[CPWG] [GTLD-WG] [registration-issues-wg] Verisign DissingDomainers?

[Evan Leibovitch]

On Sat, 3 Nov 2018 at 06:49, Kan Kaili <kankaili at gmail.com> wrote:


> We all know the famous theory about the "invisible hand".  That is, the
> market's invisible hand always wins over the govenrment's visible control.
>
>

We know of it. That knowledge neither makes this theory correct nor does it
indicate benefit to end-users (which is, I remind, is the singular
Board-mandated perspective of ALAC -- the industry has plenty of its own
channels to assert its voice within ICANN and does not need our defence).


> The ICANN's structure and way of controling domain names' pricing often
> reminds me of the land sale policy, because they have so many
> similarities: Each individual ones are unique and irreplacible.
>

So, let's dig deeper into the land analogy.

Mark Twain was famously quoted
<https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/mark_twain_380355> as saying "*Buy
land, they're not making it anymore*".

But that's not at all the case here. Each TLD is a source of nearly
infinite domains (especially if you consider third level) and the domain
industry is intent in realizing the potential of infinite numbers of TLDs.
So the land analogy is not at all applicable, supply is unrestrained.

HOWEVER, what kind of property acquisition is a registrant's getting a
domain? It's not a purchase, since if you don't pay the annual dues you
lose the domain. So to carry the land analogy to its reasonable conclusion,
registrants are tenants, registrars are rental agents, registries are
lease-holding landlords, and ICANN (and the ccTLDs) create and own the land
.

It is not without reason that many jurisdictions have legislation or
regulation either asserting tenant rights or offering various protections
<https://www.globalpropertyguide.com/faq/landlord-and-tenant-law>, and some
even have price controls. This tends to flow from demonstrated cases of
tenant abuse or unreasonably inflated rents which are seen to impede the
public good. The level of protections varies wildly but most states
recognize this as a particular commercial environment in which the
"invisible hand" usually needs a glove.

However, just like pieces of land, each domain name obviously have
> different values.  Thus, their market prices cannot, and should not, be the
> same.  Thus, although ICANN sets price-caps for registries, but cannot
> control their market values and prices via registrars or "scalpers".  If
> this is the case, why should ICANN bother to set price-caps at the first
> place?
>

I have always said that domains were undervalued, and that ICANN's fee
should be significantly higher than it is now. The currently artificially
low price encourages speculation and provides a financial incentive for
"domainers" to lock away domains that should very well be in use now. The
artificially low price also means that ICANN has to starve its own
public-interest activities such as contract compliance, abuse prevention
and ALAC support -- and this happens because the industry controls ICANN
and has a direct and obvious interest in keeping such activities
underfunded. (Proper pricing may also have prevented the current
environment of austerity.)

Were we to truly care about a market system we would allow -- maybe even
force -- domains to be sold at market rate. That is, require unused domains
to be sold at auction to determine their true value. But again, this won't
happen because the industry thrives on its speculators who buy domains that
never get used, so the industry uses its substantial clout to coerce ICANN
into seeding and fertilizing such an environment (and my my there is plenty
of fertilizer to go around...)
Cheers,
- Evan
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