[CWG-Stewardship] Strickling Remarks from 4 December re IANA Transition and Accountability

Seun Ojedeji seun.ojedeji at gmail.com
Mon Dec 8 10:06:15 UTC 2014 

On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 6:18 AM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> wrote:

> My responses are inline below.
>
>> In fact, it's up to us to identify the *IANA-specific* aspects of
>>> accountability and then determine how the IANA Functions Operator should be
>>> held accountable for failures to implement policy and for failures of
>>> operational excellence. That is our "accountability track."  And this has
>>> been true since we started.
>>>
>>> If i may ask, if this group is able to put in place mechanisms that
>> ensure the function operator is indeed accountable...why/what then is the
>> need for the MRT and CSC?
>>
>>
> The MRT and CSC are integral parts of our accountability mechanisms, along
> with the contract (and the ability to terminate it) and the independent
> Appeals Panel.  What do you think our accountability mechanisms are?
>

Greg i think you did not get my point. My point is that the major
accountability requirement that is IANA specific is that which is related
to ensuring implementation based on existing policies. So if this group (or
the cwg on accountability) is able to fashion out an internal mechanism
that guarantees that aspect. Why will we still need MRT?. I may not have
any issue if MRT's role does not include RFP and if the Contract Co is just
signing of an MOU that is not term based, because at that point, the MRT
will just be something similar to the cwg and will become very much less
attractive (except that its waste of resources). This also will not in
anyway reduce the possibility of moving IANA if need be.

You are perhaps quite experienced in the gTLD space than i am, and
realistically speaking i think the gTLD are the ones who should seek a
permanent solution that makes the role reside within ICANN because
everything about the gTLD currently exist within ICANN and it will not make
any economic sense to move it out. So i find it strange that even if there
is adequate accountability in place within ICANN, you will still insist on
going the contracting route.


>
>>> In my view (and the view of many others in this group), the current CWG
>>> proposal was (and is) seen as the most efficient, effective, and
>>> independent method for achieving this result, and also the best method for
>>> replacing NTIA's other pre-transition roles as well.  I believe we arrived
>>> at this in spite of ICANN's current *general* accountability issues,
>>> not because of them.
>>>
>>
>> Negative...i don't agree that is the best approach and again i don't know
>> how you already determine the proposal is efficient especially when we
>> don't even have the details yet. There are definitely other options that
>> allows moving of IANA from ICANN (if absolutely required) one of which does
>> not even require any contracting/MOU/agreement (which can be implemented by
>> the technical community)
>>
>> We don't have all the details, but we have 10 pages of detail, enough to
> make a preliminary judgment. These other options -- what detail is there
> for these options?  What framework is there for these options?  Until there
> is at least a "strawman" level of detail, these other "options" aren't
> options at all -- they are just empty catchphrases.
>

Greg, please do not over-estimate multistakeholder settings especially when
it has not been put to practice (as it is in this particular case). That
10page details has not touched critical aspect of MRT which is mainly its
formation and charter plus the connection between MRT and contract co (it
is not enough to call this a self company....the details is what is
important)


>
>>> To answer your question directly, I don't believe that the current
>>> proposal is in any way based on the premise that the current operator lacks
>>> -- *and will continue to lack *-- appropriate *general* accountability
>>> mechanisms.  It is based on the premise that removing the NTIA from the
>>> equation requires us to recommend *IANA-specific* accountability
>>> mechanisms, regardless of how improved ICANN's general accountability
>>> mechanisms might be (before or after the IANA Transition).  That is what we
>>> have been tasked to do, and that is what we have done.
>>>
>>
>> Greg, you mentioned earlier that the ability to move IANA is required
>> (although i don't necessarily agree but it doesn't hurt to have it) so if
>> there are adequate mechanism within ICANN wouldn't all that will be
>> required is for the mechanism to trigger movement of IANA from ICANN? Why
>> then do we require all the MRT/CSC structure? I also don't agree that NTIA
>> said we should replicate contracting processes (you may direct me to what
>> part of NTIA announcement that implied such)
>> .
>>
> There is broad support for separability in the CWG.  It's in our
> Principles (letter h) and it's in our Draft Proposal.  You are entitled to
> disagree, but unless you can convince the CWG to change the Principles and
> the Proposal, any option we recommend must include separability.,
>

Well the principles is still in draft state (unless you mean it has just
been finalised), in anycase, i have no problem with maintaining the current
separability and this is something that can still be maintained internally
by adding a few lines in the by-law


> You say "if there are adequate mechanisms within ICANN...."  What are
> these "adequate mechanisms"?  Where would they come from?  Remember, it's
> up to our CWG to come up with mechanisms relating to IANA accountability.
>

.....and this is the issue, we treat IANA accountability as if its rocket
science, i think it may have been a mistake to have separated the CWG as
its making it all look like the accountability this group is looking for is
different from what the CWG-accountability is looking for.


> Your "mechanism" is a complete mystery.  If you want this group to
> consider an "internal to ICANN" mechanism that would move the right to
> perform the IANA Functions out of ICANN (and meet all the other
> requirements in this transition), you'll need to propose one.
>

The NTIA asks us to develop a proposal that transitions its stewardship to
multi-stakeholder. It didn't say that the proposal has to be able to take
the right to perform IANA function out of ICANN. The way i interpreted it
is that ICANN currently has a growing multi-stakeholder environment and
this is the opportunity to transition the stewardship to that community so
if this require updating ICANN-by law...so be it. It is when we propose
such and it gets rejected by ICANN board that we can justify that ICANN is
not yet mature enough and a contracting route will suffice until there is
significant indications of the organisation's maturity


>
> Finally, I never said that the NTIA said we should replicate contracting
> processes. What makes you say that?
>

Well you have just implied that in your statement below


>   However, unless we have another way to accomplish our objectives, the
> contract remains the most practical option.
>

I have "paraphrased" what i believe to be our objective above.

Regards

>
> Greg
>
>> Thanks
>>
>> Regards!
>>
>>>
>>> Greg
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *Gregory S. Shatan **ï* *Abelman Frayne & Schwab*
>>>
>>> *666 Third Avenue **ï** New York, NY 10017-5621*
>>>
>>> *Direct*  212-885-9253 *| **Main* 212-949-9022
>>>
>>> *Fax*  212-949-9190 *|* *Cell *917-816-6428
>>>
>>> *gsshatan at lawabel.com <gsshatan at lawabel.com>*
>>>
>>> *ICANN-related: gregshatanipc at gmail.com <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> *
>>>
>>> *www.lawabel.com <http://www.lawabel.com/>*
>>>
>>> On Sat, Dec 6, 2014 at 2:53 AM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji at gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi Greg,
>>>>
>>>> I am definitely not also in any form of agreement with an extension of
>>>> the timeline especially as it may not be the same story after USA
>>>> elections. I am also not sure I have seen much people calling for extension
>>>> on this list... We both know what has been paramount subject of discussion
>>>> in the last few weeks and timeline is the least of them.
>>>> I am saying since it is definite ( it's a requirement) that some level
>>>> of accountability will/MUST happen before transition, will it not already
>>>> handle some of our fears that actually lead to the creation of the current
>>>> transition proposal. My understanding is that the current transition
>>>> proposal was mainly inspired on the premise of the current operator lacking
>>>> appropriate accountability mechanism... No? As you seem to be implying
>>>> otherwise by your mail.
>>>>
>>>> Cheers!
>>>>
>>>> sent from Google nexus 4
>>>> kindly excuse brevity and typos.
>>>> On 6 Dec 2014 08:36, "Greg Shatan" <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Seun:
>>>>>
>>>>> I don't see how Strickling's remarks provide an "opportunity" for
>>>>> anything.  I presume you are referring to the "spin" that some are putting
>>>>> on this speech as a "hint" that the timeline should be extended.  I think
>>>>> that is a baseless assertion.  The NTIA has indicated since March that they
>>>>> have the option to extend the agreement, so not only is this not "new news"
>>>>> it's no news.  It's also not news that both the IANA transition and
>>>>> accountability "issues must be addressed before any transition takes
>>>>> place."  Not only is this not news to the CWG  or the community, it
>>>>> is in our proposal.  So, I think the direct answer to your question is
>>>>> "No," and wishing won't make it so.
>>>>>
>>>>> The remarks also clearly recognize that there are two work streams --
>>>>> IANA transition and enhanced ICANN accountability. Not to belabor the
>>>>> obvious but we are the "IANA transition" work stream.  Of course, there are
>>>>> elements of accountability in our scope as well -- as Strickling refers to
>>>>> it, a process that will "result in ICANN’s becoming even more
>>>>> directly accountable to the customers of the IANA functions."  It is that
>>>>> type of accountability that we have to worry about, and which I believe our
>>>>> proposal (while still a work in progress) addresses.  I don't believe that
>>>>> there is anything in our proposal that can be categorized as
>>>>> "overreaching."  Indeed, I think we have been quite mindful of staying
>>>>> within our scope.
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm not sure what you are driving at -- do you want us to take on the
>>>>> task of enhancing ICANN's accountability beyond the IANA function?  This
>>>>> would be massively "overreaching." Or do you want us not to deal with
>>>>> accountability at all, leaving it to the CCWG-Accountability to handle all
>>>>> elements of accountability, with the result that ICANN would then somehow
>>>>> be "safe" for an "internal to ICANN" IANA transition?  I think this would
>>>>> be "underreaching." It also assumes that the only thing standing between us
>>>>> and an "internal to ICANN" IANA transition is enhanced ICANN
>>>>> accountability; I do not think this is the case.  I think there is a need
>>>>> for IANA-specific accountability regardless of the overall state of ICANN
>>>>> accountability, and I think our proposal meets that need.
>>>>>
>>>>> In any event, we can neither grab the entire accountability mandate or
>>>>> leave it all to the CCWG-Accountability.  Rather, we need to deal with the
>>>>> elements of accountability that fall within our bailiwick -- as we have
>>>>> done all along -- and which are an integral part of satisfying the
>>>>> requirement for transition, as it has been all along.
>>>>>
>>>>> Greg
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *Gregory S. Shatan **ï* *Abelman Frayne & Schwab*
>>>>>
>>>>> *666 Third Avenue **ï** New York, NY 10017-5621*
>>>>>
>>>>> *Direct*  212-885-9253 *| **Main* 212-949-9022
>>>>>
>>>>> *Fax*  212-949-9190 *|* *Cell *917-816-6428
>>>>>
>>>>> *gsshatan at lawabel.com <gsshatan at lawabel.com>*
>>>>>
>>>>> *ICANN-related: gregshatanipc at gmail.com <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> *
>>>>>
>>>>> *www.lawabel.com <http://www.lawabel.com/>*
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sat, Dec 6, 2014 at 1:31 AM, Seun Ojedeji <seun.ojedeji at gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks for the share Greg, wouldn't this then give us the opportunity
>>>>>> to rethink the accountability measures we propose to put in place in lieu
>>>>>> of ICANN's accountability; Since ICANN accountability is a requirement for
>>>>>> transition then there may be no need for the current overreaching
>>>>>> transition structure we are proposing.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Cheers!
>>>>>>
>>>>>> sent from Google nexus 4
>>>>>> kindly excuse brevity and typos.
>>>>>> On 6 Dec 2014 00:43, "Greg Shatan" <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> All:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I thought that Larry Strickling's remarks at a seminar yesterday
>>>>>>> would be of interest to the group.  Here is the portion of his speech that
>>>>>>> appears germane to our work and that of the CWG-Accountability:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I will finish up by addressing the challenges and opportunities
>>>>>>> facing us in 2015 with respect to Internet policy.  Our core mission at
>>>>>>> NTIA is to ensure that the Internet remains an engine for economic growth,
>>>>>>> innovation and free expression.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Internationally, the United States has been a vocal advocate of the
>>>>>>> bottom-up, consensus-based approach to Internet governance known as the
>>>>>>> multistakeholder model.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The multistakeholder model has enabled the Internet to develop into
>>>>>>> an engine for innovation, free speech and economic growth.  Under this
>>>>>>> model, all stakeholders, whether they be from industry, civil society, or
>>>>>>> government, come together in an inclusive, transparent, accountable forum
>>>>>>> to make decisions and solve problems.  As the Internet agency, NTIA’s job
>>>>>>> is to strengthen and promote that model.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In 2014, we have seen a growing acceptance of the multistakeholder
>>>>>>> model around the world, but particularly in developing countries.  Earlier
>>>>>>> this year, Brazil hosted the successful NetMundial conference, which
>>>>>>> brought together a wide range of stakeholders including technical experts,
>>>>>>> civil society groups, industry representatives and government officials,
>>>>>>> all on an equal footing with each other.  At this meeting not only did
>>>>>>> participants agree that Internet governance should be built on democratic
>>>>>>> multistakeholder processes,” the entire meeting was a demonstration of the
>>>>>>> open, participative, and consensus-driven governance that has allowed the
>>>>>>> Internet to develop as an unparalleled engine of economic growth and
>>>>>>> innovation.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A month later, a High-Level Panel, headed by the president of
>>>>>>> Estonia, Toomas Ilves released a report once again affirming the power of
>>>>>>> multistakeholder policy development.  The panel said it “recognizes, fully
>>>>>>> supports, and adopts the Internet governance principles produced in the
>>>>>>> NetMundial Statement.”
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Most recently, at the International Telecommunication Union’s 2014
>>>>>>> Plenipotentiary conference in Busan, Korea, last month, we saw the fruits
>>>>>>> of all our work to preserve multistakeholder Internet governance.  The
>>>>>>> United States achieved all of its objectives in Busan, including keeping
>>>>>>> the ITU’s work focused on its current mandate and not expanding its role
>>>>>>> into Internet and cybersecurity issues.  The U.S. delegation, led by
>>>>>>> Ambassador Danny Sepulveda, successfully built consensus across nations to
>>>>>>> protect the robust, innovative, multi-stakeholder Internet we enjoy today.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This validation of the multistakeholder model comes at a critical
>>>>>>> time.  Last March, NTIA announced its intention to complete the
>>>>>>> privatization of the Internet Domain Name System (DNS), currently managed
>>>>>>> by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).  This
>>>>>>> process began in 1998, when ICANN took over important technical functions
>>>>>>> related to the domain name system, known as the IANA functions, under a
>>>>>>> contract with NTIA.  In our March announcement, NTIA asked ICANN to convene
>>>>>>> a multistakeholder process to develop a proposal to transition the U.S.
>>>>>>> stewardship role over the IANA functions to the international community. We
>>>>>>> did this to ensure that the multistakeholder model for DNS coordination
>>>>>>> continues.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we announced this transition, we outlined some specific
>>>>>>> conditions that must be addressed before this transition takes place.
>>>>>>> First, the proposal must support and enhance the multistakeholder model of
>>>>>>> Internet governance, in that it should be developed by the multistakeholder
>>>>>>> community and have broad community support.  More specifically, we will not
>>>>>>> accept a transition proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a
>>>>>>> government-led or intergovernmental organization solution.  Second, the
>>>>>>> proposal must maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the
>>>>>>> domain name system.  Third, it must meet the needs and expectations of the
>>>>>>> global customers and partners of the IANA services.  And finally, it must
>>>>>>> maintain the openness of the Internet.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Now that we are eight months past our IANA announcement, it is
>>>>>>> important to take stock of where this transition stands.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We are pleased that the community has responded enthusiastically to
>>>>>>> our call to develop a transition plan that will ensure the stability,
>>>>>>> security and openness of the Internet.  Acting as a facilitator, ICANN
>>>>>>> announced this summer the formation of a group representing more than a
>>>>>>> dozen Internet stakeholder communities that will help develop a transition
>>>>>>> proposal.  As set forth in its charter, the IANA Stewardship Transition
>>>>>>> Coordination Group is “conduct[ing] itself transparently, consult[ing] with
>>>>>>> a broad range of stakeholders, and ensur[ing] that its proposals support
>>>>>>> the security and stability of the IANA functions.”
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The community is in the process of developing proposals for the
>>>>>>> specific IANA functions.  Earlier this week, a working group focused on
>>>>>>> domain names released a 100-page proposal for community review and
>>>>>>> comment.  We expect proposals for other of the functions to surface over
>>>>>>> the next month or so.  The community hopes to submit its transition
>>>>>>> proposal to NTIA by the end of next July, which would allow us to review
>>>>>>> the proposal before the current contract expires at the end of September
>>>>>>> 2015.  I want to emphasize that we did not set a deadline for this
>>>>>>> transition.  If for some reason the community needs more time, we have the
>>>>>>> option to extend the current contract for up to four years.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ICANN has also launched a process to examine how to ensure it
>>>>>>> remains accountable to the global Internet community.  Specifically, this
>>>>>>> process will examine how ICANN can strengthen its accountability mechanisms
>>>>>>> to address the absence of its historical contractual relationship with
>>>>>>> NTIA.  NTIA believes that this accountability process needs to include the
>>>>>>> stress testing of solutions to safeguard against future contingencies such
>>>>>>> as attempts to influence or takeover ICANN functions that are not currently
>>>>>>> possible with the IANA functions contract in place.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The two work streams on the IANA transition and enhanced
>>>>>>> accountability are directly linked and NTIA has repeatedly said that both
>>>>>>> issues must be addressed before any transition takes place.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I am confident that engaging the global Internet community to work
>>>>>>> out these important issues will strengthen the multistakeholder process and
>>>>>>> will result in ICANN’s becoming even more directly accountable to the
>>>>>>> customers of the IANA functions and to the broader Internet community.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Getting the transition right will be a major project for NTIA in
>>>>>>> 2015.
>>>>>>> The full remarks are at:
>>>>>>> http://www.ntia.doc.gov/speechtestimony/2014/remarks-assistant-secretary-strickling-plifcba-telecommunications-policy-regula
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> An article about these remarks by Kieren McCarty in the Register is
>>>>>>> at:
>>>>>>>  http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/12/05/us_government_tells_icann_no_accountability_no_iana/
>>>>>>> <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/12/05/us_government_tells_icann_no_accountability_no_iana/>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Greg
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *Gregory S. Shatan **ï* *Abelman Frayne & Schwab*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *666 Third Avenue **ï** New York, NY 10017-5621*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *Direct*  212-885-9253 *| **Main* 212-949-9022
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *Fax*  212-949-9190 *|* *Cell *917-816-6428
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *gsshatan at lawabel.com <gsshatan at lawabel.com>*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *ICANN-related: gregshatanipc at gmail.com <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> *
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *www.lawabel.com <http://www.lawabel.com/>*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> CWG-Stewardship mailing list
>>>>>>> CWG-Stewardship at icann.org
>>>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/cwg-stewardship
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb:
>> http://www.fuoye.edu.ng <http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt
>> email: <http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng
>> <seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng>*
>>
>> The key to understanding is humility - my view !
>>
>>
>>
>



-- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------





*Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb:      http://www.fuoye.edu.ng
<http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email:
<http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng
<seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng>*

The key to understanding is humility - my view !
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