[CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last Mile
Avri Doria
avri at acm.org
Tue Sep 8 18:17:01 UTC 2015
Hi,
And I think it has more to do with establishing checks and balances that
take into account the loss of the NTIA backstop/oversight.
avri
On 08-Sep-15 13:48, Jonathan Zuck wrote:
> Exactly
>
>
>
>
> On 9/8/15, 1:31 PM, "accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org on behalf of James M. Bladel" <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org on behalf of jbladel at godaddy.com> wrote:
>
>> Disagree, Nigel. It¹s not about the past, but rather an effort to
>> future-proof the organization against individuals & groups we haven¹t
>> event met yet.
>>
>> Thanks‹
>>
>> J.
>>
>>
>> On 9/8/15, 11:59 , "accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org on
>> behalf of Nigel Roberts" <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>> on behalf of nigel at channelisles.net> wrote:
>>
>>> Roelof
>>>
>>> You are a smart guy. You are open and ready to trust. These are
>>> admirable qualities.
>>>
>>> But ICANN, as a collective entity, to those of us who were there at its
>>> beginnings needs to continually prove it is worthy of trust.
>>>
>>> Because back then, it wasn't.
>>>
>>> And some of us remember.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 08/09/15 17:53, Roelof Meijer wrote:
>>>> All,
>>>>
>>>> Below I pasted some quotes from this thread. And I cannot but wonder.
>>>> What are we getting so wound up about? Did we really expected a ³yes,
>>>> perfect, let¹s implement this straight away²?
>>>> But what makes me wonder most is why, for heaven¹s sake, do we see the
>>>> board as a unity of ill-doers?
>>>>
>>>> The board members that have participated in our work are individuals
>>>> that I hold in high esteem. Quite a few of them tutored me when I
>>>> entered this miraculous world of ICANN quite a few years ago.
>>>> They gave me different angles and insights, pointed out different
>>>> possible views and were open to discussion, disagreement and new ideas.
>>>> And were tirelessly working to improve the way we work for the benefit
>>>> of the global internet community. And most of them did not change a bit
>>>> after they decided to help us all forward even more, make a personal
>>>> sacrifice and join ICANN's board.
>>>>
>>>> In my opinion, there¹s no collective single opinion in any wrong
>>>> direction in this board. There is however, a collective intellect and a
>>>> level of individual integrity and selfishness that one does not easily
>>>> find in executive structures. They deserve our respect. Which, no, does
>>>> not mean that we cannot have different opinions.
>>>>
>>>> When Steve Crocker writes:
>>>>
>>>> /"We support the important improvements for ICANN's accountability
>>>> contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal. We endorse
>>>> the goal of enforceability of these accountability mechanisms, and we
>>>> believe that it is possible to implement the key elements of the
>>>> proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements of the
>>>> proposal within the community's timeline while meeting the NTIA
>>>> requirements.²/
>>>>
>>>> he in my opinion sends a very clear message that we should happily
>>>> receive, as he commits the board. Let¹s await the promised details of
>>>> their ideas and keep engaged.
>>>> Why should we want to send messages like the following, what do we hope
>>>> to achieve? Frustrate the process to a halt?
>>>> Read the quotes below, and note the interpretations of what was read or
>>>> heard: as in ³while you say, Š. I seeŠ², ³when you say, Š you mean.."
>>>>
>>>> /"While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue, I
>>>> //see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the
>>>> //keystone of the CCWG proposal."/
>>>>
>>>> //
>>>>
>>>> /"I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the all
>>>> the //bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check"/
>>>>
>>>> //
>>>>
>>>> /"It should not come as a surprise that ICANN's current structure does
>>>> not want changes. Nothing is more natural in a change process than for
>>>> those who see some loss of control or authority to oppose it. It is a
>>>> very natural human reaction."/
>>>>
>>>> //
>>>>
>>>> /"for too long ICANN the corporation has operated according to the
>>>> priorities of the legal dept, and especially Jones Day, with the
>>>> board-staff simply taking direction from its lawyers (in-house and
>>>> out-house), putting the corporation first and the community last" /
>>>>
>>>> //
>>>>
>>>> /"When you say you agree to a thing in principle you mean that you have
>>>> not the slightest intention of carrying it out in practice."/
>>>>
>>>> //
>>>>
>>>> /"And I, for one, do not want the transition //badly enough that I would
>>>> capitulate to the Board's effort to completely //distort the proposed
>>>> process."/
>>>>
>>>> //
>>>>
>>>> /"I understand why the Board does not want to yield power. That is
>>>> precisely //why it must."/
>>>>
>>>> //
>>>>
>>>> /"The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just
>>>> //operationalization is impressive."/
>>>>
>>>> //
>>>>
>>>> /"not surrender and let the Board have complete control //without any
>>>> possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever again"/
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Let¹s all sit back a bit and reflect. On ourselvesŠ
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Cheers,
>>>>
>>>> Roelof Meijer
>>>>
>>>> SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE
>>>> NETHERLANDS
>>>> T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05
>>>> roelof.meijer at sidn.nl <mailto:roelof.meijer at sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl
>>>> <http://www.sidn.nl/>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 07-09-15 20:14, "accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>>>> <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org> on behalf of
>>>> Avri Doria" <accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>>>> <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org> on behalf of
>>>> avri at acm.org <mailto:avri at acm.org>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Hi,
>>>>
>>>> First, my perceptions are not colored by Trust. I trust the Board
>>>> and I
>>>> trust that you are all well intentioned people who are doing the
>>>> best
>>>> you can for ICANN. I believe that none of you has an ulterior
>>>> motive of
>>>> personal advantage for the positions you take. I go so far in my
>>>> trust
>>>> of the Board members as being among those who do not believe that a
>>>> Board member would ever take a position just because it would help
>>>> him
>>>> get elected and in the future would never believe that a Board
>>>> member
>>>> would change her position due to a concern with being removed from
>>>> the
>>>> Board. I am sure that each and every Board member would resign
>>> >from the
>>>> Board if they believed their effect were deleterious on ICANN and
>>>> the
>>>> Internet.
>>>>
>>>> My issue has to with with different perspectives. Perspective from
>>>> the
>>>> Board that holds all the power, and from the community that wishes
>>>> to
>>>> become empowered, at leas to a degree.
>>>>
>>>> While you say the the Single member is just a implementation issue,
>>>> I
>>>> see you attacking one of the fundamental principles, in fact the
>>>> keystone of the CCWG proposal.
>>>>
>>>> I see in the Board's response a fear of the community and of the
>>>> all the
>>>> bad things we might do if we were not kept tightly in check. I
>>>> think
>>>> this is problematic and may be a barrier to finding a solution to
>>>> the
>>>> current impasse.
>>>>
>>>> Some inset comments below.
>>>>
>>>> On 07-Sep-15 04:22, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Hi Avri,
>>>>
>>>> it is not easy for me to disagree with you. In most of the areas
>>>> where we work together we have consensus or rough
>>>> consensus. But here we have one of this seldom cases of
>>>> disagreement. I recognize your statement but I am asking myself
>>>> whether it is grounded on facts or on mistrust?
>>>>
>>>> What are the facts? For nearly all CCWG building blocks we have
>>>> an agreement:
>>>> €Community empowerment (Agreeement)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I do not see the Board as agreeing with the basic proposal. Maybe
>>>> it is
>>>> a matter of degree. The Board wishes to empower the community to a
>>>> lower
>>>> extent than the community considers empowerment. As explained by
>>>> other,
>>>> you want to give the community more appeal mechanisms, whereas on
>>>> some
>>>> fundamental issues the community requires decision making
>>>> empowerment.
>>>> The concepts are so far apart, it cannot be called 'agreement' in
>>>> any
>>>> straightforward definition of the term..
>>>>
>>>> €Removal of the Board (Agreement with some minor specifications)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Sort of ok. I think there is a bit of very unflattering conjecture
>>>> on
>>>> the Board's part of a capricious and vengeful community. Why do you
>>>> fear us so?
>>>>
>>>> €Fundamental Bylaws (Agreement)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Not really, the CCWG proposal required that the Community have a
>>>> direct
>>>> say on changes to fundamental bylaws and articles of incorporation.
>>>> Raising the Board's threshold and consultations do not match the
>>>> requirements at all. The are qualitatively different proposals.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> €Operational Plan (Agreement)
>>>> €Budget (Agreement with some minor clarifictions)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> How minor are those clarifications? My impression in the meeting
>>>> was
>>>> that they, like many of the other 'minor' issues where actually
>>>> based on
>>>> fundamental disagreements.
>>>>
>>>> €Enforceability (Agreement)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I think you make a mistake about this. The Board seems to assume
>>>> that
>>>> we want to run off to court every time we are thwarted. Nothing
>>>> could
>>>> be further from the truth. The CCWG plan was designed to make
>>>> going to
>>>> court the end of a very long chain of other options that should not
>>>> be
>>>> necessary. The Board seems to offer a fast path to court. The CCWG
>>>> plan
>>>> balances the empowerment of the community with the empowerment of
>>>> the
>>>> Board nd strengthened redress mechanisms. It creates a new
>>>> participant
>>>> in the checks and balances.
>>>>
>>>> €IRP (Agreement)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Without allowing for binding decisions, it can't be called
>>>> agreement.
>>>>
>>>> €Ombudsman (Agreement)
>>>>
>>>> We have a disagreement with regard to the Sole Membership Model.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Which is the keystone of the proposal and the reason that the other
>>>> parts of the solution would work.
>>>>
>>>> For me the remaining open issues can be solved by further
>>>> intensification of the dialogue within the community including
>>>> CCWG and Board members. We have enough legal advice from
>>>> different perspectives. If needed, we could get a third legal
>>>> advice. But at the end it is the community which has to make the
>>>> decision.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The community makes the decision? I thought the situation here was
>>>> that
>>>> ultimately the Board would make the decision. Had the community
>>>> been
>>>> making the decision, this process would have been like the CWG
>>>> process.
>>>> Once we would have finished the last comment period we would have
>>>> submitted out proposal and then we could have moded on to the
>>>> implementation phase.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This is the last mile. It is very natural that in such a
>>>> complicated transition in the final stage there are some
>>>> remaining controversies. In my eyes, there are not 20 miles to
>>>> go (as Becky has proposed). The main work is done. And it is
>>>> good work, also thanks to the CCWG, to its co-chairs, to its
>>>> members and to the input from the broader community. The whole
>>>> process is a very encouraging example which shows how the
>>>> multistakeholder approach works in practice. This is an
>>>> important signal also towards the WSIS 10+ Review process in New
>>>> York.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If the Board were closer to agreeing with the CCWG proposal, I
>>>> would be
>>>> able to agree. But given the explanations we have had of the MEM
>>>> and
>>>> the Board's other possible solutions, I just do not see this. To
>>>> me,
>>>> this looks like the morning of a multiday bike bike tour when a
>>>> century*
>>>> or two are left to the finish. But maybe it is more like a climb of
>>>> Everest at the last stage - stage 4, but i have never tried that.
>>>>
>>>> (*century as in 100 km or miles - lets go with km, that is a little
>>>> better)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The reason why I have problems with the sole membership model is
>>>> simple: I am in favor of a new mechanism to strengthen the
>>>> checks and balances in the ICANN system to keep the board (and
>>>> the other ICANN bodies) accountable to the community. But in my
>>>> eyes the proposed Sole Membership Model is untested, has a
>>>> number of risks and is open for unintended side-effects.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Whereas I see this as a fundamental check and balance element that
>>>> compensates for the removal of ICANN's only external oversight. An
>>>> organization that removes formal external oversight needs a stronger
>>>> notion of community oversight mechanisms. The AOC reviews are a
>>>> good
>>>> start, but we have seen that not only do the recommendations
>>>> sometimes
>>>> get perverted in implementation (for example bylaws changes that
>>>> made
>>>> the IRP less useful rather than more so, as had been recommended by
>>>> ATRT1) or rather lackadaisically as we have seen with ATRT2
>>>> recommendations that are green lighted for someday over the
>>>> rainbow. As
>>>> people pointed out to me frequently when I spoke of ATRT2
>>>> recommendations, I mostly had to add: "but we are still waiting."
>>>>
>>>> You speak of untested models. The only model that has been tested
>>>> is the
>>>> current model without any changes. And we have seen that this is a
>>>> model that does nothing to curb the creative and spending
>>>> exuberance of
>>>> the Board. It is a model that will not work without ultimate
>>>> oversight
>>>> somewhere. This we can see strong evidence for. As we become free
>>>> from
>>>> government's ultimate control, we have to make sure that the
>>>> community,
>>>> one that is ever outreaching, has adequate oversight. We need the
>>>> SMCM
>>>> in order to replace NTIA's ultimate responsibility. This cannot be a
>>>> transition of the absence of oversight, but rather must be a
>>>> transition
>>>> to community oversight. It is this that I don't think the Board has
>>>> accepted, and that is the crux of the matter. I think it is
>>>> something
>>>> that the CWG proposal requires.
>>>>
>>>> I am not convinced that the proposed voting mechanism is save
>>>> enough against capture. I did not get a satisfying rationale why
>>>> Advisory Committees are treated so differently in the proposed
>>>> mechanism. I have my doubts how governments can be included in
>>>> an appropriate way into this new mechanism without touching the
>>>> well designed balance between governments and the
>>>> non-governmental stakeholders in the ICANN ecosystem. And there
>>>> are other detailed questions.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> In one respect, I agree with you. I want all ACSO to have equal
>>>> footing in the SMCM, but am in the minority on that one as I want
>>>> its
>>>> structure to resemble essence of the matrix balance that exists in
>>>> the
>>>> ICANN system architecture. Nonetheless, I do not see major
>>>> opportunity
>>>> for capture in the reference model as the initiation mechanisms for
>>>> action and the vote thresholds are so high they do not facilitate
>>>> capture. And the simpler we are allowed to implement, the less
>>>> chance
>>>> there will be for capture and other shenanigans.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The Sole Membership Model, as it is proposed now, is still too
>>>> vague, too unbalanced, too confusing.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I disagree. It is fairly direct and limited. It has defined scope
>>>> and
>>>> functions. The only fuzzy part is the voting thresholds and the
>>>> modalities by which it worst internally, but that is an
>>>> implementation
>>>> detail.
>>>>
>>>> It is not yet ready for adoption.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> We disagree on this.
>>>>
>>>> It needs a lot of more work.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> We agree on this, but those are implementation details. That fact
>>>> of an
>>>> SMCM is not a mere operationalization detail as the Board seems to
>>>> claim, but its implementation modalities may be.
>>>>
>>>> There are too many weak points. Go back to the table which was
>>>> presented by Sidley in Paris where they showed us the plus and
>>>> minus of the three models. It is true that the Sole Membership
>>>> Model was the best of the three with more plus and less minus
>>>> than the other two. But in total, all the three models were far
>>>> away to meet the NTIA criteria, to be save enough against
>>>> capture and to enhance ICANNs operational stability and
>>>> security. More innovation, more creativity and more careful
>>>> analysis are needed. I raised my doubts in BA. I repeated this
>>>> in Paris. And I raised my voice in the various telcos.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I think you will find if you investigate it that many of the
>>>> weaknesses
>>>> of the model have been dealt with. perhaps Sidley and Adler will
>>>> help
>>>> us with that.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> My first proposal was to dislink the discussion of the sole
>>>> membership model from WS 1 and to have more time to go into the
>>>> details of such a needed new mechanism in WS 2. This is
>>>> obviously impossible. We have to propose something here and now
>>>> within WS 1. I know that some CCWG members have mistrust into a
>>>> long-term process and speculate that if they do not get it now
>>>> they will get it never. I think this is wrong. The process is
>>>> unstoppable.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Again you miss the point about the SMCM being the the keystone in
>>>> this
>>>> system construction. Removing it requires going back to the
>>>> beginning
>>>> as it holds everything together.
>>>>
>>>> As soon as WS1 in complete, the process will be stoppable unless the
>>>> community model has been implemented. As long as the Board remains
>>>> unchecked, and only accessible by appeal, a system that has failed
>>>> at
>>>> ICANN since its beginnings, there will be no way fro redress Board
>>>> actiions. If there is one thing ICANN has nearly always failed in
>>>> it is
>>>> redress mechanisms. After all these years of failure in redress
>>>> mechanism why should anyone be convinced on ICANN's future redress
>>>> mechanisms. Here we have proof of what doesn't work. New RR, IRP,
>>>> ombudsman roles roles &c, are the experimental part of this
>>>> proposal. I
>>>> have faith that with a SMCM we can insure that there are genuine
>>>> improvements to the redress mechanisms, but in today's Board
>>>> configuration, it is impossible to believe in redress at ICANN.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> My impression is that the majority in the community sees this
>>>> indeed as an ongoing process of ICANNs improvement which will
>>>> not stop with the IANA transition. In BA I argued that after the
>>>> IANA transition (WS 1) and an enhanced accountability (WS 2) we
>>>> will need to discuss a restructuring of ICANN to adjust its
>>>> various SOs and ACs and CCWGs to the new challenges of a
>>>> changing environment. I did call this ³WS 3² and ³ICANN 2020².
>>>> And I also argued that small steps are better than big jumps.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yes any organization that does not continually improve is doomed.
>>>> but
>>>> we should get to a point of sufficient accountability in good time,
>>>> and
>>>> leave the future to necessary tweaking.
>>>>
>>>> I find the invention of WS3 to be the first step in the process of
>>>> taking decisions out of WS2 and see it as the tip of the spear for
>>>> thwarting future change. Anything hard, lets push it to WS2, and
>>>> then to
>>>> WS3...
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> More or less we are witnessing now what Bill Clinton told us in
>>>> San Francisco that getting Internet Governance right is like
>>>> stumbling forward. As longs as it goes forward, it is ok. And
>>>> what we are doing now is to prepare the next (small) stumbling
>>>> step forward. With other words, we have to be patient and to do
>>>> now what can be done now and what is needed under WS 1 to allow
>>>> the termination of the IANA contract. But this will not be the
>>>> end of the story. It will go on.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I am not quite the Bill Clinton fan you are. And find that too much
>>>> stumbling, as we often see among the Clintons, is not really the
>>>> best
>>>> example. Yes, if we are about to fall, stumbling forward is
>>>> preferable,
>>>> but I would prefer to see us get our multistakeholder model beyond
>>>> the
>>>> stumbling phase.
>>>>
>>>> As for being patient, sorry, been too long coming. We have been
>>>> patient. My experience is of at least of decade of 'soon come.'
>>>> For
>>>> others it is much longer.
>>>>
>>>> But if patient I must be, I am ready to be patient now and wait for
>>>> transition until we are ready.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> And here is a final observation. To put it like Greg as a
>>>> conflict as ³Board on Top² vs. ³Community on Top² is misleading.
>>>> Both the members of the Board and the members of the CCWG are
>>>> selected by the community. Both are accountable to the
>>>> community. As I said in the chat during the recent telco we all
>>>> are sitting in one boat (or in one car) and want to have a
>>>> better, stable, secure, efficient and accountable ICANN with
>>>> more (and stress-tested) checks and balances in the system.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The politics of Tops and Bottoms is always tough unless there is
>>>> real
>>>> mutual trust of each party by the other. You claim that the
>>>> community
>>>> does not trust the Board, that may be the case among some parts of
>>>> the
>>>> community. I claim that a far greater lack of trust is displayed
>>>> by the
>>>> Board for the community. I think many of your comments are colored
>>>> by a
>>>> pervasive distrust of the community and its purported drive to
>>>> capture
>>>> and game.
>>>>
>>>> Once a community member becomes a Board member she adopts a new
>>>> perspective and set of responsibilities. This is what makes the
>>>> Board
>>>> another part of the community while not representing the community.
>>>> For
>>>> a the Board to become a genuine member of the community, it needs to
>>>> give up its role as benevolent despot and accept the need for the
>>>> community to balance its power. ICANN needs a community that can
>>>> check
>>>> and balance the Board's unilateral power.
>>>>
>>>> The CCWG model defines a degree of power sharing between the two as
>>>> the
>>>> best solution for replacing NTIA oversight.
>>>>
>>>> avri
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Wolfgang
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
>>>> Von: accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>>>> <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org> im
>>>> Auftrag von Avri Doria
>>>> Gesendet: Sa 05.09.2015 08:17
>>>> An: accountability-cross-community at icann.org
>>>> <mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
>>>> Betreff: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] Blog: Working Together Through The Last
>>>> Mile
>>>> Hi,
>>>>
>>>> The effort to spin the replacement recommendation as just
>>>> operationalization is impressive.
>>>>
>>>> I do not understand the references to capture unless they mean
>>>> capture
>>>> by the community from the Board. I suppose that from their
>>>> perspective
>>>> the CMSM would appear to be capture in and of itself, as it
>>>> gives the
>>>> community a share of the power they now hold for themselves. I
>>>> think
>>>> any discussion of capture that goes beyond FUD, needs an
>>>> analysis who
>>>> who has captured the current ICANN model. Capture is always an
>>>> interesting topic because it often means: "who is trying to
>>>> share my
>>>> power now?" I am all for opening up the discussion to the power
>>>> anlaysi, current, potential and likely.
>>>>
>>>> Additionally, I do not understand this statement:
>>>>
>>>> where the current proposal still warrants much detail that
>>>> may not be
>>>> achievable
>>>>
>>>> While it is true that is needs a bit more detail, though perhaps
>>>> much
>>>> less that is being claimed - until it is time for implementaton,
>>>> it is
>>>> not as bad as all of that. What do they mean that an adequate
>>>> level of
>>>> detail is not achievable? Though I have learned that if someone
>>>> does not
>>>> wish to accept a proposal, it can never have enough detail.
>>>>
>>>> I think we are facing a critical moment in this transition where
>>>> we, as
>>>> a community, will have to decide whether we want the transition
>>>> so badly
>>>> that we are willing to surrender and let the Board have complete
>>>> control
>>>> without any possibility of ever being subject to oversight ever
>>>> again.
>>>> The transition is the time to switch from NTIA oversight to
>>>> community
>>>> oversight. If this is not possible, then perhaps the transition
>>>> should
>>>> not go forward.
>>>>
>>>> We need to consider this turn of affairs quite carefully.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> avri
>>>>
>>>> On 04-Sep-15 15:53, Grace Abuhamad wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Original
>>>> link:
>>>>
>>>> https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Working Together Through The Last Mile
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>>>> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>>>> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>>>> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>>>> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#>
>>>> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#
>>>>
>>>> <https://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mile#%
>>>> 3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-last-mi
>>>> le#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the-las
>>>> t-mile#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through-the
>>>> -last-mile#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-through
>>>> -the-last-mile#%3E%3Chttps://www.icann.org/news/blog/working-together-thr
>>>> ough-the-last-mile#>>
>>>>
>>>> I'd like to thank everyone who has participated in both the
>>>> CCWG
>>>> briefing to the ICANN Board
>>>>
>>>> <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56132981>,
>>>> and the CCWG and ICANN board dialogue
>>>>
>>>> <https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56133316>.
>>>> All of our dialogues over the past months have been
>>>> illuminating,
>>>> challenging and in my opinion, an important and true
>>>> testament to the
>>>> multistakeholder model as we work toward the IANA
>>>> Stewardship Transition.
>>>>
>>>> */We support the important improvements for ICANN's
>>>> accountability
>>>> contained in the CCWG-Accountability's 2nd Draft Proposal.
>>>> We endorse
>>>> the goal of enforceability of these accountability
>>>> mechanisms, and we
>>>> believe that it is possible to implement the key elements
>>>> of the
>>>> proposal. We want to work together to achieve the elements
>>>> of the
>>>> proposal within the community's timeline while meeting
>>>> the NTIA requirements./*
>>>>
>>>> As we enter the final days of the Public Comment period, the
>>>> Board
>>>> wants to be completely clear on our position. We are in
>>>> agreement on
>>>> key concepts set forward in the CCWG's proposal, for
>>>> example:
>>>>
>>>> * Fundamental bylaws.
>>>> * Specific requirements for empowering the community
>>>> into the bylaws
>>>> adoption process.
>>>> * IRP enhancements.
>>>> * Board and director removal.
>>>> * ICANN's mission and core values.
>>>> * Strengthening requirements for empowering the
>>>> community in the
>>>> budget, operational and strategic planning process.
>>>> * The incorporation of the Affirmation of Commitments
>>>> Reviews
>>>> intoICANN bylaws.
>>>> * Community ability to enforce the accountability
>>>> mechanisms in the
>>>> bylaws.
>>>>
>>>> We have suggestions on how these could be operationalized.
>>>> With
>>>> regards to the mechanisms for community enforceability,
>>>> where the
>>>> current proposal still warrants much detail that may not be
>>>> achievable
>>>> we have a suggestion on how to deliver on it in a stable
>>>> way, as
>>>> increased enforceability must not open up questions of, for
>>>> example,
>>>> capture or diminishing of checks and balances.
>>>>
>>>> Let's work together on operationalizing the above principles
>>>> on which
>>>> we agree. Once again, we are committed to providing more
>>>> detail on how
>>>> these ideas can be operationalized in a way that they can be
>>>> implemented within the community identified time frame for
>>>> the
>>>> transition, as well as have sufficient tested grounds to not
>>>> result in
>>>> unintended consequences.
>>>>
>>>> During last night's discussion we shared this feedback. It
>>>> was a lot
>>>> of information to digest in a call (notes around opening
>>>> remarks
>>>>
>>>> <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem
>>>> ber/005160.html>,
>>>> notes
>>>> around 10 points
>>>>
>>>> <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem
>>>> ber/005161.html>
>>>>
>>>> <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-Septem
>>>> ber/005161.html%3E>),
>>>> and we appreciate everyone giving our advice consideration.
>>>> We are
>>>> committed to submitting our comments into the Public Comment
>>>> process
>>>> in the next few days, and we look forward to the working
>>>> with the
>>>> community on further details.
>>>>
>>>> It is critical that we work together to build enhanced
>>>> accountability
>>>> forICANN and continue to refine and flesh out details of the
>>>> impressive work already done by the community and complete
>>>> the IANAStewardship Transition.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
>>>> <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org>
>>>>
>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>>>>
>>>>
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>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
>>>> <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org>
>>>>
>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
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>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
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>>>> <mailto:Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org>
>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
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>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
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