[gnso-rpm-wg] FOR REVIEW & DISCUSSION: Draft collated proposal for Sunrise-related data collection
icann at leap.com
Wed Aug 9 14:24:34 UTC 2017
And to make things even clearer, take note that registry operators
could, if they wanted to, accomplish the system I described in my
prior message (elimination of sunrise) by simply setting the price of
sunrise registrations to $1 million (i.e. a high enough price to make
the actual number of registrations equal to zero).
They don't do so, because they actually can set a profit-maximize
sunrise price to make *more money* from sunrise compared to just a
pure landrush period, effectively preying on the sunrise registrants
(earning more from them than would be the case if the sunrise had been
So, eliminating the sunrise period actually helps even those 130 or so
odd sunrise registrants (on average per TLD), as their effective costs
would be lower, given that registries wouldn't be given the
opportunity to prey on them via selection of the sunrise price. [I
just alienated every registry operator!] But, registrants and TM
holders would be better off, and the incentives would all be in proper
alignment for desirable behaviours.
On Wed, Aug 9, 2017 at 10:02 AM, George Kirikos <icann at leap.com> wrote:
> One additional comment, re: sunrise vs. landrush, to address some of
> the other points with respect to the claimed "exorbitant" costs of not
> registering in sunrise.
> Perhaps someone can draw a flow chart, but let's describe exactly what
> would happen if sunrises were eliminated.
> 1. Those currently registering domains in sunrise would save money (no
> longer paying out sunrise fees).
> 2. Those currently registering domains in sunrise presumably still
> value the domain name, so their demand/desire would shift to the
> landrush period.
> 3. (a) Scenario A: No one else desires the domain name in landrush --
> the TM holder then pays the landrush price, instead of the sunrise
> 3. (b) Scenario B: Others desire the domain name during landrush.
> Proceed to auction. The TM holder can, if they're paranoid, outbid
> everyone else in landrush, and still end up owning the domain name.
> It's their choice whether to outbid everyone.
> (i) TM holder (who would have bought the domain in sunrise) outbids
> everyone else for the domain name. All the claimed "damage to
> consumers" doesn't occur, since the TM holder owns the domain. They
> can "insure" against future risks by simply outbidding all comers.
> (ii) TM holder is outbid by someone else. Either that someone else is
> (a) a legitimate registrant, or (b) a cybersquatter.
> So, the only "scenario" where we're concerned about, re:
> cybersquatting, is in point #3(b)(ii)(b). There, the markholder had a
> perfectly viable option to eliminate that cybersquatting, namely by
> outbidding all comers, to get to option #3(b)(i), but did their own
> risk assessment as to the costs of prevention (outbidding) vs. the
> costs of monitoring and curative rights (courts, UDRP/URS, etc.).
> By eliminating sunrise, we've allowed other legitimate registrants
> equal and fair access to the domain names (i.e. point #3(b)(ii)(a)).
> We've also reduced the effect of "gaming", because those with gamed
> TMs don't get any advantage in their bidding against others (someone
> who values the domain name more will just outbid them, in
> #3(b)(ii)(a)). One can even use the usual scaremongering TMCH to try
> to scare away those potential other bidders in that landrush auction,
> by the way.
> Most cybersquatting is on "cheap" domains, not domains won at auction,
> so the risk of #3(b)(ii)(b) is bad for a cybersquatter, in economic
> terms. They would have to outbid a Microsoft, Apple, Lego, Dell, etc.
> first, before even having a chance to inflict damage. And they'd be on
> the radar of those companies, presumably, by outbidding them.
> Cybersquatters aren't stupid --- they'll usually wait until the
> general availability, when the economics are more favourable (e.g. 99
> cent domains, etc.).
> George Kirikos
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