[CCWG-ACCT] Notes-Recordings-Transcript links for CCWG ACCT Session #14 24 February
Alan Greenberg
alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca
Thu Feb 26 11:51:40 UTC 2015
Hi Roelof,
Actually, despite all of our talk about
"community action", I think such actions are
going to be very few and far between. In this
particular case, I would be very surprised if
such a critical mass could be accumulated to take
community action. Certainly if the person simply
never shows up, such action might be possible.
But in that case, I would hope the Board itself
would take action. In the case of the person
effectively disappearing from the milieu of the
appointing AC/SO, other parts of the community
would likely have no problem at all.
I will take a specific case of the At-Large Board
member (and what I am describing does NOT apply
to our current appointee). If this person had no
inclination to even take about or support issues
of great import to At-Large (and I am talking
about USER issues and not funding for At-Large),
actively campaigned AGAINST such user positions,
and the Member never came to explain why he/she
was doing so, I think that would be a real
problem to At-Large, but might have absolutely no
traction to parts of ICANN who themselves might not have concerns in this area.
In the more general case, and talking about
community action in general (and not recall),
when I look at some of the actions/inactions of
the Board that parts of the community most
objected to, I have great doubts that if we
already had the powers we are talking about,
whether we would be able to amass the critical
mass to take action. I am fine with that, since I
think it SHOULD be hard to do...
Alan
At 26/02/2015 05:04 AM, Roelof Meijer wrote:
>Thanks, Alan, that helps me understand.
>However, don’t you think that „If there is
>evidence that this [shared set of values] had
>changed, or perhaps that the person is simply
>not doing the job (ie not showing up or never
>talking to the AC/SO)†that it would be
>relatively easy to have also the other
>stakeholders’ representatives vote in favor of
>recalling that particular board member?
>
>
>Best,
>
>Roelof
>
>From: Alan Greenberg
><<mailto:alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca>alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca>
>Date: donderdag 26 februari 2015 02:45
>To: Roelof Meijer
><<mailto:roelof.meijer at sidn.nl>roelof.meijer at sidn.nl>,
>"<mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>accountability-cross-community at icann.org"
><<mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
>Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT]
>Notes-Recordings-Transcript links for CCWG ACCT Session #14 24 February
>
>Hi Roelof,
>
>First, a contradiction is quite possible, since
>the two bulleted statements were from different
>people. The first, I believe was Bruce Tonkin,
>and the second was me. I was also the one quoted
>earlier starting with "Board members are
>appointed because they share a mindset..."
>
>I will let Bruce explain his comment if he wishes, but here is my rationale.
>
>The Board currently has the ability to remove
>any Member or Liaison (with the exception of the
>GAC Liaison). According to the Bylaws, they do
>not need a reason to do so. To my knowledge,
>they have never taken such an action (although
>there are rumours that the threat of doing so
>has caused 1 or 2 Board members to resign). So
>to date, we do not seem to take the ability to
>remove Board members frivolously.
>
>I believe that an AC/SO should be able to remove
>their appointee if they so choose. The Board
>member is not their "representative", but is
>appointed because of a presumed shared set of
>values. If there is evidence that this had
>changed, or perhaps that the person is simply
>not doing the job (ie not showing up or never
>talking to the AC/SO), they should have recourse
>(Larry Strickling used the term "lose confidence
>in them" I think). Yes, it is possible that this
>could be used as a pay-back for voting the
>"wrong" way, but I think it highly unlikely. If
>a Board member from an AC/SO is going to vote
>against the interests of their AC/SO, presumably
>they will talk to the AC/SO and explain their
>rationale. I do agree that such a recall should
>require something like a supermajority.
>
>I know of only one case in the history of ICANN
>where an AC/SO was *SO* upset with their
>appointee that they *might* have recalled the
>person if they had the ability. I just cannot
>see the capability being used frivolously, and
>if it was, they would probably have a difficult time re-filling the position.
>
>Any Board member, even without the threat of
>recall, may choose to act in their community's
>interest even if they believe it is against the
>public interest. I'm not sure how we can prevent
>that, and I would hope that the majority of
>people we appoint will understand their mandate.
>
>The bullet said that the other AC/SOs should not
>be able to gang up on someone else's Board
>member without their support, and remove
>him/her. That would allow the silencing of a
>Board member by those who did not like what they were saying.
>
>I to believe that the community (by large
>consensus) should be able to remove NomCom
>appointees (who have no AC/SO) or the entire Board.
>
>Alan
>
>At 25/02/2015 09:20 AM, Roelof Meijer wrote:
>>All,
>>
>>Regrettably, I had to leave yesterday’s call before the end.
>>
>>Reading the meeting notes that Brenda sent us,
>>there seems to be a kind of contradiction in the end part with:
>>
>>- Recall Board members if not acting in global
>>public interest rather than if not acting in
>>segmented interest of a community. Consider
>>community capture (especially a segment of community).
>>
>>- We should not allow community removal of one
>>Board member in particular – must come from the concerned community.
>>
>>I< think that giving (only) the concerned
>>community the possibility to recall a
>>particular board member, is asking for a
>>situation in which a board member is recalled
>>for not adequately serving the interests of
>>that particular community (while very possibly
>>adequately serving the public interest). Not
>>where we want to end up, as under those
>>circumstances board members will be stimulated
>>to serve their community's interests primarily, instead of the public interest.
>>
>>In my opinion, the power to recall the board
>>(or part there of) can only be effectively
>>given to representatives of the community (as
>>opposed to the community as a whole), as
>>discussed e.g. through a membership structure,
>>a permanent CCWG, delegates, supervisory board
>>etc. The power should be implemented through
>>vote and the motion should require a supermajority to pass.
>>
>>Best,
>>
>>Roelof
>>
>>From: Brenda Brewer
>><<mailto:brenda.brewer at icann.org>brenda.brewer at icann.org >
>>Date: woensdag 25 februari 2015 14:40
>>To:
>>"<mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
>>accountability-cross-community at icann.org"
>><<mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
>>accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
>>Subject: [CCWG-ACCT]
>>Notes-Recordings-Transcript links for CCWG ACCT Session #14 24 February
>>
>>[]
>>
>>Dear all,
>>
>>The notes, recordings and transcripts for the
>>CCWG ACCT Session #14 call on 24 February will
>>be available here:
>><https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=52889476>https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=52889476
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>Action Items
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>ACTION ITEM: Becky Burr and Kavouss Arasteh to further discuss offline
>>ACTION ITEM: Jonathan Zuck to suggest how we could change format
>>ACTION ITEM: Legal subteam to review and refine
>>questions and determine whether WS1/WS2
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>Notes
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>1. Statement of interest to be uploaded/updated
>>- contact staff if help needed
>>
>>2. Activity report from Work Parties
>>
>>WP 1
>>
>>- WP1 has developed a draft work plan, has
>>agreed on working methods, is working with an
>>aggressive deadline and plans to deliver WP output by March 11.
>>
>>- Volunteers are developing templates for each
>>power and mechanism. Current gaps will be
>>picked up. Editors will review content.
>>
>>- Triggered and non triggered categorization
>>has been applied to items in paper, resulting
>>in an initial allocation between two Working
>>parties. WP1 is awaiting WP2 feedback to allocate tasks.
>>
>>- WP1 has structured mechanisms around powers
>>and finds the accountability mechanism template
>>challenging in some ways: some questions are
>>more relevant to mechanisms and vice-versa. It
>>envisions to produce recommendations on how to
>>improve it. It was commented that questions
>>would not have same relevance to both
>>categorizations and will be reviewed and addressed as progress is made.
>>
>>- It was observed that a mechanism gives
>>structure to power and there is need for a
>>procedure and vehicle to support the power.
>>Threshold (consensus/full consensus) also comes into play.
>>
>>- The recommendation is to commence with the
>>analysis of powers and to attach them with mechanisms.
>>
>>- The WP1 walked the CCWG through proposed
>>Bylaws additions on amending ICANN Bylaws to
>>incorporate AOC reviews. The text is merged
>>with periodic structural reviews text that
>>currently exists in Bylaws. Edits to the AoC
>>review process were also suggested. Feedback to
>>suggestions included: should Bylaws give a
>>prescriptive headcount? Stakeholder Groups
>>being subordinates to a structure, is it really
>>necessary to include them? ; It is important to
>>reflect diversity and balance; While support
>>for selections made by SO/ACs, lack of
>>diversity was flagged as a downside and an
>>aspect that could be preserved through
>>selectors; Specifics may change in the future.
>>With the objective of stable Bylaws, consider
>>high level principles that can be included in
>>the Bylaws instead, along with a reference to
>>an external document where specifics would be
>>given. In this approach a very high threshold
>>on ability to change that document would be
>>added; A Bylaws categorization was proposed:
>>1) fundamental and constitutional provisions
>>(stable); 2 functional and operation (less
>>stable); 3) rules relations to elections etc; consider more lengthy timelines.
>>
>>- No decision will be made on the call.
>>
>>---
>>
>>WP2
>>
>>- WP2 has produced a revised scoping document
>>to reflect changes and results of WP 1 work on
>>triggered and non-triggered. Scoping documents for WP1 and WP2 are harmonized.
>>
>>- Close coordination with WP 1 is needed.
>>
>>- A work plan and working methods (based on WP1
>>modus operandi) has been circulated. Standards of work will be discussed.
>>
>>- WP2 plans to have a document available by
>>face-to-face meeting (17 March tentatively)
>>
>>---
>>
>>ST-WP
>>
>>- ST-WP wrapped up presentation of stress test
>>18 (If GAC changes operating procedures from
>>consensus to majority voting). A contributor
>>suggested looking into the preliminary
>>injunction (IRP) regarding delegation of
>>Persian and noted absence of GAC advice and a
>>group of GAC members invoking IRP. Objections
>>were raised by another contributor i.e. outside
>>CCWG mandate and references made to the South Africa communiqué.
>>
>>ACTION ITEM: Becky Burr and Kavouss Arasteh to further discuss offline
>>
>>- ST-WP walked the group through stress test
>>17 (ICANN adds a new TLD in spite of SSR
>>concerns). Feedback included: What is our
>>definition of success within context of stress
>>tests?; Stress tests are going to be measures
>>of degrees -t say yes/no answers will be rare.
>>
>>- No decision will be made on the call.
>>
>>ACTION ITEM: Jonathan Zuck to suggest how we could change format
>>
>>
>>
>>3. Legal Subteam Update
>>
>>- Questions have been suggested and the Subteam
>>is awaiting questions from WP1 and WP2.
>>
>>- Robin is working on framing questions into a
>>letter that can be delivered to law firm that
>>will be selected. Background and context will be included.
>>
>>- Call with final list of law firms will be
>>held. Update on final candidate that will be
>>put forward for hiring by ICANN will be shared asap.
>>
>>- Questions are divided into 3 categories: 1)
>>corporate governance; 2)jurisdictional matters;
>>3) protection of ICANN, antitrust and other law suits.
>>
>>- Given concerns about ccTLD delegation and
>>redelegations remedies (e.g. dispute resolution), feedback is needed.
>>
>>- Feedback included: formulate questions to be
>>list of powers and ask for mechanisms that can
>>accomplish powers as opposed to putting
>>mechanisms up; frame questions using how to
>>trigger response (as opposed to yes/no);
>>lawyers need to know what our requirements are
>>so that can advise what empowerment can be
>>implemented. In context of jurisdictional:
>>global survey of jurisdiction can take ages and
>>cost a fortune; changing jurisdiction will make
>>transition impossible: the group needs to
>>decide if these questions are for WS1; Keep
>>jurisdictional issues open: are there any
>>arbitration or international panel can go to
>>for jurisdictional issues, is there a way to
>>get step into resolution with something simpler
>>to begin with; Jurisdiction might be too
>>complicated, keep it simple (recall Board,
>>Independent Appeals mechanism etc).
>>
>>ACTION ITEM: Legal subteam to review and refine
>>questions and determine whether WS1/WS2
>>
>>
>>
>>4. F2F meeting
>>
>>- Confirmed for 23-24 March 2015 at Hilton
>>Istanbul Bomonti Hotel & Conference Center.
>>
>>- Agenda will be circulated in time.
>>
>>- Discussing May F2F meeting in coordination with CWG-stewardship leadership.
>>
>>
>>
>>5. A.O.B
>>
>>The CCWG discussed removal of individual Board
>>members with a note that architecture needs to
>>be revisited if allowing for entire Board or
>>individual Board. Feedback includes:
>>
>>- Current Bylaws allow that Board can dismiss
>>individual board members if CoI. Individual
>>removal might lead to unhealthy environment, create a witch hunt.
>>
>>- Be careful to not penalize whole group if one group is concerned.
>>
>>- Spilling of Board is a nuclear option and
>>disruptive step. We are seeking incremental,
>>implementable ways to challenge Board decision.
>>The community does not have anybody that
>>represents their interest. We need ability to override and challenge decision.
>>
>>- Board members are appointed because they
>>share a mindset – if not in linne with mindset,
>>should be able to remove this Board
>>member. There is also the case of NomCom
>>appointed members: ability to remove them is
>>needed. Significant consensus among SO/ACs
>>would be needed – the member woould be removed
>>for serious reasons. On the other hand, removal
>>of entire Board is a whole set of issues (interim etc).
>>
>>- A mechanism is needed for the three above:
>>spilling entire board is not disruptive as long
>>as there is a defined method; spilling an
>>individual Board members is a SG/C decision,
>>not a community decision to make. Recall
>>mechanism within process defined for NomCom
>>would take a lot more time. Vote of
>>non-confidence on the Board or all the other need to be in WS1.
>>
>>- Predictability and stability is important:
>>recall of Board members will undermine
>>predictability/stability. Consider reducing term and don't reelect.
>>
>>- Recall Board members if not acting in global
>>public interest rather than if not acting in
>>segmented interest of a community. Consider
>>community capture (especially a segment of community).
>>
>>- We should not allow community removal of one
>>Board member in particular – must come from thee concerned community.
>>
>>
>>_______________________________________________
>>Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
>><mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org>Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
>>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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