[gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Dangers of public whois

Hollenbeck, Scott shollenbeck at verisign.com
Mon Feb 13 15:24:18 UTC 2017


From: gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org [mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of nathalie coupet via gnso-rds-pdp-wg
Sent: Monday, February 13, 2017 10:08 AM
To: Michele Neylon - Blacknight <michele at blacknight.com>; benny at nordreg.se; Victoria Sheckler <vsheckler at riaa.com>
Cc: gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Dangers of public whois



How about puting 'fat' information behind a 'thin' wall? For example, to prevent public viewing of a registrant's personal information, why not require an email registration or some other light form of identification? It would deter spammers and other frauds, while insuring a certain level of public viewing (also to deter fraud).



To the argument that the vast majority of Internet users do not use WHOIS, this might be true now but not in the future. Furthermore, this argument was also used by people who opposed the paper version of the phone book, and a survey shoed that about 11% of households rely on the phone book to get information. The consensus was that people who do not have access to the Internet need it, therefore it qualifies as a public service which has to be kept for the public good.



Scott Hollenbeck's RDAP project requires exactly that: identification through email (right, Scott?). This is simple enough and everybody could live with this solution, I think.



My implementation does indeed support a basic level of authentication and access control using credentials issued by certain email providers. Finer-grained access control can be implemented using more rigorous processes for assigning client credentials.



Scott

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