[WP1] [Party1] For discussion - criteria to select preferred mechanisms

Sun Mar 15 21:43:59 UTC 2015

Steve,
Yes we have to be more precise about the ciommuity
This what  I am referring at various occations.
AC,SO are all not similar .there are différences.
The number of members from each are not identical
Regards
Kavouss

2015-03-15 16:10 GMT+01:00 Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco at netchoice.org>:

>   Kavouss — I believe Jordan mentions Members or Delegates as possible
> ways to give the ‘community’ powers we’re considering.
>
>  If we designate that each AC/SO/SG has a Delegate or Member, then a
> supermajority (4/5) vote threshold would be required from that group to
> exercise these powers.
>
>  It may not be sufficient to just say ‘4/5 votes of the community’ since
> the community is not formally defined.
>
>  You are correct that there is no power to force management and board to
> act.  But if ICANN refused to heed the instructions of a properly used
> community power, the community might be motivated to remove the entire
> board.
>
>
>   From: Kavouss Arasteh
> Date: Sunday, March 15, 2015 at 10:59 AM
> To: Mathieu Weill
> Cc: "wp1 at icann.org"
> Subject: Re: [WP1] [Party1] For discussion - criteria to select preferred
> mechanisms
>
>   Dear Jordan,
> THANK you very much for the message
> First of all I do not really understand the meaning of the following
> " *Using California's delegates or memberships system to vest these
> powers in members/delegates" *
> *Moreover, one simple  way would be to modify bylaws by including a) a 4/5
> voting criteria if ICANN bOARD dECIDES TO MODIFY THE BYLAWS*
> *An an addition empoweringh community to even override that 4/5 DECISION ?*
> *In addition, your text used the Trem" forcing " ..... why such a term is
> used , the community would exercise its empowerment but not forcing .*
> *There would be no force . we are living in a democratic world without one
> could force the other.*
> *Regards*
> *Kavouss e*
>
>
> 2015-03-15 14:17 GMT+01:00 Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill at afnic.fr>:
>
>> Thanks Jordan for setting up this discussion. It is one we need to carry
>> to the whole group I believe, considering the upcoming meeting in Istanbul.
>> I will try to circulate a consolidated draft before our call on Tuesday.
>>
>> See some comments inline :
>>
>> Le 14/03/2015 05:08, Jordan Carter a écrit :
>>
>> *I think it would be valuable to work out some criteria to help establish
>> our preferred mechanism - both in terms of the process/structure divide and
>> within those too.*
>>
>>   We should bear in mind that the question will be about comparing
>> options, so our questions will be of the kind "which option would be
>> more...".
>>
>>  Here are some that come to mind - above and beyond the stress-tests,
>> which will help, and above and beyond the matters set out in our definition
>> and scope document:
>>
>>    - Legal effectiveness - how operable or entrenched would the
>>    community's new powers be? [We can't choose a mechanism that isn't
>>    effective, in my opinion.]
>>
>>
>>   I support the idea, but would welcome some details of how we would
>> rate a specific option to be more effective than the other ?
>>
>>
>>    - Decisionmaking quality - what impact will the mechanism's
>>    construction have on quality of decisionmaking? [This could be quite
>>    subjective but does need to be considered.]
>>
>>
>>   I believe we can avoid most of the subjectivity by relying on the
>> qualities of accountability mechanisms : checks and balances and
>> independence seem quite relevant here. There might also be an aspect of
>> skillsets of decision makers ?
>>
>>
>>    - Simplicity of design - what is the level of simplicity to implement
>>    and to explain, internally and externally? [We have a consensus that
>>    simpler is preferable, so far as I can tell.]
>>
>>    - Simplicity of operation - what is the level of attention and
>>    resource required from the community to make the mechanism work?
>>
>>
>>   Nice and useful distinction around the expected simplicity of our
>> proposals.
>>
>>
>>    - Accountability - how is the mechanism held accountable to the
>>    stakeholders whose power it is designed to enforce over ICANN?
>>
>>
>>
>>  I am sure there are more, and welcome your additions to the list and
>> discussion of the whole subject.
>>
>>  I'd like to build off that conversation by starting a table that sets
>> out some of the aspects of each model based on these criteria and the
>> others that come up, so as to pull all the key information into one place
>> for debate in Istanbul. I'll start working on that tomorrow.
>>
>>  Looking forward to your thoughts!
>>
>>
>>  best
>> Jordan
>>
>>
>>  --
>>   Jordan Carter
>>
>> Chief Executive
>> *InternetNZ*
>>
>> 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob)
>> jordan at internetnz.net.nz
>> Skype: jordancarter
>>
>> *A better world through a better Internet *
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>> --
>> *****************************
>> Mathieu WEILL
>> AFNIC - directeur général
>> Tél: +33 1 39 30 83 06mathieu.weill at afnic.fr
>> Twitter : @mathieuweill
>> *****************************
>>
>>
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>
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