[CCWG-Accountability] [ccnso-members] Re: [Cctldworld] [ccTLDcommunity] Fwd: Accountability measures required by CWG Proposal(s)

Dr Eberhard W Lisse epilisse at gmail.com
Fri Jan 16 12:22:21 UTC 2015 

The gTLDs need may be to be explained, again, the necessity of their input into ccTLDs/ccNSO, which is as much as we need another deluge.

I am unaware of such nonsense having made it towards CCWG-Accountability and will object against it, should it.

el

-- 
Sent from Dr Lisse's iPhone 5s


> On Jan 16, 2015, at 13:05, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:
> 
> I’m beginning to think that I may have a blind spot here. Help me to figure this out.
> 
>> Just for clarification, the CWG group is _very_ gTLD Registry focused... and Chuck is very gTLD Registry orientated.
> 
> Agreed. So the remarks by Chuck re ccTLDs are surprising.
> 
>> The gTLDs want the CWG Accountability Group to have a role in determining an Appeals process, whereas it was recognised that ICANN's role with respect to (the majority of) ccTLD reassignment was non-existent.
> 
> How does that sit with Chuck’s suggest that the CCWG...
> 
>>>>> provide an accountability process that registry operators (c's & g's) and possibly governments in the case of
>>>>> ccTLDs can use in cases where they think delegation and re-delegation
>>>>> decisions are not in line with approved policy or for governments local
>>>>> law.
> 
> Unless I’m misreading this then it is saying that coming up with such a process is the job of the CCWG. 
> 
>> The goal of the CWG should be to create a light weight structure of service delivery - as discussed (and agreed) in Frankfurt.
> 
> Agreed that this is the CWG’s role. Chuck’s point was about the expectations of the CCWG on Accountability. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> 
> 
> Chris
> 
> 
>> On 16 Jan 2015, at 22:43 , Paul M Kane <Paul.Kane at icb.co.uk> wrote:
>> 
>> Chris
>> 
>> Just for clarification, the CWG group is _very_ gTLD Registry focused... and Chuck is very gTLD Registry orientated.
>> 
>> During yesterday's call it was recognised that (the majority of) ccTLDs Registries have a very different relationship with ICANN than that of gTLDs Registries.
>> 
>> The gTLDs want the CWG Accountability Group to have a role in determining an Appeals process, whereas it was recognised that ICANN's role with respect to (the majority of) ccTLD reassignment was non-existent.
>> 
>> The goal of the CWG should be to create a light weight structure of service delivery - as discussed (and agreed) in Frankfurt.
>> Over the holiday period the process has been captured and the simple (accountable) structure has become seriously over-complicated.  Overburdening the structure is a game currently being played by some to sink the initiative, or capture it,  and time is needed to redress the balance and loose the excess baggage.
>> 
>> IMHO it is out of scope for the IANA Accountability process to have a sanction to remove an ICANN Director - but this also needs more time to play out.
>> 
>> Best
>> 
>> Paul
>> 
>> 
>> Chris Disspain wrote:
>>> Understood Roelof.
>>> 
>>> My point is that Chuck and others seem to think that it is the CCWG’s job to come up with something cc-specific re delegation and re-delegation ‘disputes’ rather than higher level accountability mechanisms. If we as a community are happy with that then so be it. If we are not then we need to tell them.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Cheers,
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Chris
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> On 16 Jan 2015, at 21:01 , Roelof Meijer <Roelof.Meijer at sidn.nl <mailto:Roelof.Meijer at sidn.nl>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Chris, All,
>>>> 
>>>> I would hope that the CCWG comes up with mechanisms that enhance ICANN¹s
>>>> accountability on a higher level than (just) delegation, revocation etc.
>>>> I am comfortable waiting for (and as I am a member, contributing to) the
>>>> deliverables of the CCWG, in the expectation that, once accountability is
>>>> enhanced and stewardship transitioned, the outcome of the FoIWG can be
>>>> inputted, with satisfactory results for us ccTLDs.
>>>> 
>>>> Yes, I am an optimist, life is great
>>>> 
>>>> Cheers,
>>>> 
>>>> Roelof
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>> On 16-01-15 07:53, "Stephen Deerhake" <SDeerhake at nic.as <mailto:SDeerhake at nic.as>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> Chris,
>>>>> 
>>>>> Speaking for .as, I can say that the idea that "the CCWG [be tasked] with
>>>>> drafting/creating an accountability process re delegation and
>>>>> re-delegation"
>>>>> is a complete non-starter.
>>>>> 
>>>>> How can this be even be a serious consideration of the CCWG?
>>>>> 
>>>>> I believe this issue has been addressed by the work of the FoI-WG, and I
>>>>> don't see the need to re-invent the wheel here.  Perhaps the larger
>>>>> problem
>>>>> is getting ICANN to acknowledge and endorse  the work/findings of the
>>>>> FoI-WG...  I've seen scant evidence of this to date.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Best,
>>>>> 
>>>>> /Stephen
>>>>> 
>>>>> Stephen Deerhake
>>>>> Director of Registry Services
>>>>> AS Domain Registry
>>>>> GDNS LLC
>>>>> +1 212 334 3660
>>>>> +1 212 656 1982 (fax)
>>>>> sdeerhake at nic.as <mailto:sdeerhake at nic.as>
>>>>> sdeerhake at gdns.net
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: cctldcommunity-bounces at cctld-managers.org
>>>>> [mailto:cctldcommunity-bounces at cctld-managers.org] On Behalf Of Chris
>>>>> Disspain
>>>>> Sent: Thursday, January 15, 2015 5:58 PM
>>>>> To: ccTLD Community List; ccNSO Council; ccNSO Members;
>>>>> cctldworld at icann.org
>>>>> Subject: [ccTLDcommunity] Fwd: Accountability measures required by CWG
>>>>> Proposal(s)
>>>>> Importance: High
>>>>> 
>>>>> All,
>>>>> 
>>>>>> We need the Accountability CCWG to provide an accountability process
>>>>>> that
>>>>> registry operators (c's & g's) and possibly governments in the case of
>>>>> ccTLDs can use in cases where they think delegation and re-delegation
>>>>> decisions are not in line with approved policy or for governments local
>>>>> law.
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> I know I keep pressing on this but I want to make sure we all understand
>>>>> before I stop and let it go.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Are we, the ccTLDs comfortable with the CCWG drafting/creating an
>>>>> accountability process re delegation and re-delegation?
>>>>> 
>>>>> Is this something we should be doing ourselves pursuant to the
>>>>> interpretations of the FoI WG?
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>> 
>>>>> Chris
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>> 
>>>>> Chris Disspain | Chief Executive Officer .au Domain Administration Ltd
>>>>> T: +61 3 8341 4111 | F: +61 3 8341 4112
>>>>> E: ceo at auda.org.au | W: www.auda.org.au auDA - Australia's Domain Name
>>>>> Administrator
>>>>> 
>>>>> Important Notice - This email may contain information which is
>>>>> confidential
>>>>> and/or subject to legal privilege, and is intended for the use of the
>>>>> named
>>>>> addressee only. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not use,
>>>>> disclose or copy any part of this email. If you have received this email
>>>>> by
>>>>> mistake, please notify the sender and delete this message immediately.
>>>>> Please consider the environment before printing this email.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Begin forwarded message:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> From: "Gomes, Chuck" <cgomes at verisign.com>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by CWG
>>>>> Proposal(s)
>>>>>> Date: 16 January 2015 01:55:07 AEDT
>>>>>> To: Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca>, CWG IANA
>>>>>> <cwg-stewardship at icann.org>
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Alan,
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> First let me put in writing the what I said in the last weekend call:
>>>>>> We
>>>>> need the Accountability CCWG to provide an accountability process that
>>>>> registry operators (c's & g's) and possibly governments in the case of
>>>>> ccTLDs can use in cases where they think delegation and re-delegation
>>>>> decisions are not in line with approved policy or for governments local
>>>>> law.
>>>>> This may be covered by your item 4 (gTLD Delegation or Redelegation Appeal
>>>>> within ICANN prior to the change request going to IANA) although I am not
>>>>> sure that appeals would always have to happen before going to IANA; that
>>>>> would be preferred though.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Alan - why do you think that this would conflict with item 2
>>>>>> (Independent
>>>>> certification for delegation and re-delegation requests)?  In the case of
>>>>> gTLDs, the decision whether or not a gTLD could be delegated or
>>>>> re-delegated
>>>>> would happen before any certification would occur.  The certification
>>>>> would
>>>>> simply confirm that required steps were followed properly.  For gTLDs I
>>>>> think that any appeal would preferably happen before any certification
>>>>> happened but I suppose it could happen afterwards; those details would
>>>>> need
>>>>> to be defined.  I won't try to venture into the ccTLD world.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On a totally different topic with regard to item 2, I don't think that
>>>>>> is
>>>>> something that we need the Accountability CCWG to deal with that.  In my
>>>>> view, that seems to be clearly in our court.  Any accountability for a
>>>>> certification decision would probably be covered by general accountability
>>>>> processes.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Why is item 6 (Ability to Remove Directors) an action that the CWG needs
>>>>> from the CCWG.  I agree that we need some specific accountability
>>>>> mechanisms
>>>>> from the CCWG but we don't specifically need the one that would allow for
>>>>> the removal of Directors.  That option may provide some of the
>>>>> accountability that the CWG needs but we require that specific option.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Chuck
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> From: cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org
>>>>>> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icannorg] On Behalf Of Alan Greenberg
>>>>>> Sent: Thursday, January 15, 2015 1:12 AM
>>>>>> To: CWG IANA
>>>>>> Subject: [CWG-Stewardship] Accountability measures required by CWG
>>>>>> Proposal(s)
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I believe that this is the minimalist list of accountability measures or
>>>>> accountability-related processes that would be required based on the two
>>>>> proposals currently under consideration.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I have explicitly not included the wider list of measures that the CCWG
>>>>>> is
>>>>> considering for possible inclusion in its WS1, specifically those which
>>>>> the
>>>>> community would like to see and for which the IANA transition might
>>>>> provide
>>>>> additional impetus for the Board to approve, but are not absolutely
>>>>> required
>>>>> to ensure that the IANA transition can occur. I recognize that this is a
>>>>> judgement call that not all might agree with.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> During the last of the four weekend meetings, Chuck mentioned one
>>>>> additional issue, and referred to a chat exchange between him and Donna
>>>>> during the third meeting that listed several other potential
>>>>> accountability
>>>>> issues. Unfortunately, that chat transcript was not preserved due to an
>>>>> error in saving it.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> The list of measures for the Contract Co. model is based on the list
>>>>>> that
>>>>> the Co-Chairs created in December, augmented by Chucks suggestion. I do
>>>>> not
>>>>> believe that the December list has been negated by any work done in the
>>>>> interim, but perhaps I have missed something. I could not find a rationale
>>>>> for the inclusion of the first of the three items, but include it here so
>>>>> that the CWG could decide if it is based on a real need associated with
>>>>> the
>>>>> proposal or not. If included, I would suggest the CWG be more specific as
>>>>> to
>>>>> under what conditions it would apply. Chuck's suggestion seems to conflict
>>>>> with the 2nd measure in that the 2nd measure is specified as being
>>>>> binding.
>>>>> I am also not sure if it could possibly be replaced by the more
>>>>> generalized
>>>>> IAP (once the request goes to IANA).
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> The requirements for the internal-to-ICANN model are based on my
>>>>> discussions with a number of people over the last weeks.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Contract Co. Model Requirements
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 1. Independent Review of Board Actions
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Change the ICANN Bylaws to specify that under certain circumstances (to
>>>>>> be
>>>>> defined) the determinations of an Independent Review of Board Actions
>>>>> Panel
>>>>> would be binding and not implemented at the Board's discretions.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 2. Independent certification for delegation and re-delegation requests
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> This would be a replacement for the authorization function for all
>>>>>> changes
>>>>> to the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database currently performed by the NTIA.
>>>>> The
>>>>> replacement mechanism would have gTLD requests for delegations and
>>>>> re-delegations authorized by an independent third party and its decision
>>>>> on
>>>>> these matters would be binding on ICANN/IANA.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 3. Independent Appeals Panel
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> An independent review panel must be set up to deal with contested
>>>>>> changes
>>>>> to the Root Zone or its WHOIS Database. Although discussions are still
>>>>> ongoing as to the specifics of such a proposal, it is generally agreed
>>>>> that
>>>>> the decisions of such a panel would be binding. There may also be a need
>>>>> for
>>>>> an injunction-like mechanism to defer the change in question during the
>>>>> appeal process.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 4. gTLD Delegation or Redelegation Appeal within ICANN prior to the
>>>>>> change request going to IANA
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> A Registry could appeal an ICANN decision to delegate or redelegate and
>>>>> gTLD, based on policy not being followed (or presumably contractual terms
>>>>> not being followed).
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Internal-To-ICANN Model Requirements
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> This model will require all of the above measures plus the following:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 5. Control over ICANN Board decisions.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> The ability for ICANN Stakeholders, potentially augmented by other
>>>>> non-ICANN entities, to mandate or overrule, a particular Board decision,
>>>>> or
>>>>> to require that the implementation of such a decision be subject to
>>>>> consideration of an independent, binding review. These measures might need
>>>>> to be augmented by advance notice of such decisions and allow the MS
>>>>> community to react. In the most restricted form, this ability might be
>>>>> restricted to decisions related to IANA, but in reality, it may not be
>>>>> practical to define this scope limitation (ie how to recognize an
>>>>> IANA-related decision).
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 6. Ability to Remove Directors
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> The ability of the overall multi-stakeholder community to remove some or
>>>>> all of the Board Directors. In the case of a full Board removal, a
>>>>> mechanism
>>>>> would be required for appointing an Interim Board and then a replacement
>>>>> regular Board. In addition, ACs and SOs could be given the right to recall
>>>>> their appointed Director(s).
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> CWG-Stewardship mailing list
>>>>>> CWG-Stewardship at icann.org
>>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
>>>>> 
>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>> 
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>>>>> 
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>>> 
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> 
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