[CCWG-Accountability] Membership thoughts

Roelof Meijer Roelof.Meijer at sidn.nl
Mon Jan 19 15:23:24 UTC 2015


Thanks Jordan, that’s very helpful. My observation is that the visions have a common strategic line: shifting some of the powers of the ICANN board to another structure and that structure containing customers/stakeholders. How this structure is „filled” and positioned in the governance structure of ICANN, is where the differences occur. One could consider that to be details, indeed to be explored and developed

Regards,

Roelof Meijer

From: Jordan Carter <jordan at internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan at internetnz.net.nz>>
Date: maandag 19 januari 2015 16:00
To: Accountability Cross Community <accountability-cross-community at icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>>
Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Membership thoughts

Hi all

I wanted to explain a bit more why I thought implementing a membership system might be an addition to accountability.

The main point is in building an ICANN that is less centralised.

At the moment, in respect of policymaking, the ICANN bylaws set out various requirements. E.g. my understanding is that the ICANN Board can't make generally policy for ccTLDs except in endorsing the outcome of a PDP from the ccNSO (I caveat it with the fact I haven't researched the bylaws).

There are other areas of ICANN work where there isn't external control of the board. E.g. the budget-setting process, governing scope, and so on.

A lightweight membership structure that gave representatives from the SOs and ACs (and maybe more widely, though at this point I don't see the argument for that) a particular role at a particular general meeting (e.g. approving the budget, approving new members, ratifying changes to the bylaws) would provide new accountability in a fairly straightforward manner.

Such an approach doesn't change the fact the ICANN Board governs the organisation between general meetings; it doesn't create a split board unlike Roeolf's proposal; it works regardless of whether IANA stewardship is concentrated solely within ICANN or is distributed between organisations as it is today. It's a model most people are familiar with.

In the discussion this morning some people offered feedback that it would be complicated. I agree that there are some design decisions that would need to be made:

a) what classes of membership are available
b) what powers do the members collectively have and how do they make use of them
c) what majorities are required in order for decisions to stick

It would be straightforward and possible to make e.g. SO and AC chairs effective "members" of ICANN (we define our own membership system). It would be harder to allow individuals with some standing to join stakeholder constituencies of voters and then allocate shares of total votes across these in a fair way. It would be possible but mad to have a "one member one vote" system where a ccTLD manager had the same say as an Internet user.

If this is a concept to explore and develop further as part of our work, I am happy to help. I have direct experience of this at InternetNZ, and through other organisations. I know many of you would too.


cheers
Jordan

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Jordan Carter

Chief Executive
InternetNZ

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