[Party1] Accountability Mechanism Template WP-1-F | Community Veto Proposal
Mathieu Weill
mathieu.weill at afnic.fr
Fri Mar 13 08:36:35 UTC 2015
Dear Colleagues,
It is greatly valuable to our work at this stage to identify areas where
different views are expressed. It is even more valuable when they can be
voiced with :
- alternate proposals (such as, what would the "community veto
mechanism" look like in the constituency-based approach ?)
- identification of the benefits of the proposed approach to enhance
accountability, as defined in our definition document.
The criteria, rightly referenced by Kavouss below, can easily be derived
from these definitions. Does one option provide greater transparency ?
Enable accountability to a larger set of stakeholder ? Improve
independence ? Provide better checks and balances ?
We will certainly expand on these criteria very shortly.
Best
Mathieu
Le 12/03/2015 22:28, Kavouss Arasteh a écrit :
> Dear All,
> Yes there are some evident criteria to address the issue of
> proportionality.
> Instead of defending one and offending the ethers create an unhealthy
> Atmosphere. Instead let us to make valid reasoning and develop
> associated criteria
> Regars
> Kavouss.
>
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> On 12 Mar 2015, at 21:11, <olivier.muron at orange.com
> <mailto:olivier.muron at orange.com>> <olivier.muron at orange.com
> <mailto:olivier.muron at orange.com>> wrote:
>
>> I fully agree with Greg: the GNSO represent the largest part of
>> ICANN’s activities , the other supporting organizations like the ASO
>> and the ccNSO only rely on ICANN for the overall level of policies
>> (global policies), and for them most of the policy work is done at
>> the regional or national level. Moreover the GNSO represents a very
>> broad diversity of stakeholders, each with a very specific point of
>> view on the issues handled by ICANN.
>>
>>
>> *I think that the GNSO should benefit from a specific representation
>> based on its constituencies*, that fully represent the diversity of
>> the stakeholders involved, and take into account the policy work done
>> at ICANN level.
>>
>>
>> One should note that in Work Area 2 inventory of input from Public
>> Comment, reference is made to a SO/AC Group where GNSO is indeed
>> represented at the Constituency level.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Olivier
>>
>> Le 12 mars 2015 à 18:51, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com
>> <mailto:gregshatanipc at gmail.com>> a écrit :
>>
>>> I would be opposed to a group composed solely of SO and AC chairs.
>>> It is a mistake to treat all SO's and AC's as equivalent
>>> organizations. They are not. Specifically, the GNSO consists of 4
>>> separate Stakeholder Groups, two of which are composed of 2-3
>>> separate Constituencies. One of those Stakeholder Groups, the
>>> Registry SG, is really the equivalent of the ccNSO, and when the new
>>> gTLD program wraps up, the RySG will represent more registries than
>>> the ccNSO (even including the non-ccNSO ccTLDs). Other Stakeholder
>>> Groups include the Registrar SG, the Non-Commercial SG, essentially
>>> the equivalent of "Civil Society," and the Commercial SG,
>>> essentially the equivalent of the "Private Sector." (And that does
>>> not even take the substantial variation at the Constituency level
>>> into account -- the ISPs, for example, are stuffed into the
>>> Commercial SG.)
>>>
>>> Are we suggesting that the ccNSO should share a seat with
>>> representatives of, registrars, the private sector and civil
>>> society? No -- that would seem absurd. It's no less absurd to do
>>> that on the gTLD side.
>>>
>>> The GNSO and its hierarchical structure exist for a particular
>>> purpose -- to develop policy recommendations for gTLDs. Using that
>>> structure for other purposes is an abuse of the structure, and
>>> ultimately a distortion and an abuse of the multistakeholder model.
>>>
>>> Greg Shatan
>>>
>>> On Thu, Mar 12, 2015 at 12:57 PM, Roelof Meijer
>>> <Roelof.Meijer at sidn.nl <mailto:Roelof.Meijer at sidn.nl>> wrote:
>>>
>>> All,
>>>
>>> Not so much a content reaction, but the template set me thinking.
>>>
>>> Somehow, referring to your "/This challenge mechanism would only
>>> apply to a narrow set of predetermined high impact board
>>> decisions such as the adoption of the organization’s strategic
>>> plan, approval of the budget, approval of bylaws, etc/.” we
>>> should „merge" or „synchronize” this with the work done on
>>> powers 1A, 1B and 1C (Vetoing changing to the bylaws, vetoing
>>> the budget/strategic plan, vetoing board action in conflict with
>>> bylaws).
>>> Veto’s with different impact should have different voting
>>> thresholds, but the rest of the „ingredients” of the powers will
>>> mostly be the same and I have the impression that as a WS/WG we
>>> are pretty much aligned on those ingredients. That also applies
>>> for template 7A- removing the board of directors, that Jordan
>>> presented in yesterdays call.
>>>
>>> The most difficult part to discuss and decide upon now (and we
>>> are not yet aligned there and seem to be kind of touching it
>>> lightly so far) is the overarching mechanism to apply the
>>> powers. We identified: existing SO/AC structure, permanent CCWG,
>>> Statutory delegates or members, supervisory board. In his
>>> template 7A, Jordan introduces an additional one, "Community
>>> Council", and provides alternative proposals for its compilation.
>>>
>>> The group of community representatives that vote on vetoing a
>>> board decision, intention, action, budget, removing the board
>>> etc (the group that administers the powers we identified) can
>>> –and should in my opinion- be the same for all those powers.
>>> In Frankfurt we decided to identify the requirements first and
>>> then determine the best fitting mechanism.
>>>
>>> We have the requirements (powers to be given to the community)
>>> largely, we are pretty much aligned on them. So we really have
>>> to start working on the mechanism to apply: what should the
>>> composition of the group (who should be in it, how do they get
>>> in: elected/appointed/ex officio, how do they get recalled) ,
>>> how are positions mandated, decisions made and how do we fix al
>>> that in the bylaws. I am aware that we will need legal advice on
>>> that, but I don’t think that we have to wait with everything
>>> for that.
>>>
>>> And let’s make it as effective, simple and executable as
>>> possible. I noted again during the call yesterday, that quite a
>>> few of us (I admit, I am one of them) are in favor of the group
>>> (whatever it will be called in the end) be composed of SO and AC
>>> chairs. Although we should not limit ourselves to that, I submit
>>> that we should really explore that option.
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Roelof
>>>
>>> From: Robin Gross <robin at ipjustice.org <mailto:robin at ipjustice.org>>
>>> Date: woensdag 11 maart 2015 22:15
>>> To: "wp1 at icann.org <mailto:wp1 at icann.org>" <wp1 at icann.org
>>> <mailto:wp1 at icann.org>>
>>> Subject: [Party1] Accountability Mechanism Template WP-1-F |
>>> Community Veto Proposal
>>>
>>> Attached please find the template completed for the proposal
>>> regarding a "community veto process".
>>>
>>> Improvements, clarifications, suggestions, etc. are most welcome.
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Robin
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>> *Gregory S. Shatan **ï****Abelman Frayne & Schwab*
>>>
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--
*****************************
Mathieu WEILL
AFNIC - directeur général
Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06
mathieu.weill at afnic.fr
Twitter : @mathieuweill
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