[CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile

Jonathan Zuck JZuck at actonline.org
Tue Sep 8 17:48:36 UTC 2015


Exactly




On 9/8/15, 1:31 PM, "accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org on behalf of James M. Bladel" <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org on behalf of jbladel at godaddy.com> wrote:

>Disagree, Nigel.  It¹s not about the past, but rather an effort to
>future-proof the organization against individuals & groups we haven¹t
>event met yet. 
>
>Thanks‹
>
>J.
>
>
>On 9/8/15, 11:59 , "accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org on
>behalf of Nigel Roberts" <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>on behalf of nigel at channelisles.net> wrote:
>
>>Roelof
>>
>>You are a smart guy. You are open and ready to trust. These are
>>admirable qualities.
>>
>>But ICANN, as a collective entity, to those of us who were there at its
>>beginnings needs to continually prove it is worthy of trust.
>>
>>Because back then, it wasn't.
>>
>>And some of us remember.
>>
>>
>>
>>On 08/09/15 17:53, Roelof Meijer wrote:
>>> All,
>>>
>>> Below I pasted some quotes from this thread. And I cannot but wonder.
>>> What are we getting so wound up about? Did we really expected a ³yes,
>>> perfect, let¹s implement this straight away²?
>>> But what makes me wonder most is why, for heaven¹s sake, do we see the
>>> board as a unity of ill-doers?
>>>
>>> The board members that have participated in our work are individuals
>>> that I hold in high esteem. Quite a few of them tutored me when I
>>> entered this miraculous world of ICANN quite a few years ago.
>>> They gave me different angles and insights, pointed out different
>>> possible views and were open to discussion, disagreement and new ideas.
>>> And were tirelessly working to improve the way we work for the benefit
>>> of the global internet community. And most of them did not change a bit
>>> after they decided to help us all forward even more, make a personal
>>> sacrifice and join ICANN's board.
>>>
>>> In my opinion, there¹s no collective single opinion in any wrong
>>> direction in this board. There is however, a collective intellect and a
>>> level of individual integrity and selfishness that one does not easily
>>> find in executive structures. They deserve our respect. Which, no, does
>>> not mean that we cannot have different opinions.
>>>
>>> When Steve Crocker writes:
>>>
>>> /"We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability
>>> contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse
>>> the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we
>>> believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the
>>> proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the
>>> proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA
>>> requirements.²/
>>>
>>> he in my opinion sends a very clear message that we should happily
>>> receive, as he commits the board. Let¹s await the promised details of
>>> their ideas and keep engaged.
>>> Why should we want to send messages like the following, what do we hope
>>> to achieve? Frustrate the process to a halt?
>>> Read the quotes below, and note the interpretations of what was read or
>>> heard: as in ³while you say, Š. I seeŠ², ³when you say, Š you mean.."
>>>
>>> /"While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I
>>> //see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the
>>> //keystone of the CCWG proposal."/
>>>
>>> //
>>>
>>> /"I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all
>>> the //bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check"/
>>>
>>> //
>>>
>>> /"It should not come as a surprise that ICANN's current structure does
>>> not want changes. Nothing is more natural in a change process than for
>>> those who see some loss of control or authority to oppose it. It is a
>>> very natural human reaction."/
>>>
>>> //
>>>
>>> /"for too long ICANN the corporation has operated according to the
>>> priorities of the legal dept, and especially Jones Day, with the
>>> board-staff simply taking direction from its lawyers (in-house and
>>> out-house), putting the corporation first and the community last" /
>>>
>>> //
>>>
>>> /"When you say you agree to a thing in principle you mean that you have
>>> not the slightest intention of carrying it out in practice."/
>>>
>>> //
>>>
>>> /"And I, for one, do not want the transition //badly enough that I would
>>> capitulate to the Board's effort to completely //distort the proposed
>>> process."/
>>>
>>> //
>>>
>>> /"I understand why the Board does not want to yield power.  That is
>>> precisely //why it must."/
>>>
>>> //
>>>
>>> /"The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just
>>> //operationalization is impressive."/
>>>
>>> //
>>>
>>> /"not surrender and let the Board have complete control //without any
>>> possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again"/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Let¹s all sit back a bit and reflect. On ourselvesŠ
>>>
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>>
>>> Roelof Meijer
>>>
>>> SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE
>>> NETHERLANDS
>>> T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05
>>> roelof.meijer at sidn.nl <mailto:roelof.meijer at sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl
>>> <http://www.sidn.nl/>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 07-09-15 20:14, "accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>>> <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org> on behalf of
>>> Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>>> <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org> on behalf of
>>> avri at acm.org <mailto:avri at acm.org>> wrote:
>>>
>>>     Hi,
>>>
>>>     First, my perceptions are not colored by Trust.  I trust the Board
>>>and I
>>>     trust that you are all well intentioned people who are doing the
>>>best
>>>     you can for ICANN.  I believe that none of you has an ulterior
>>>motive of
>>>     personal advantage for the positions you take.  I go so far in my
>>>trust
>>>     of the Board members as being among those who do not believe that a
>>>     Board member would ever take a position just because it would help
>>>him
>>>     get elected and in the future would never believe that a Board
>>>member
>>>     would change her position due to a concern with being removed from
>>>the
>>>     Board.  I am sure that each and every Board member would resign
>>>from the
>>>     Board if they believed their effect were deleterious on ICANN and
>>>the
>>>     Internet.
>>>
>>>     My issue has to with with different perspectives.  Perspective from
>>>the
>>>     Board that holds all the power, and from the community that wishes
>>>to
>>>     become empowered, at leas to a degree.
>>>
>>>     While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue,
>>>I
>>>     see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the
>>>     keystone of the CCWG proposal.
>>>
>>>     I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the
>>>all the
>>>     bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check.  I
>>>think
>>>     this is problematic and may be a barrier to finding a solution to
>>>the
>>>     current impasse.
>>>
>>>     Some inset comments below.
>>>
>>>     On 07-Sep-15 04:22, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" wrote:
>>>
>>>         Hi Avri,
>>>
>>>         it is not easy for me to disagree with you. In most of the areas
>>>         where we work together we have consensus or rough
>>>         consensus.  But here we have one of this seldom cases of
>>>         disagreement. I recognize your statement but I am asking myself
>>>         whether it is grounded on facts or on mistrust?
>>>
>>>         What are the facts? For nearly all CCWG building blocks we have
>>>         an agreement:
>>>         €Community empowerment (Agreeement)
>>>
>>>
>>>     I do not see the Board as agreeing with the basic proposal.  Maybe
>>>it is
>>>     a matter of degree. The Board wishes to empower the community to a
>>>lower
>>>     extent than the community considers empowerment.  As explained by
>>>other,
>>>     you want to give the community more appeal mechanisms, whereas on
>>>some
>>>     fundamental issues the community requires decision making
>>>empowerment.
>>>     The concepts are so far apart, it cannot be called 'agreement' in
>>>any
>>>     straightforward definition of the term..
>>>
>>>         €Removal of the Board (Agreement with some minor specifications)
>>>
>>>
>>>     Sort of ok. I think there is a bit of very unflattering conjecture
>>>on
>>>     the Board's part of a capricious and vengeful community.  Why do you
>>>     fear us so?
>>>
>>>         €Fundamental Bylaws (Agreement)
>>>
>>>
>>>     Not really, the CCWG proposal required that the Community have a
>>>direct
>>>     say on changes to fundamental bylaws and articles of incorporation.
>>>     Raising the Board's threshold and consultations do not match the
>>>     requirements at all.  The are qualitatively different proposals.
>>>
>>>
>>>         €Operational Plan (Agreement)
>>>         €Budget (Agreement with some minor clarifictions)
>>>
>>>
>>>     How minor are those clarifications?  My impression in the meeting
>>>was
>>>     that they, like many of the other 'minor' issues where actually
>>>based on
>>>     fundamental disagreements.
>>>
>>>         €Enforceability (Agreement)
>>>
>>>
>>>     I think you make a mistake about this.  The Board seems to assume
>>>that
>>>     we want to run off to court every time we are thwarted.  Nothing
>>>could
>>>     be further from the truth.   The CCWG plan was designed to make
>>>going to
>>>     court the end of a very long chain of other options that should not
>>>be
>>>     necessary.  The Board seems to offer a fast path to court. The CCWG
>>>plan
>>>     balances the empowerment of the community with the empowerment of
>>>the
>>>     Board nd strengthened redress mechanisms. It creates a new
>>>participant
>>>     in the checks and balances.
>>>
>>>         €IRP (Agreement)
>>>
>>>
>>>     Without allowing for binding decisions, it can't be called
>>>agreement.
>>>
>>>         €Ombudsman (Agreement)
>>>
>>>         We have a disagreement with regard to the Sole Membership Model.
>>>
>>>
>>>     Which is the keystone of the proposal and the reason that the other
>>>     parts of the solution would work.
>>>
>>>         For me the remaining open issues can be solved by further
>>>         intensification of the dialogue within the community including
>>>         CCWG and Board members. We have enough legal advice from
>>>         different perspectives. If needed, we could get a third legal
>>>         advice. But at the end it is the community which has to make the
>>>         decision.
>>>
>>>
>>>     The community makes the decision?  I thought the situation here was
>>>that
>>>     ultimately the Board would make the decision.  Had the community
>>>been
>>>     making the decision, this process would have been like the CWG
>>>process.
>>>     Once we would have finished the last comment period we would have
>>>     submitted out proposal and then we could have moded on to the
>>>     implementation phase.
>>>
>>>
>>>         This is the last mile. It is very natural that in such a
>>>         complicated transition in the final stage there are some
>>>         remaining controversies. In my eyes, there are not 20 miles to
>>>         go (as Becky has proposed). The main work is done. And it is
>>>         good work, also thanks to the CCWG, to its co-chairs, to its
>>>         members and to the input from the broader community. The whole
>>>         process is a very encouraging example which shows how the
>>>         multistakeholder approach works in practice. This is an
>>>         important signal also towards the WSIS 10+ Review process in New
>>>         York.
>>>
>>>
>>>     If the Board were closer to agreeing with the CCWG proposal, I
>>>would be
>>>     able to agree.  But given the explanations we have had of the MEM
>>>and
>>>     the Board's other possible solutions, I just do not see this.  To
>>>me,
>>>     this looks like the morning of a multiday bike bike tour when a
>>>century*
>>>     or two are left to the finish. But maybe it is more like a climb of
>>>     Everest at the last stage - stage 4, but i have never tried that.
>>>
>>>     (*century as in 100 km or miles - lets go with km, that is a little
>>>     better)
>>>
>>>
>>>         The reason why I have problems with the sole membership model is
>>>         simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the
>>>         checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board (and
>>>         the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in my
>>>         eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model  is untested, has a
>>>         number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects.
>>>
>>>
>>>     Whereas I see this as a fundamental check and balance element that
>>>     compensates for the removal of ICANN's only external oversight.  An
>>>     organization that removes formal external oversight needs a stronger
>>>     notion of community oversight mechanisms.  The AOC reviews are a
>>>good
>>>     start, but we have seen that not only do the recommendations
>>>sometimes
>>>     get perverted in implementation (for example bylaws changes that
>>>made
>>>     the IRP less useful rather than more so, as had been recommended by
>>>     ATRT1) or rather lackadaisically as we have seen with ATRT2
>>>     recommendations that are green lighted for someday over the
>>>rainbow.  As
>>>     people pointed out to me frequently when I spoke of ATRT2
>>>     recommendations, I mostly had to add: "but we are still waiting."
>>>
>>>     You speak of untested models. The only model that has been tested
>>>is the
>>>     current model without any changes.  And we have seen that this is a
>>>     model that does nothing to curb the creative and spending
>>>exuberance of
>>>     the Board.  It is a model that will not work without ultimate
>>>oversight
>>>     somewhere.  This we can see strong evidence for.  As we become free
>>>from
>>>     government's ultimate control, we have to make sure that the
>>>community,
>>>     one that is ever outreaching, has adequate oversight.  We need the
>>>SMCM
>>>     in order to replace NTIA's ultimate responsibility. This cannot be a
>>>     transition of the absence of oversight, but rather must be a
>>>transition
>>>     to community oversight. It is this that I don't think the Board has
>>>     accepted, and that is the crux of the matter. I think it is
>>>something
>>>     that the CWG proposal requires.
>>>
>>>         I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save
>>>         enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale why
>>>         Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the proposed
>>>         mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included in
>>>         an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching the
>>>         well designed balance between governments and the
>>>         non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem.  And there
>>>         are other detailed questions.
>>>
>>>
>>>     In one respect, I  agree with you.  I want all ACSO to have equal
>>>     footing in the SMCM, but am in the minority on that one as I want
>>>its
>>>     structure to resemble essence of the matrix balance that exists in
>>>the
>>>     ICANN system architecture. Nonetheless, I do not see major
>>>opportunity
>>>     for capture in the reference model as the initiation mechanisms for
>>>     action and the vote thresholds are so high they do not facilitate
>>>     capture. And the simpler we are allowed to implement, the less
>>>chance
>>>     there will be for capture and other shenanigans.
>>>
>>>
>>>         The Sole Membership Model, as it is proposed now, is still too
>>>         vague, too unbalanced, too confusing.
>>>
>>>
>>>     I disagree.  It is fairly direct and limited.  It has defined scope
>>>and
>>>     functions.  The only fuzzy part is the voting thresholds and the
>>>     modalities by which it worst internally, but that is an
>>>implementation
>>>     detail.
>>>
>>>         It is not yet ready for adoption.
>>>
>>>
>>>     We disagree on this.
>>>
>>>            It needs a lot of more work.
>>>
>>>
>>>     We agree on this, but those are implementation details.  That fact
>>>of an
>>>     SMCM is not a mere operationalization detail as the Board seems to
>>>     claim, but its implementation modalities may be.
>>>
>>>         There are too many weak points. Go back to the table which was
>>>         presented by Sidley in Paris where they showed us the plus and
>>>         minus of the three models. It is true that the Sole Membership
>>>         Model was the best of the three with more plus and less minus
>>>         than the other two. But in total, all the three models were far
>>>         away to meet the NTIA criteria, to be save enough against
>>>         capture and to enhance ICANNs operational stability and
>>>         security.  More innovation, more creativity and more careful
>>>         analysis are needed. I raised my doubts in BA. I repeated this
>>>         in Paris. And I raised my voice in the various telcos.
>>>
>>>
>>>     I think you will find if you investigate it that many of the
>>>weaknesses
>>>     of the model have been dealt with.  perhaps Sidley and Adler will
>>>help
>>>     us with that.
>>>
>>>
>>>         My first proposal was to dislink the discussion of the sole
>>>         membership model from WS 1 and to have more time to go into the
>>>         details of such a needed new mechanism in WS 2. This is
>>>         obviously impossible. We have to propose something here and now
>>>         within WS 1. I know that some CCWG members have mistrust into a
>>>         long-term process and speculate that if they do not get it now
>>>         they will get it never. I think this is wrong.  The process is
>>>         unstoppable.
>>>
>>>
>>>     Again you miss the point about the SMCM being the the keystone in
>>>this
>>>     system construction.  Removing it requires going back to the
>>>beginning
>>>     as it holds everything together.
>>>
>>>     As soon as WS1 in complete, the process will be stoppable unless the
>>>     community model has been implemented.  As long as the Board remains
>>>     unchecked, and only accessible by appeal, a system that has failed
>>>at
>>>     ICANN since its beginnings, there will be no way fro redress Board
>>>     actiions.  If there is one thing ICANN has nearly always failed in
>>>it is
>>>     redress mechanisms.   After all these years of failure in redress
>>>     mechanism why should anyone be convinced on ICANN's future redress
>>>     mechanisms.  Here we have proof of what doesn't work.  New RR, IRP,
>>>     ombudsman roles roles &c, are the experimental part of this
>>>proposal. I
>>>     have faith that with a SMCM we can insure that there are genuine
>>>     improvements to the redress mechanisms, but in today's Board
>>>     configuration, it is impossible to believe in redress at ICANN.
>>>
>>>
>>>         My impression is that the majority in the community sees this
>>>         indeed as an ongoing process of ICANNs improvement which will
>>>         not stop with the IANA transition. In BA I argued that after the
>>>         IANA transition (WS 1) and an enhanced accountability (WS 2) we
>>>         will need to discuss a restructuring of ICANN to adjust its
>>>         various SOs and ACs and CCWGs to the new challenges of a
>>>         changing environment. I did call this ³WS 3² and ³ICANN 2020².
>>>         And I also argued that small steps are better than big jumps.
>>>
>>>
>>>     Yes any organization that does not continually improve is doomed.
>>>but
>>>     we should get to a point of sufficient accountability in good time,
>>>and
>>>     leave the future to necessary tweaking.
>>>
>>>     I find the invention of WS3 to be the first step in the process of
>>>     taking decisions out of WS2 and see it as the tip of the spear for
>>>     thwarting future change. Anything hard, lets push it to WS2, and
>>>then to
>>>     WS3...
>>>
>>>
>>>         More or less we are witnessing now what Bill Clinton told us in
>>>         San Francisco that getting Internet Governance right is like
>>>         stumbling forward. As longs as it goes forward, it is ok. And
>>>         what we are doing now is to prepare the next (small) stumbling
>>>         step forward.  With other words, we have to be patient and to do
>>>         now what can be done now and what is needed under WS 1 to allow
>>>         the termination of the IANA contract. But this will not be the
>>>         end of the story. It will go on.
>>>
>>>
>>>     I am not quite the Bill Clinton fan you are.  And find that too much
>>>     stumbling, as we often see among the Clintons, is not really the
>>>best
>>>     example.  Yes, if we are about to fall, stumbling forward is
>>>preferable,
>>>     but I would prefer to see us get our multistakeholder model beyond
>>>the
>>>     stumbling phase.
>>>
>>>     As for being patient, sorry, been too long coming.  We have been
>>>     patient.   My experience is of at least of decade of 'soon come.'
>>>For
>>>     others it is  much longer.
>>>
>>>     But if patient I must be,  I am ready to be patient now and wait for
>>>     transition until we are ready.
>>>
>>>
>>>         And here is a final observation.  To put it ­ like Greg ­ as a
>>>         conflict as ³Board on Top² vs. ³Community on Top² is misleading.
>>>         Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are
>>>         selected by the community. Both are accountable to the
>>>         community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we all
>>>         are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a
>>>         better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with
>>>         more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system.
>>>
>>>
>>>     The politics of Tops and Bottoms is always tough unless there is
>>>real
>>>     mutual trust of each party by the other. You claim that the
>>>community
>>>     does not trust the Board, that may be the case among some parts of
>>>the
>>>     community.  I claim that a far greater lack of trust is displayed
>>>by the
>>>     Board for the community.  I think many of your comments are colored
>>>by a
>>>     pervasive distrust of the community and its purported drive to
>>>capture
>>>     and game.
>>>
>>>     Once a community member becomes a Board member she adopts a new
>>>     perspective and set of responsibilities.  This is what makes the
>>>Board
>>>     another part of the community while not representing the community.
>>> For
>>>     a the Board to become a genuine member of the community, it needs to
>>>     give up its role as benevolent despot and accept the need for the
>>>     community to balance its power. ICANN needs a community that can
>>>check
>>>     and balance the Board's unilateral power.
>>>
>>>     The CCWG model defines a degree of power sharing between the two as
>>>the
>>>     best solution for replacing NTIA oversight.
>>>
>>>     avri
>>>
>>>
>>>         Wolfgang
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>         -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
>>>         Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>>>         <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org> im
>>>         Auftrag von Avri Doria
>>>         Gesendet: Sa 05.09.2015 08:17
>>>         An: accountability-cross-community at icann.org
>>>         <mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
>>>         Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last
>>>         Mile
>>>         Hi,
>>>
>>>         The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just
>>>         operationalization is impressive.
>>>
>>>         I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean
>>>         capture
>>>         by the community from the Board.  I suppose that from their
>>>         perspective
>>>         the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it
>>>         gives the
>>>         community a share of the power they now hold for themselves.  I
>>>         think
>>>         any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an
>>>         analysis who
>>>         who has captured the current ICANN model.  Capture is always an
>>>         interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to
>>>share my
>>>         power now?"  I am all for opening up the discussion to the power
>>>         anlaysi, current, potential and likely.
>>>
>>>         Additionally, I do not understand this statement:
>>>
>>>             where the current proposal still warrants much detail that
>>>             may not be
>>>             achievable
>>>
>>>         While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps
>>>         much
>>>         less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton,
>>>         it is
>>>         not as bad as all of that.  What do they mean that an adequate
>>>         level of
>>>         detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone
>>>         does not
>>>         wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail.
>>>
>>>         I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where
>>>         we, as
>>>         a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition
>>>         so badly
>>>         that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete
>>>         control
>>>         without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever
>>>         again.
>>>         The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to
>>>         community
>>>         oversight.  If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition
>>>         should
>>>         not go forward.
>>>
>>>         We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully.
>>>
>>>
>>>         avri
>>>
>>>         On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote:
>>>
>>>             Original
>>>             link:
>>>             
>>>https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile
>>>
>>>
>>>                 Working Together Through The Last Mile
>>>
>>>             
>>><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>>><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>>><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>>><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>>><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>>><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#
>>>             
>>><https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#%
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>>>ough-the-last-mile#>>
>>>
>>>             I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the
>>>CCWG
>>>             briefing to the ICANN Board
>>>             
>>><https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>,
>>>             and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue
>>>             
>>><https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>.
>>>             All of our dialogues over the past months have been
>>>             illuminating,
>>>             challenging and in my opinion, an important and true
>>>             testament to the
>>>             multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA
>>>             Stewardship Transition.
>>>
>>>             */We support the important improvements for ICANN's
>>>             accountability
>>>             contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal.
>>>             We endorse
>>>             the goal of enforceability of these accountability
>>>             mechanisms, and we
>>>             believe that it is possible to implement the key elements
>>>of the
>>>             proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements
>>>             of the
>>>             proposal within the community's timeline while meeting
>>>             the NTIA requirements./*
>>>
>>>             As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the
>>>             Board
>>>             wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in
>>>             agreement on
>>>             key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for
>>>example:
>>>
>>>                 * Fundamental bylaws.
>>>                 * Specific requirements for empowering the community
>>>             into the bylaws
>>>                   adoption process.
>>>                 * IRP enhancements.
>>>                 * Board and director removal.
>>>                 * ICANN's mission and core values.
>>>                 * Strengthening requirements for empowering the
>>>             community in the
>>>                   budget, operational and strategic planning process.
>>>                 * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments
>>>             Reviews
>>>                   intoICANN bylaws.
>>>                 * Community ability to enforce the accountability
>>>             mechanisms in the
>>>                   bylaws.
>>>
>>>             We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized.
>>>With
>>>             regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability,
>>>             where the
>>>             current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be
>>>             achievable
>>>             we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable
>>>way, as
>>>             increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for
>>>             example,
>>>             capture or diminishing of checks and balances.
>>>
>>>             Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles
>>>             on which
>>>             we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more
>>>             detail on how
>>>             these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be
>>>             implemented within the community identified time frame for
>>>the
>>>             transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not
>>>             result in
>>>             unintended consequences.
>>>
>>>             During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It
>>>             was a lot
>>>             of information to digest in a call (notes around opening
>>>remarks
>>>             
>>><http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem
>>>ber/005160.html>,
>>>             notes
>>>             around 10 points
>>>             
>>><http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem
>>>ber/005161.html>
>>>             
>>><http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem
>>>ber/005161.html%3E>),
>>>             and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration.
>>>             We are
>>>             committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment
>>>             process
>>>             in the next few days, and we look forward to the working
>>>             with the
>>>             community on further details.
>>>
>>>             It is critical that we work together to build enhanced
>>>             accountability
>>>             forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the
>>>             impressive work already done by the community and complete
>>>             the IANAStewardship Transition.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>             _______________________________________________
>>>             Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
>>>             Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
>>>             <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org>
>>>             
>>>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>>>
>>>
>>>         ---
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>>>         https://www.avast.com/antivirus
>>>
>>>         _______________________________________________
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>>>         Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
>>>         <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org>
>>>         
>>>https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>     ---
>>>     This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software.
>>>     https://www.avast.com/antivirus
>>>
>>>     _______________________________________________
>>>     Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
>>>     Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
>>>     <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org>
>>>     https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
>>> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>>>
>>_______________________________________________
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>
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