[CCWG-ACCT] proposal for how community could be delegated to make some decisions

[Dr Eberhard W Lisse]

Repeating myself, I think we must think about what multistakeholder actually means.

A stakeholder in the Names Constituencies has a stake in Names.

A stakeholder in the Address Constituencies has a stake in Addresses.

An End User does not have a (or rather not the same) stake in (the Management of) Addresses or Names. Neither do governments.

And so forth.

Unless we are able to separate this, this is not going to fly.

Never mind that the below is staggeringly difficult to understand. 

And hence to pitch. To Representatives and/or Senators who have the attention span of a Cocker Spaniel, if they are even ideologically willing consider that the earth isn't flat.

el


Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini

> On Jan 25, 2015, at 12:19, Beran Gillen - Yahoo <berangillen at yahoo.com> wrote:
> 
> I agree with Robin on his proposal. It causes minimal disruption yet gets the job done. IMHO I believe this can be implemented provided as Seun pointed out, the right mechanisms are in place for flagging issues
> 
> Regards
> 
> Beran 
> 
> "There is nothing more difficult to arrange and more dangerous to carry through than initiating change..." Machiavelli 
> 
> Sent from my iPhone
> 
>> On 22 Jan 2015, at 00:48, Robin Gross <robin at ipjustice.org> wrote:
>> 
>> To flesh this proposal out a bit further: The "Community" could overturn a board decision on a limited number of key issues via an ombudsman mediated process in which a decision could be rendered via the "Community".  Each individual component of the Community (for example, GAC, GNSO, AT-Large, CCNSO, etc.) would have a proportional weight in the over-all decision of the Community.  Currently, each of these individual components already has internal mechanisms in place to make decisions (take policy positions, elections, etc.) through which the decision of the Community is actually rendered.  This way, we don't need to create a new super-structure to be "Representational".  We can do away with that additional layer entirely - creating the "super board" because decisions can be made in the individual component's internal mechanisms.  This would be a much more bottom-up method of reaching a "Decision of the Community" regarding a particular board decision.  The ombudsman could act as the facilitator of this process: put the issue to vote, collect and tally the votes of the individual components to render the "Decision of the Community".  The board would then be required to adopt this Decision of the Community unless it voted (unanimous or super-majority) to not adopt the Decision of the Community, which could be stipulated to in bylaws.   The board would retain ultimate decisional authority as required by Cal Corp law, but it would be very difficult for it to ignore the bottom-up Decision of the Community.  Coupled with a mechanism to recall recalcitrant board members, this overall model could solve many of our problems and remake ICANN in a more bottom-up fashion without too much structural redesign.  Thoughts?  
>> 
>> Thanks,
>> Robin
[...]
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