely will in the future.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > If the registrars will be the only people who have any clue who
>>>>> their customers are, I think we will see a strong shift towards forcing
>>>>> those registrars to take more responsibility for their pollution. This is
>>>>> something I am seeing increasingly advocated in defender circles, so
>>>>> outsiders are likely going to see the results of this in upcoming years.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > With the direction I see things going, I believe that anti-abuse
>>>>> will involve imposing economic pressure on registrars. It's not unlike how
>>>>> notorious hosting providers have been de-peered in the past due to abuse,
>>>>> and there is a lot of legal precedent to support the legitimacy of this
>>>>> strategy.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > Also, many of us outside the ICANN community don't see the death of
>>>>> the new TLDs as a bad thing. More people are interested in blocking them
>>>>> than supporting them. Companies are also realizing that it isn't a good
>>>>> idea to run their businesses on new TLDs.  Some of us will cheer when they
>>>>> finally go away.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Without any specific knowledge of the industry, your line of reasoning
>>>>> makes sense to me, i.e. ‘If the registrars will be the only people who have
>>>>> any clue who their customers are, I think we will see a strong shift
>>>>> towards forcing those registrars to take more responsibility’ as well as
>>>>> the ‘anti-abuse will involve imposing economic pressure on registrars’.
>>>>>
>>>>> (Fyi I will not comment on the ’their pollution’)
>>>>>
>>>>> A question though. I understand how ’TLD blocking’ would work as an
>>>>> effective albeit sledge hammer way of mitigating certain forms of spam. And
>>>>> I get the concept of blocking all traffic coming from particular
>>>>> hosting-providers, ignoring cases where spoofing of prefixes is involved.
>>>>> But what exactly is ‘registrar level blocking’?
>>>>>
>>>>> The example you refer to is (also) a hosting/cloud-provider - but if
>>>>> that were not the case, what can ‘blocked’ purely looking at the registrar
>>>>> service provided?
>>>>>
>>>>> -Bastiaan
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >
>>>>> >
>>>>> > On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 3:11 PM, theo geurts <gtheo at xs4all.nl>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>> > Agreed Kris,
>>>>> >
>>>>> > Thanks, Allison, though this is, I guess, the cold hard truth,
>>>>> selling domains dirt cheap or giving them away is a sure method to poison a
>>>>> TLD, I think it is a separate issue when discussing RDS.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > And the examples are clear, and at a point, such TLD operators need
>>>>> to re-think their business model and act accordingly to keep their TLD
>>>>> alive.
>>>>> >
>>>>> > So in May 2018, we will see a lot of use of the privacy services due
>>>>> to the GDPR, I guess mostly at a Registrar level, but let's not rule out
>>>>> that it might be on a Registry level, the dynamics here are shifting day by
>>>>> day.
>>>>> > So my question here, and I hope we can discuss this in good faith,
>>>>> but it seems to me that the WHOIS will be an irrelevant factor when it
>>>>> comes to the risk/reputation score?
>>>>> > How does/will that play out?
>>>>> > And yes, this is not exactly related to our work when it comes to
>>>>> RDS, but since we have the expertise here, I think it would be useful to
>>>>> explore this a little more even though off topic. I hope the leadership
>>>>> team allows this to get a better understanding, for the community on what
>>>>> is going down and might happen in a just a few months here.
>>>>> > And if we need to do this offlist, sure, no problem. I am just
>>>>> trying to get a sense to here to comply with the law and keep a business
>>>>> running.
>>>>> >
>>>>> >
>>>>> > Thanks
>>>>> >
>>>>> > Theo
>>>>> >
>>>>> >
>>>>> > On 28-11-2017 20:57, John Bambenek via gnso-rds-pdp-wg wrote:
>>>>> >> Full agreement on this point
>>>>> >>
>>>>> >> On 11/28/2017 01:30 PM, Kris Seeburn wrote:
>>>>> >>> As we move on …one way or the other the GDPR and other aligned
>>>>> privacy laws will catch up eventually. We will need to find levels and
>>>>> technical ways and reasons to get things to work. We move to RDAPis fine as
>>>>> we look ahead but we should be able to not only look at the laws that we
>>>>> need to respect but also to find technical ways to get and make sure things
>>>>> still continue towork. As this stage personally both are as important.
>>>>> >>>
>>>>> >>>> On Nov 28, 2017, at 23:15, allison nixon <elsakoo at gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> Most systems operators are not afraid to block entire TLDs. While
>>>>> there are no scientific studies out on this matter AFAIK, the help forums
>>>>> are littered with people asking how to block entire TLDs, and also
>>>>> registrants on those TLDs asking why everyone is blocking them. It's enough
>>>>> to conclusively say this is already an issue, and we can thank abuse for
>>>>> this.
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> In this Reddit post, a user learns the hard truth about his brand
>>>>> new XYZ domain:
>>>>> >>>> https://www.reddit.com/r/webdev/comments/6jq6f5/getting_bloc
>>>>> ked_should_i_abandon_my_xyz_domain/
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> This article discusses Facebook's block of all XYZ domains:
>>>>> >>>> http://adamyamada.com/facebook-blocks-xyz-domains-new-domain
>>>>> s-pages/
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> This Malwarebytes staff member explains to a legitimate
>>>>> registrant that all .SCIENCE TLDs are blocked and he gets no exception:
>>>>> >>>> https://forums.malwarebytes.com/topic/173535-all-my-science-
>>>>> domains-blocked/
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> In fact, the Malwarebytes "false positive" forum is littered with
>>>>> owners of hacked domains that discovered their problem because of a block,
>>>>> not because of a notification:
>>>>> >>>> https://forums.malwarebytes.com/forum/123-website-blocking/
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> This user asks for an 'Existing list of garbage "new" TLDs' to
>>>>> block
>>>>> >>>> https://vamsoft.com/forum/topic/597/existing-list-of-garbage
>>>>> -new-tlds
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> There are 179 Google search results for people asking Microsoft's
>>>>> help service for ways to block entire TLDs:
>>>>> >>>> https://www.google.com/search?q=how+do+i+block+TLD+site:answ
>>>>> ers.microsoft.com
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> There are 72,500 Google search results for "how to block" "tld":
>>>>> >>>> https://www.google.com/search?q=%22how+to+block%22+%22tld%22
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> The Internet is effectively "broken" for any legitimate
>>>>> registrants on these TLDs.
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> As a seller of some of those same TLDs, should you be concerned
>>>>> if your customers purchase domains rendered useless due to blocking?
>>>>> >>>> Would you actually refund a customer if they told you they
>>>>> couldn't use the domain for e-mail due to the TLD?
>>>>> >>>> Would you warn your prospective .XYZ, .STUDY, .PRESS, .PARTY,
>>>>> etc, customers that they should not use the domains for e-mail?
>>>>> >>>> When ICANN releases new gTLDs in the future, do you think that
>>>>> those domains will ever be able to send e-mail?
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> Truly, the rest of the world will be fine. The more that ICANN
>>>>> has the "not my problem" attitude, the more the rest of the world is going
>>>>> to push back. ICANN seems to have lost the ability to release new gTLDs
>>>>> without severe connectivity issues, so we also need to ask the question:
>>>>> "why are these guys selling the digital equivalent of the scarlet letter
>>>>> and not warning their customers beforehand?"
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> I think the question of selling defective products is one that
>>>>> needs to be addressed more seriously by regulators and outside parties.
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> I can also tell you that security vendors are already looking
>>>>> into other anti-abuse techniques for domains post-WHOIS, and I can also
>>>>> tell you that they will result in an increase in the percentage of
>>>>> legitimate domains that are blocked. This is your problem now.
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 12:43 PM, Volker Greimann <
>>>>> vgreimann at key-systems.net> wrote:
>>>>> >>>> Hi Andrew,
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> re:hotbed I was rather intending to ask whether there is a direct
>>>>> correllation between TLDs with redacted whois and issues that go
>>>>> unresolved. So do you have more unresolved issues in .co.uk than in
>>>>> .com (if numbers are normalized for registered domain names).
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> I am sure no one would consider blocking the entire mail traffic
>>>>> originating from the United Kingdom Top Level Domain just because you
>>>>> cannot resolve some issues in a few domains, correct?
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> So if everyone followed their (or a similar) model, the internet
>>>>> would not break. Some issues would get harder to solve (or take longer). I
>>>>> am asking because that is what most likely will happen on May 25 or sooner.
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> Volker
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> Am 28.11.2017 um 18:27 schrieb Andrew Sullivan:
>>>>> >>>> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 04:31:56PM +0100, Volker Greimann wrote:
>>>>> >>>> case of internet operability issues. While I appreciate that
>>>>> there can be
>>>>> >>>> issues that would necessitate the ability to quickly contact
>>>>> whoever can fix
>>>>> >>>> the issue, I wonder how this problem is solved in TLDs where
>>>>> whois is
>>>>> >>>> already redacted.
>>>>> >>>> It's not.  In that case, if I am the one who has this experience
>>>>> and I
>>>>> >>>> can't reach the target, then the problem goes unresolved.  In mail
>>>>> >>>> cases, as John suggests elsewhere in this thread, the answer is
>>>>> very
>>>>> >>>> likely that mail is blocked.  People seem surprised these days
>>>>> that
>>>>> >>>> mail is so fragile, but this sort of thing is part of the reason.
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> So how does it work there? Are these TLDs hotbeds of DNS issues
>>>>> and
>>>>> >>>> unresolved problems?
>>>>> >>>> I don't know what you mean by "hotbed", or whether that is
>>>>> intended to
>>>>> >>>> be dismissive.  Some TLDs defintely have more DNS problems than
>>>>> >>>> others.  Given how hard the DNS works to make connections happen
>>>>> even
>>>>> >>>> when things are badly misconfigured, lots of stuff will work to
>>>>> some
>>>>> >>>> extent even when it is badly configured.  But DNS operations
>>>>> people
>>>>> >>>> trade stories about problems amongst themselves, after giving up
>>>>> on
>>>>> >>>> sites because whois can't help and the mname in the SOA record is
>>>>> >>>> broken.  I find this happens more often than you might expect.
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> But yes, there are broken domains on the Internet.  I find it
>>>>> hard to
>>>>> >>>> believe that would be even slightly remarkable.
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> Best regards,
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> A
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> --
>>>>> >>>> Bei weiteren Fragen stehen wir Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung.
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> Volker A. Greimann
>>>>> >>>> - Rechtsabteilung -
>>>>> >>>>
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>>>>> this e-mail. If an addressing or transmission error has misdirected this
>>>>> e-mail, kindly notify the author by replying to this e-mail or contacting
>>>>> us by telephone.
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> >>>> gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list
>>>>> >>>> gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org
>>>>> >>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>> >>>> --
>>>>> >>>> _________________________________
>>>>> >>>> Note to self: Pillage BEFORE burning.
>>>>> >>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> >>>> gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list
>>>>> >>>> gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org
>>>>> >>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg
>>>>> >>>
>>>>> >>>
>>>>> >>>
>>>>> >>>
>>>>> >>>
>>>>> >>> Kris Seeburn
>>>>> >>> seeburn.k at gmail.com
>>>>> >>>     • www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/
>>>>> >>>
>>>>> >>> <KeepItOn_Social_animated.gif>
>>>>> >>>
>>>>> >>>
>>>>> >>>
>>>>> >>> ______________________________
>>>>> >>> _________________
>>>>> >>> gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list
>>>>> >>>
>>>>> >>> gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org
>>>>> >>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg
>>>>> >>
>>>>> >>
>>>>> >>
>>>>> >> ______________________________
>>>>> >> _________________
>>>>> >> gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list
>>>>> >>
>>>>> >> gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org
>>>>> >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg
>>>>> >
>>>>> >
>>>>> > _______________________________________________
>>>>> > gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list
>>>>> > gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org
>>>>> > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg
>>>>> >
>>>>> >
>>>>> >
>>>>> > --
>>>>> > _________________________________
>>>>> > Note to self: Pillage BEFORE burning.
>>>>> > _______________________________________________
>>>>> > gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list
>>>>> > gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org
>>>>> > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> _________________________________
>>>> Note to self: Pillage BEFORE burning.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing listgnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Bei weiteren Fragen stehen wir Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung.
>>>>
>>>> Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
>>>>
>>>> Volker A. Greimann
>>>> - Rechtsabteilung -
>>>>
>>>> Key-Systems GmbHIm Oberen Werk 1 <https://maps.google.com/?q=Im+Oberen+Werk+1+%0D+%3E%3E%3E%3E+66386+St.+Ingbert+%3Chttps://maps.google.com/?q%3DIm%2BOberen%2BWerk%2B1%2B%250D%2B%253E%253E%253E%253E%2B66386%2BSt.%2BIngbert%26entry%3Dgmail%26source%3Dg%3E&entry=gmail&source=g>66386 St. Ingbert <https://maps.google.com/?q=Im+Oberen+Werk+1+%0D+%3E%3E%3E%3E+66386+St.+Ingbert+%3Chttps://maps.google.com/?q%3DIm%2BOberen%2BWerk%2B1%2B%250D%2B%253E%253E%253E%253E%2B66386%2BSt.%2BIngbert%26entry%3Dgmail%26source%3Dg%3E&entry=gmail&source=g>
>>>> Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901 <+49%206894%209396901>
>>>> Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851 <+49%206894%209396851>
>>>> Email: vgreimann at key-systems.net
>>>>
>>>> Web: www.key-systems.net / www.RRPproxy.net <http://www.domaindiscount24.com>
>>>>
>>>> ...
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