[WP1] [Party1] For discussion - criteria to select preferred mechanisms

Tijani BEN JEMAA tijani.benjemaa at fmai.org.tn
Sun Mar 15 22:55:21 UTC 2015

Yes Kavous, all SO and AC are not identical, but they are all important since they have the quality of ICANN community stakeholder and have the same right to participate actively in the definition of ICANN accountability mechanisms and to be part of the Community entity that will contribute in the implementation of those mechanisms. 




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De : wp1-bounces at icann.org [mailto:wp1-bounces at icann.org] De la part de Kavouss Arasteh
Envoyé : dimanche 15 mars 2015 22:44
À : Steve DelBianco
Cc : wp1 at icann.org
Objet : Re: [WP1] [Party1] For discussion - criteria to select preferred mechanisms



Yes we have to be more precise about the ciommuity

This what  I am referring at various occations.

AC,SO are all not similar .there are différences.

The number of members from each are not identical




2015-03-15 16:10 GMT+01:00 Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco at netchoice.org>:

Kavouss — I believe Jordan mentions Members or Delegates as possible ways to give the ‘community’ powers we’re considering.   


If we designate that each AC/SO/SG has a Delegate or Member, then a supermajority (4/5) vote threshold would be required from that group to exercise these powers.


It may not be sufficient to just say ‘4/5 votes of the community’ since the community is not formally defined.    


You are correct that there is no power to force management and board to act.  But if ICANN refused to heed the instructions of a properly used community power, the community might be motivated to remove the entire board.



From: Kavouss Arasteh
Date: Sunday, March 15, 2015 at 10:59 AM
To: Mathieu Weill
Cc: "wp1 at icann.org"
Subject: Re: [WP1] [Party1] For discussion - criteria to select preferred mechanisms


Dear Jordan,

THANK you very much for the message

First of all I do not really understand the meaning of the following 

" Using California's delegates or memberships system to vest these powers in members/delegates" 

Moreover, one simple  way would be to modify bylaws by including a) a 4/5 voting criteria if ICANN bOARD dECIDES TO MODIFY THE BYLAWS

An an addition empoweringh community to even override that 4/5 DECISION ?

In addition, your text used the Trem" forcing " ..... why such a term is used , the community would exercise its empowerment but not forcing .

There would be no force . we are living in a democratic world without one could force the other.


Kavouss e



2015-03-15 14:17 GMT+01:00 Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill at afnic.fr>:

Thanks Jordan for setting up this discussion. It is one we need to carry to the whole group I believe, considering the upcoming meeting in Istanbul. I will try to circulate a consolidated draft before our call on Tuesday. 

See some comments inline : 

Le 14/03/2015 05:08, Jordan Carter a écrit :

I think it would be valuable to work out some criteria to help establish our preferred mechanism - both in terms of the process/structure divide and within those too. 


We should bear in mind that the question will be about comparing options, so our questions will be of the kind "which option would be more...".  

Here are some that come to mind - above and beyond the stress-tests, which will help, and above and beyond the matters set out in our definition and scope document:

*	Legal effectiveness - how operable or entrenched would the community's new powers be? [We can't choose a mechanism that isn't effective, in my opinion.]

I support the idea, but would welcome some details of how we would rate a specific option to be more effective than the other ? 

*	Decisionmaking quality - what impact will the mechanism's construction have on quality of decisionmaking? [This could be quite subjective but does need to be considered.]

I believe we can avoid most of the subjectivity by relying on the qualities of accountability mechanisms : checks and balances and independence seem quite relevant here. There might also be an aspect of skillsets of decision makers ? 

*	Simplicity of design - what is the level of simplicity to implement and to explain, internally and externally? [We have a consensus that simpler is preferable, so far as I can tell.]
*	Simplicity of operation - what is the level of attention and resource required from the community to make the mechanism work?

Nice and useful distinction around the expected simplicity of our proposals. 

*	Accountability - how is the mechanism held accountable to the stakeholders whose power it is designed to enforce over ICANN?


I am sure there are more, and welcome your additions to the list and discussion of the whole subject.


I'd like to build off that conversation by starting a table that sets out some of the aspects of each model based on these criteria and the others that come up, so as to pull all the key information into one place for debate in Istanbul. I'll start working on that tomorrow.


Looking forward to your thoughts!








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