[UA-discuss] Re : Re: UASG Response to WordFence IDN Phishing concerns

Wed Apr 26 09:40:48 UTC 2017

Exactly Andrie. Thank you for confirming the same. I confirmed with .pyc registry (we enabled EAI on почта.рус) also and they are not allowed (as per agreement) to use any other script other than Cyrillic. 

So basically it looks like .com problem. Any other examples other than .com ?  It narrows down the problem to solve. Thanks. 

Dr. Ajay DATA  | Founder &amp CEO 

Get email id like अजय@डाटा.भारत in your own language,visit www.xgenplus.com 

From: Andrei Kolesnikov   MailId : [68484721]To: Don Hollander Cc: "Dr. AJAY D A T A" ,tan tanakadennis via ua-discuss Subject: Re: [UA-discuss] UASG Response to WordFence IDN Phishing concernsDate: 26 Apr 2017 02:16:05 PM 

Don, there is no such thing as IDN at .RU - only ascii allowed - we understood the problem long time ago due to similarity of many Cyrillic letters with Latin. 
In IDN .РФ in Russia only Cyrillic allowed. This definitely must be the rule for registries. Or some kind of immediate mitigation service to bring down dangerous domains. 
--andrei

2017-04-26 11:34 GMT+03:00 Don Hollander don.hollander at icann.org>:

Hi Andrei:

What about at the ccTLD?  idn.ru?   Does .ru also allow ASCII?

Does the .ru registry, for example, do anything to address homoglyphs between ascii and cyrillic?

D

On 26/04/2017, at 8:30 PM, Andrei Kolesnikov andrei at rol.ru> wrote:

most use of idn.ascii gTLD as far as I know is .com for example http://путин.com/[xn--h1akeme.com]
Basically most of the confusing cases discussed above are from .com
--andrei

2017-04-26 10:35 GMT+03:00 Dr. AJAY D A T A ajay at data.in>:

Hello Don, Which all registries are allowed to register mix of scripts domain while registering an IDN. I checked .pyc (Cyrillic) and .भारत (Devanagiri) do not allow mix of scripts.  I think we address those registries through ICANN by modifying the registry agreement, major problem can be solved. Thanks. 

Dr. Ajay DATA  | Founder &amp CEO 

Get email id like अजय@डाटा.भारत in your own language,visit www.xgenplus.com[xgenplus.com] 

From: "Tan Tanaka,Dennis via UA-discuss" ua-discuss at icann.org>  MailId : [68456683]To: Don Hollander don.hollander at icann.org>,"ua-discuss at icann.org" ua-discuss at icann.org>Subject: Re: [UA-discuss] UASG Response to WordFence IDN Phishing concernsDate: 25 Apr 2017 06:28:22 PM 

Don, my comments enclosed

Thanks
-Dennis

From:  ua-discuss-bounces at icann.org> on behalf of Don Hollander don.hollander at icann.org> Date: Monday, April 24, 2017 at 5:40 PM To: "UA-discuss at icann.org" ua-discuss at icann.org> Subject: [EXTERNAL] [UA-discuss] UASG Response to WordFence IDN Phishing concerns

Further to recent discussion on this list, we have drafted a document that we plan on posting as a Blog Post to the UASG Web site that can be referenced by others .

We want to get feedback from the community on this document by Thursday UTC .

So, here it is &ndash pasted below and as a word document in case you want to enable tracking and make amendments.   If you have comments or suggestions, please share them to this group .

Don

IDNs and Phishing: What You Need to Know
By TBD at UASG 

Internationalized Domain Names[icann.org] (IDNs) are growing in popularity, a testament to their role in the expansion of the global Internet and the value they provide in connecting non-English speakers to the Web. However, you may have noticed a renewed focus over the past week of a script mixing technique that phishing scammers could potentially use to trick Internet users into visiting malicious websites. This phishing method takes advantage of the fact that characters from various languages and scripts are sometimes visually similar to each other. For example, the Cyrillic &ldquoа&rdquo and the ASCII[en.wikipedia.org] &ldquoa&rdquo look virtually identical. This technique is known as a homograph attack.  

Homographic phishing efforts associated with IDNs are not new. In fact, they date back to the early 2000s. Registries have since implemented policies that preclude mixing scripts[1] within a domain name label .

While this issue should be taken seriously and serves as an important reminder of consumer safety, various IDN and anti-abuse groups are actively working to mitigate potential threats, and there are already certain browser-set protections in place. In the meantime, Internet users should practice the same basic security hygiene that is always recommended: avoid clicking suspicious links, and use a good password manager that will only enter login credentials on trusted sites. 

Equally important is to recognize the benefits of IDNs and avoid disabling them, which could lead to an unpredictable user experience and eventually a decrease in adoption. IDNs are essential in bringing non-English speakers &ndash the majority of the world&rsquos population &ndash online, and allowing those users to create their own highly relevant online identities as well as navigate the Internet in their native languages. In addition to the social and cultural benefits of IDNs, they also represent a significant economic opportunity a recent report[uasg.tech] commissioned by the Universal Acceptance Steering Group (UASG) found that online spending from new IDN users could start at USD 6.2 billion per year.  

The UASG&rsquos mission is to help software developers and website owners keep pace with the evolving Domain Name System (DNS) &ndash and this includes issues around the adoption and acceptance of IDNs. If you&rsquod like to get involved in helping work toward a solution to this and other IDN-related issues, please visit https://uasg.tech/[uasg.tech] or  get in touch[uasg.tech] to learn more. 

[1] Exceptions are practiced for languages with established orthographies and conventions that require the commingled use of multiple scripts, e.g. the Japanese writing system .

Do not Remove:[HID]20170425182821379[-HID] 

-- 

Andrey Kolesnikov
RIPN.NET[RIPN.NET]

Don Hollander
Universal Acceptance Steering Group
Skype: don_hollander

-- 

Andrey Kolesnikov
RIPN.NET

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