[CWG-Stewardship] Agenda item 5 - Alternate proposals

Thu Dec 18 11:12:35 UTC 2014

Hi

I don't see independent oversight and separability of the IANA contract 
on the one hand and "real multistakeholder accountability" at ICANN on 
the other as mutually exclusive or that one has to be weakened or 
sacrificed on the promise of the enhanced accountability of the other.  
I see them both as desirable, indeed essential, to ensuring appropriate 
levels of accountability and performance once the USG steps back from 
its administrative and stewardship roles. I agree that we need to be 
very pragmatic about the structure and modalities of the IANA proposal - 
and that these are things we need to start working through asap - but we 
should not underestimate the importance of separability and independent 
oversight.

Matthew

On 12/18/2014 3:55 AM, Alan Greenberg wrote:
> I note that item 5 on the agenda for the 18 December meeting is "Due 
> consideration of alternative proposal (not to exclude other proposals)".
>
> I also note that there has been significant discussion about the CWG 
> Stewardship and the CCWG Accountability, their inter-relationship and 
> co-dependency.
>
> In light of this, I would like to bring the CWGs attention to a recent 
> e-mail on the CCWG list (copied below).
>
> Although I believe that the ALAC proposal 
> (http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-naming-transition-01dec14/msg00011.html 
> ) is the only such alternative presented here, it is not alone. I am 
> not advocating the exact details of the proposal referenced in the 
> message (see 
> http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/ and 
> http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-plan-needs-new-ideas-to-ensure-accountability), 
> but it does demonstrate that we are not unique in wanting a far 
> simpler mode for the new IANA coupled with *real multistakeholder 
> accountability in ICANN*.
>
> I believe that the CCWG *WILL* deliver and I think that we need to 
> factor that into our deliberations. Specifically, is there really a 
> need for the complexity, cost and associated issues of Contract Co. 
> given the same level of control could be provided by a change such as 
> this?
>
> Alan
>
> ===================
>> From: Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco at netchoice.org>
>> To: Accountability Cross Community 
>> <accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:20:43 +0000
>> Subject: [CCWG-Accountability] Op-Ed from ITIF regarding permanent 
>> cross-community group as ultimate authority
>>
>>
>> This pertains to our discussion yesterday about a permanent, 
>> cross-community "~Membership" group to hold ICANN board and 
>> management accountable to the community.  It was described this way 
>> in draft3 
>> <https://community.icann.org/download/attachments/51414327/WorkArea2%20Accountability%20suggestions%20%5Bdraft%203%5D.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1418610739000&api=v2> 
>> for work area 2:
>>
>>     Amend ICANN bylaws to recognize a permanent cross-community
>>     representative structure (all ACs, SOs, Constituencies) with
>>     authority to:
>>
>>         Appoint members of Affirmation review teams
>>         Review a board decision, or resolve a dispute (option to use
>>         independent panel)
>>         Approve changes to ICANN bylaws or Articles, with 2/3 approval
>>         Approve annual proposed ICANN budget
>>         Recall one or all ICANN Board members
>>
>> One of the groups proposing 
>> <http://www.innovationfiles.org/key-principles-for-the-icann-transition/> 
>> a community of stakeholders as ultimate authority posted a relevant 
>> Op-Ed 
>> <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/technology/227375-icann-transition-plan-needs-new-ideas-to-ensure-accountability> 
>> in a Washington paper today.  Daniel Castro of the Information 
>> Technology & Innovation Foundation (ITIF) wrote:
>>
>>     California state law applies since ICANN is a registered
>>     nonprofit corporation in the state. As such, California law
>>     allows nonprofit organizations to have statutory members.
>>     Gunnarson suggests that one way to provide an effective check on
>>     the ICANN board's power is to create statutory members of ICANN
>>     with extensive authority over the board. This authority could
>>     include removing board members, overturning board decisions, etc.
>>     The statutory members would likely include the chairs of the
>>     various ICANN "supporting organizations" and "advisory
>>     committees," such as the Address Supporting Organization (ASO)
>>     responsible for IP address policy and the Country Code Name
>>     Supporting Organization (ccNSO) responsible for managing the
>>     country code top-level domains. To ensure that the statutory
>>     members do not hold too much sway, their actions could be limited
>>     to situations where there is a supermajority (i.e., consensus).
>>
>> We welcome further elaboration of legal basis to enable this 
>> modification to ICANNâEUR^(TM)s bylaws in conformance with California 
>> law.
>>
>> Steve DelBianco
>> Executive Director
>> NetChoice
>>
>> http://www.NetChoice.org <http://www.netchoice.org/> and 
>> http://blog.netchoice.org <http://blog.netchoice.org/> 
> +1.202.420.7482
>
>
>
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-- 
Matthew Shears
Director - Global Internet Policy and Human Rights
Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT)
mshears at cdt.org
+ 44 771 247 2987

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