[CWG-Stewardship] FW: Do we really need a Contracting Co.?

Matthew Shears mshears at cdt.org
Fri Dec 5 11:13:19 UTC 2014


Hi

The recurring RFP approach would not cause any more turmoil than we 
could have under the present contract construct.  For example, a 5 year 
recurring RFP would be a longer contract period than the current 
NTIA-ICANN contract (which is 3 years, /with two two-year options to 
extend//that are entirely at the discretion of the USG /which one can 
argue do not provide the kind of contractual predictability we would 
want).  Extensions, and whether they might be awarded or not, merely 
contribute to longer term uncertainty.   W/r/t/ continuity and stability 
the operator, according to section C.7.3 of the current contract, is 
required to provide a "a plan in place for transitioning each of the 
IANA functions to ensure an orderly transition while maintaining 
continuity and security of operations" in the event that "the Government 
selects a successor contractor."  Of course these safeguards should be 
kept to ensure continuity from one operator to another post  RFP.  A 
recurring 5 year RFP offers more certainty from a contracting 
perspective than what we have at the moment and, it could be argued, 
should provide equal stability and continuity _and_, importantly, 
greater accountability.

Matthew

On 12/5/2014 10:13 AM, Maarten Simon wrote:
>
> Hi Milton,
>
> It is not that I see the Contracting co as a non option but I try to 
> get a better understanding of what it will actually brings us.
>
> A clear one is that it probably makes a future separation mainly from 
> a legal perspective a bit easier. But as stated by others, I think 
> separation will in whatever form always only be a nuclear option. (I 
> do not like the idea of a recurring 3 or whatever number of years RFP 
> cycle as it will likely cause a lot of political turmoil each time 
> which I think will not be supportive to the stability of the function 
> that the solution is supposed to warrant).
>
> I am further still not sure if I am with you on the power struggle. As 
> I see it now the MRT will be in both options a sort of the ICANN 
> community minus the board and staff. In that case I do not see much of 
> a difference, and certainly do not expect to see that in practice, 
> between the MRT telling the Contracting co to tell the ICANN board 
> what the ICANN board has to do or the MRT telling the ICANN board 
> directly what to do. In the first instance the ICANN board has to 
> follow orders because of a contract. In the second the ICANN board has 
> to follow orders because of its bylaws.
>
> The improvement of the plan would be that we do not need to discuss 
> all kind of legal (capture, liability) and political (jurisdiction) 
> technicalities around an entity we do not need. (as far as the bylaws 
> option is technically legally possible under Californian law).
>
> Best,
>
> Maarten
>
> *From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org 
> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Milton L Mueller
> *Sent:* donderdag 4 december 2014 18:54
> *To:* cwg-stewardship at icann.org
> *Subject:* [CWG-Stewardship] FW: Do we really need a Contracting Co.?
>
> Hi, Maarten
>
> In your scenario, the MRT has to tell the board to do something that 
> it probably won't want to do.
>
> In the CWG scenario, the MRT tells the Contracting Co, which has no 
> interest, what to do.
>
> Clearly, your approach produces an internal power struggle.
>
> If you say the MRT can unambiguously order the board to spin off IANA 
> according to the bylaws, you run into California law problems; but 
> even if you didn't, you are simply making the MRT an authority no 
> different from the Contract Co. How is that an improvement over the 
> CWG plan?
>
> --MM
>
> *From:*Maarten Simon [mailto:maarten.simon at sidn.nl]
> *Sent:* Thursday, December 4, 2014 11:08 AM
> *To:* Milton L Mueller
> *Cc:* 'cwg-stewardship at icann.org'
> *Subject:* RE: [CWG-Stewardship] Do we really need a Contracting Co.?
>
> Milton,
>
> Viable or legal possible are two different things and yes I find the 
> separability principle less central than the stability one and am 
> therefore willing to accept something like the 'kludgy patch' as an 
> escape from ICANN as a worst case scenario and as the last resort 
> safeguard if all others fail.
>
> I further wonder if there will be a different 'ongoing power struggle 
> between the MRT and the board' in the contract co situation or in the 
> internal ICANN situation.  That all depends on the whole set of the 
> arrangements and in the end on the acceptance of the authority of the 
> MRT by the board.
>
> Best,
>
> Maarten
>
> *From:*Milton L Mueller [mailto:mueller at syr.edu]
> *Sent:* donderdag 4 december 2014 15:52
> *To:* Maarten Simon; 'Eduardo Diaz'; 'Holly Raiche'
> *Cc:* 'cwg-stewardship at icann.org'
> *Subject:* RE: [CWG-Stewardship] Do we really need a Contracting Co.?
>
> Maarten
>
> I think this proposal is not viable. In effect, it makes the ICANN 
> board the contracting authority for the IANA functions, thus 
> eliminating the separability principle. You try to patch this problem 
> in a kludgy way by saying that the MRT can "order the ICANN board" to 
> give up the IANA function, which in effect makes the MRT a continuing 
> legal entity, and paves the way for an ongoing power struggle should 
> the MRT and board come into conflict over the future control of IANA.
>
> This is yet another example of people tying themselves in knots and 
> putting at risk the separability principle in order to avoid the 
> simple expedient of creating a Contract Co. But why do you fear the 
> Contract Co so  much? No clear rationale for avoiding this has ever 
> been put forward.
>
> If you want to be able to move the IANA functions contract it is much 
> cleaner and simpler to have an independent, separate contract co.
>
> --MM
>
> *From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org 
> <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org> 
> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Maarten Simon
> *Sent:* Thursday, December 4, 2014 8:56 AM
> *To:* 'Eduardo Diaz'; Holly Raiche
> *Cc:* cwg-stewardship at icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship at icann.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Do we really need a Contracting Co.?
>
> Hi all,
>
> I am of the same opinion and wonder, not noing much about Californian 
> corporate law, if we could find a solution in adding specific elements 
> to ICANN's bylaws specifically aimed on the IANA function.
>
> If we could arrange via the bylaws that the ICANN board explicitly has 
> to follow orders from a MRT-like structure, we might not need a 
> contract but have an (internal) MoU/SLA or whatever. If the ICANN 
> board would at a certain moment in time still decide not to follow 
> orders of the MRT, I would assume it may be sued by affected parties 
> for violating its own bylaws. We further may dictate in the bylaws 
> that ICANN has to give up the IANA function if decided by this MRT and 
> of course seal it by dictating that these specific articles may only 
> be changed with the explicit consent of the MRT.
>
> As I said, I have no clue if such a solution would be possible under 
> Californian law. Under my legal system I think it would.
>
> Best,
>
> Maarten
>
> *From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org 
> <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org> 
> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Eduardo Diaz
> *Sent:* woensdag 3 december 2014 1:19
> *To:* Holly Raiche
> *Cc:* cwg-stewardship at icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship at icann.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Do we really need a Contracting Co.?
>
> Holly and all:
>
> I have the same questions and concerns. Are we taking the route of a 
> Contrac Co, because is what NTIA is expecting to see as part of the 
> proposal or is it because concerns of ICANN accountability. My 
> impression is the second.
>
> -ed
>
> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 7:12 PM, Holly Raiche 
> <h.raiche at internode.on.net <mailto:h.raiche at internode.on.net>> wrote:
>
> Seun
>
> You have summed up the issue wonderfully.
>
> Yes, we appear to be going down the second route.  But there are still 
> questions around that route.  Alan's (and Olivier's and many other's) 
> inputs have asked hard questions about the route - as have I.  In 
> particular, I asked about the proposed Contract Co.  If it is to be 
> created, what is to be its nature, size, powers, funding.  From Greg, 
> it emerged that what was envisaged was a shelf company and the multi 
> stakeholder processes under its umbrella would be the mechanisms of 
> accountability.  Since then, it appears that the Contract Co will be 
> more than a shelf company, so the many questions about its nature, 
> powers, funding remain.  And without answers, I am not sure why the 
> first alternative - fixing the accountability mechanisms - has been 
> rejected.  It appears we are hoping the creation of a legal entity 
> (however small) will solve problems.  I remain to be convinced.
>
> Holly
>
> On 3 Dec 2014, at 7:21 am, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji at gmail.com 
> <mailto:seun.ojedeji at gmail.com>> wrote:
>
> Hi Chuck,
>
> Thanks a lot for sharing this url....its really useful and i am going 
> to hope that the accountability team are looking at scenarios like 
> that to fix ICANN. Inview of this, there are generally 2 routes:
>
> - Fix the accountability mechanisms within ICANN and let the NTIA role 
> naturally go away
>
> - While the accountability mechanism is yet to be fixed, provide a 
> means by which IANA can still be moved out of ICANN
>
> I presume we are currently going the second route at the moment. So a 
> question that i may ask is, will it not be better to work towards the 
> first route through the second route? This will mean maintaining the 
> ability to move IANA from current operator with an external body (can 
> be an existing body like ISOC, IETF etc) or the lightweight 
> (Contracting Co earlier proposed) and then provide certain 
> principles/mechanisms that this CWG expect to have been addressed 
> within specific time-frame.
>
> That will give ICANN (and its community) enough time to work on 
> improving its accountability measures within the timeline indicated by 
> this CWG.
>
> Regards
>
> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 2:05 PM, Gomes, Chuck <cgomes at verisign.com 
> <mailto:cgomes at verisign.com>> wrote:
>
> Seun,
>
> Please see the letter I sent to Fadi in 2013: 
> https://www.icann.org/resources/correspondence/gomes-to-chehade-2013-08-30-en 
> .
>
> Chuck
>
> *From:*cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org 
> <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org> 
> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org 
> <mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Seun Ojedeji
> *Sent:* Tuesday, December 02, 2014 3:57 AM
> *To:* Avri Doria
> *Cc:* cwg-stewardship at icann.org <mailto:cwg-stewardship at icann.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [CWG-Stewardship] Do we really need a Contracting Co.?
>
> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 7:33 AM, Avri Doria <avri at acm.org 
> <mailto:avri at acm.org>> wrote:
>
> On 02-Dec-14 07:16, Seun Ojedeji wrote:
>
> I also don't understand the view that ICANN community and corporate 
> are separate.
>
>
> The ICANN Board and Staff are independent of the Community and can 
> overrule the community either by a vote of the Board, or by calling an 
> action 'implementation' that does not require community agreement.
>
> Okay, may i ask if this is happening at the moment and what the NTIA 
> role has been in making sure it does not happen? because what we are 
> trying to transition is the NTIA role and not ICANN management 
> itself....if there is something that needs to be fixed in the ICANN 
> structure then it could be put in the requirement for transition (most 
> of which should be looked into by the accountability cwg).
>
>     especially since the Board, given its understanding of the its
>     fiduciary responsibility sees itself as NOT representing the
>     community. Adn the staff is governed by a CEO that is not subject,
>     in any way, to community appproval in hiring or contract renewal. 
>     The Community has NO influence over ICANN Staff.
>
> Well in the RIR world the board (by by-law) acts in the interest of 
> the organisation. They may also choose not to listen to the community 
> but they usually wisely choose otherwise.... ;).
>
>     What does that mean? and how is ICANN community different from a
>     typical RIR community.
>
>     In the RIRs there is no body with a vote that can overrule the
>     will of the community in policy making.
>
> The RIR board by the by-law could decide not to approve a policy 
> proposal, its just that they have not had any reason to exercise such 
> powers. So if you are saying there has been consistence instances 
> where a policy that achieved consensus in the ICANN community was 
> overruled by the board, then there is definitely something wrong and 
> will be good to have an example of such scenario to understand why 
> they took such action and determine how to avoid such in future. This 
> is how we build the organisation from inside especially if we 
> understand that ICANN is the home for gTLD
>
>     Please when you think of who pays, think of it from the customer
>     perspective, think of participation, think of the resources that's
>     already been expended in this current ICG process.
>
>
>     How does the contractor paying hurt the consumers?
>
> I think it will be safer to answer this with another question, where 
> will the contractor get the money to pay from?
>
>
>     I persist in seeing the only real possibility of capture in a
>     massively multistakeholder body is that the community process can
>     be captured by ICANN corporate decisions made that disregard the
>     community's consensus, and that is what we need to protect against.
>
> Looks like you are now referring the MRT to be a MASSIVE 
> multi-stakeholder body, please can we fashion out the composition and 
> charter of this organisation so we appreciate what we are looking at. 
> It sure seem there is going to be a lot of mechanism required to 
> ensure that the multistakeholder body is indeed inclusive.
>
> Regards
>
>
>     avri
>
>
>     _______________________________________________
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>     CWG-Stewardship at icann.org <mailto:CWG-Stewardship at icann.org>
>     https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
>
>
>
>
> -- 
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> /Seun Ojedeji,
> Federal University Oye-Ekiti
> web: //http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng/>
> //Mobile: +2348035233535 <tel:%2B2348035233535>//
> //alt email:<http://goog_1872880453/>seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng 
> <mailto:seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng>/
>
> The key to understanding is humility - my view !
>
>
>
>
> -- 
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> /Seun Ojedeji,
> Federal University Oye-Ekiti
> web: //http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng/>
> //Mobile: +2348035233535//
> //alt email:<http://goog_1872880453/>seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng 
> <mailto:seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng>/
>
> The key to understanding is humility - my view !
>
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-- 
Matthew Shears
Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights
Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT)
mshears at cdt.org
+ 44 771 247 2987

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