[gnso-rpm-wg] FOR REVIEW & DISCUSSION: Draft collated proposal for Sunrise-related data collection
icann at leap.com
Wed Aug 9 14:02:25 UTC 2017
One additional comment, re: sunrise vs. landrush, to address some of
the other points with respect to the claimed "exorbitant" costs of not
registering in sunrise.
Perhaps someone can draw a flow chart, but let's describe exactly what
would happen if sunrises were eliminated.
1. Those currently registering domains in sunrise would save money (no
longer paying out sunrise fees).
2. Those currently registering domains in sunrise presumably still
value the domain name, so their demand/desire would shift to the
3. (a) Scenario A: No one else desires the domain name in landrush --
the TM holder then pays the landrush price, instead of the sunrise
3. (b) Scenario B: Others desire the domain name during landrush.
Proceed to auction. The TM holder can, if they're paranoid, outbid
everyone else in landrush, and still end up owning the domain name.
It's their choice whether to outbid everyone.
(i) TM holder (who would have bought the domain in sunrise) outbids
everyone else for the domain name. All the claimed "damage to
consumers" doesn't occur, since the TM holder owns the domain. They
can "insure" against future risks by simply outbidding all comers.
(ii) TM holder is outbid by someone else. Either that someone else is
(a) a legitimate registrant, or (b) a cybersquatter.
So, the only "scenario" where we're concerned about, re:
cybersquatting, is in point #3(b)(ii)(b). There, the markholder had a
perfectly viable option to eliminate that cybersquatting, namely by
outbidding all comers, to get to option #3(b)(i), but did their own
risk assessment as to the costs of prevention (outbidding) vs. the
costs of monitoring and curative rights (courts, UDRP/URS, etc.).
By eliminating sunrise, we've allowed other legitimate registrants
equal and fair access to the domain names (i.e. point #3(b)(ii)(a)).
We've also reduced the effect of "gaming", because those with gamed
TMs don't get any advantage in their bidding against others (someone
who values the domain name more will just outbid them, in
#3(b)(ii)(a)). One can even use the usual scaremongering TMCH to try
to scare away those potential other bidders in that landrush auction,
by the way.
Most cybersquatting is on "cheap" domains, not domains won at auction,
so the risk of #3(b)(ii)(b) is bad for a cybersquatter, in economic
terms. They would have to outbid a Microsoft, Apple, Lego, Dell, etc.
first, before even having a chance to inflict damage. And they'd be on
the radar of those companies, presumably, by outbidding them.
Cybersquatters aren't stupid --- they'll usually wait until the
general availability, when the economics are more favourable (e.g. 99
cent domains, etc.).
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