[gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Dangers of public whois
John Bambenek
jcb at bambenekconsulting.com
Tue Feb 14 18:52:01 UTC 2017
All public policy is weighed against the pantheon of interests. Very rarely is only one interest the only person in the room. Yes there are data privacy laws, but there also is the need of criminal investigations. The reason I keep bringing up child sexual exploitation is the fact that governments consistently use that to justify overreach. Sociologically laws operate on a pendulum. Swing it one way too hard, a prevailing force swings it the other way. We are seeing this play out in real time with the political dynamics in many countries in Europe and the US.
So yes, protect privacy but that's not the only interest. You can say "boo hoo" about that and then knuckledraggers like me show up, grab the pendulum and swing it the other way against the wall.
Sent from my iPhone
> On Feb 14, 2017, at 09:22, Volker Greimann <vgreimann at key-systems.net> wrote:
>
> Hi John,
>
> indeed, stricter data protection laws, court decisions or a different appreciation of the need of users to be protected from abuse of their private data may dictate stricter handling in the future. I hope you are not arguing against allowing for such changes?
>
> Best,
>
> Volker
>
>> Am 14.02.2017 um 18:18 schrieb John Horton:
>> Hi Benny,
>>
>> Let me try to dig into that a little bit with a serious question. What assurance do those of us engaged in cybercrime investigation -- or not yet created organizations that are legitimate -- have that we would have the same level of access in the future? Is it possible for this group to make that assurance? To be sure, this isn't my only concern or objection, but part of what I'm trying to get at is: even if those of us on this working group were to agree that cybercrime-mitigation entities should have the same access we have today, what's to prevent a stricter regime from changing the rules in the future? In other words, if we create a system that empowers one central organization to say that Allison's reasons (for example) are valid now, there's nothing to prevent that organization from deciding to block her in the future because they don't believe her reasons for investigating cybercrime are valid. Put another way, my concern isn't that you personally or anyone on this group wants to block cybercrime mitigation from happening -- rather, I'm wondering how this group could bind a future RDS 1, 5 or 10 years down the road not to change the goalposts.
>>
>> John Horton
>> President and CEO, LegitScript
>>
>>
>> Follow LegitScript: LinkedIn | Facebook | Twitter | Blog | Google+
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>>
>>
>>> On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 9:05 AM, benny at nordreg.se <benny at nordreg.se> wrote:
>>> Well it might be so, but every singel person “claiming” they use whois for investigation seems to lack the understanding that they will get the access it will just be a little harder to get the normal misuse of whois info can be prevented but looks like noen of you want that to happen...
>>>
>>> --
>>> Med vänliga hälsningar / Kind Regards / Med vennlig hilsen
>>>
>>> Benny Samuelsen
>>> Registry Manager - Domainexpert
>>>
>>> Nordreg AB - ICANN accredited registrar
>>> IANA-ID: 638
>>> Phone: +46.42197080
>>> Direct: +47.32260201
>>> Mobile: +47.40410200
>>>
>>> > On 14 Feb 2017, at 17:58, allison nixon <elsakoo at gmail.com> wrote:
>>> >
>>> > Benny, dude, you just wrote "Buhu my work will get harder", so please don't complain about adult and mature answers
>>> >
>>> > On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 11:56 AM, benny at nordreg.se <benny at nordreg.se> wrote:
>>> > A very adult and mature answer… with some nice baked in threats, funny its only your kind of crimes which matter apparantly… oh and the final on which always are been draged out when there are no more arguments, think about the one child we can save…
>>> >
>>> > To answer your questions hidden in the threats, yes you are part of the better for all but that also means everyone have to give and take to come to a better solution.
>>> > In you ignorance you completely miss the point that by have all these data public there are commited crimes every minut by using those data nut hey what does that matter as long as you business can roll on… I guess those people will thank you for you helpful insights…
>>> >
>>> > Welcome to the discussion
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > --
>>> > Med vänliga hälsningar / Kind Regards / Med vennlig hilsen
>>> >
>>> > Benny Samuelsen
>>> > Registry Manager - Domainexpert
>>> >
>>> > Nordreg AB - ICANN accredited registrar
>>> > IANA-ID: 638
>>> > Phone: +46.42197080
>>> > Direct: +47.32260201
>>> > Mobile: +47.40410200
>>> >
>>> > > On 14 Feb 2017, at 17:29, John Bambenek <jcb at bambenekconsulting.com> wrote:
>>> > >
>>> > > Let me translate Allison's comments in the light of your mockery.
>>> > >
>>> > > You're ideas of privacy are patently absurd and your arrogance that entire industries need to rewrite how they do things to suit your effete and fantastical notions is breathtaking. Your mockery of people who investigate crime is just icing on the cake. Its not a question of looking past your own walls, its a question of whether you religious fanatics can acknowledge that other use cases are valid (or are we not part of the "all" in "better for all"). Are you really suggesting preventing spam is a higher priority than stopping human trafficking online?
>>> > >
>>> > > If someone who had need of privacy came to me for advice on registering a domain name I would tell them absolutely not to do it. Use blogspot or any other mechanism that doesn't involve a financial transaction to shield your privacy. Creating paper trails is always a poor life decision when OPSEC matters. Anything less and I would stop taking your concerns seriously.
>>> > >
>>> > > That said, we have a viable compromise, its called whois privacy protection. And it allows me to use risk based decisions on how I treat traffic to such domains.
>>> > >
>>> > > But if you wish to enable criminals to better hide so they can steal people's life savings, so they can anonymously traffic in child exploitation or to engage in sextortion against teenage girls all because you can't handle a spam filter, you can count me one that will line up against you and very publicly label you an enabler of child sexual exploitation. Then I will go to Congress, drag ICANN back under the Department of Commerce and ensure some adult supervision is had.
>>> > >
>>> > > Or you can calm the hell down and knock it off with your attitude and we can find a viable middle ground. Totally your call.
>>> > >
>>> > > And if you are really concerned about spammers, I help run investigations against them too (using whois data, in part) and could totally use the help.
>>> > >
>>> > > Sent from my iPhone
>>> > >
>>> > >> On Feb 14, 2017, at 05:28, "benny at nordreg.se" <benny at nordreg.se> wrote:
>>> > >>
>>> > >> So basicaly what you say are… Buhu my work will get harder, let all innocent registrants suffer from spam/scam mail sprung out of the whois data published, all those registrants who get fake mails about renewing there domain or buying fake SEO plans?
>>> > >> How can anyone defend that we have data published to get abused just because some bad guys registrer domains? And those of you who does will still have access to the date just not in the same easy way…
>>> > >>
>>> > >> Sorry for my harsh tone but I really don’t see why we cant look past our own walls and find a solution which are to the better for all..
>>> > >>
>>> > >>
>>> > >> --
>>> > >> Med vänliga hälsningar / Kind Regards / Med vennlig hilsen
>>> > >>
>>> > >> Benny Samuelsen
>>> > >> Registry Manager - Domainexpert
>>> > >>
>>> > >> Nordreg AB - ICANN accredited registrar
>>> > >> IANA-ID: 638
>>> > >> Phone: +46.42197080
>>> > >> Direct: +47.32260201
>>> > >> Mobile: +47.40410200
>>> > >>
>>> > >>> On 14 Feb 2017, at 06:38, allison nixon <elsakoo at gmail.com> wrote:
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> This car metaphor isn't complete without also stating that some car owners purchase them for the sole purpose of running over people!
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> Some car owners purchase fleets of cars to run over as many people as possible. Even though they re-use their name on every single vehicle registration, the subpeona takes so long that the city can no longer automatically block the cars as they enter, and need to wait for them to run over a few people before they can do anything about it.
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> This metaphor has obviously been tortured past the point of absurdity, I'll leave it alone now.
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> I've mostly been lurking for the whole duration of this group, and please forgive me if I'm missing something massive here, but I get the impression that most people here don't spend a lot of time doing investigations. But this is my life. If I needed a subpeona for every single historical lookup, pivot, and reverse search, I would get zero done due to a lack of legal authority. Many if not most of the people doing the heavy lifting in anti-cybercrime efforts are private citizens with no government issued authority. It seems that the general expectation here is that limiting access to people with badges is OK, but I'm telling you there is a severe lack of those skillsets and it will be years before we see widespread technical literacy among the police. Whatever system results, private citizens need a path for unrestricted and automated access. And if we want to talk protecting privacy, I think criminally motivated violations of privacy are far more likely to affect everyone's day to day life right now, and automated WHOIS lookups are used heavily especially in anti-phishing and anti-spam operations.
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> With the status quo, I can go on fishing expeditions through the WHOIS data and turn up hundreds of domains used for the same type of malicious activity, and predict with a high accuracy which domains will be malicious before they are used for anything. It sometimes turns up domains owned by innocent people, and I doubt privacy minded people would like that, but the reality is I rarely ever encounter WHOIS data that is convincing PII. It's almost all fake. And if it's not fake, it's a company's public contact info, or it's a foolish person who turned down WHOIS privacy protection, and will change their WHOIS as soon as the spam starts flowing.
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> Have there been any studies on what percentage of WHOIS data is real and correct? Can we ever expect to have meaningful data when registrars are allowed to take Bitcoins over Tor as payment? At what point does "privacy" become an empty argument when some of these Internet hosting/registrar companies clearly profit from facilitating abuse, and network defenders block entire TLDs due to the saturation of abuse?
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> From my vantage point, I see great benefit from seeing patterns in the fake data submitted by fraudsters, and I see few harms from the privacy side of things, because people seem to generally realize that "123 fake st" is a perfectly acceptable WHOIS entry.
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> I also recognize this situation is completely absurd. Every aspect of this is surely an abuse of the original system. But it seems like building a pyramid from the top down, restricting access to supposed "PII" that is unlikely to contain PII, to the detriment of legitimate efforts that also seek to enhance privacy by preventing criminal theft of private data like bank account numbers.
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> On Mon, Feb 13, 2017 at 9:14 PM, Sam Lanfranco <sam at lanfranco.net> wrote:
>>> > >>> I have to strongly agree with Alex that whatever the criteria are for thin data, they cannot include that thin data "is transitive" in some sort of bread crumb trail manner.
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> Everything is potentially transitive in that sense. I observe a vehicle but all I get is make, model and license plate, and in most jurisdictions that is all I get. It is the vehicle owner's "thin data". Of course I can hang around, see that the car has a baby seat, witness a woman or man putting a child in the car, assume that she/he has legitimate access to the car, follow the car and assemble more personal information (lives at; works at; shops at; visits;) The license plate didn't facilitate that crumb train discovery, but no license plate would hamper legitimate seeking of information about who owns the car (issuing a parking ticket, LEA investigation, etc.) . License plate is part of thin data with no gated access. Of course, this will change in the era of the digital vehicle. Depending on security, and authorization, one will be able to just ask the car, and ask about a lot of things...like whose cell phone was in the passenger's seat last night, when I was supposed to be alone )-:
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> There needs to be a similar balance (license plate but no owner's name unless wanted, like Sam's Curry Pizza Barn logo, phone number and website URL painted on the side).
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> More Important, have we made progress (convergence) on the working principles that should be brought to bear in building a thin data set. A lot of time has been spent looking at good case and bad case scenarios. What operational principles have been distilled from all these examples? What is the balance between thin data inclusion and exclusion, and design and technical solutions that can be used to prevent (for example) robotic harvesting? There is another frontier here, and that is what governments will do to restrain or enable certain uses of thin data? While ICANN needs to be aware of what is going on there, that part is beyond ICANN's remit, but those policies will help shape some of the context within which ICANN deals with the thin data task.
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> Sam L
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> On 2017-02-14 1:23 AM, Deacon, Alex wrote:
>>> > >>> All,
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> So it seems the debate has progressed from “thin data” to “thick data” (i.e. data that includes email). I know we are all super excited to talk about “thick data” but I don’t think we are there yet (are we? Hopefully I didn’t miss the party…)
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> Focusing on thin data for the moment I struggle to understand how it is personal data. I do not believe it is. As for the odd logic proposed by some that the property of privacy is transitive (i.e. Because “thin data” can be used to link/point/discover other data then “thin data” equals “personal data”) I just don’t buy it.
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> I don’t disagree with much of what was expressed in this thread, however we must keep in mind that balance and proportionality are important concepts in many (all?) data privacy laws. Any arguments that imply that no such balance exists (or should exist) is obstructive IMO.
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> Alex
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> On 2/13/17, 5:42 AM, <gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org on behalf of michele at blacknight.com> wrote:
>>> > >>>
>>> > >>> I agree and I know from how I’ve used various email addresses that they are actively being harvested and spammed.
>>> > >>> Also it’s one of the biggest sources of complaints we get from our clients (registrants)
>>> > >>> It’s definitely not an “edge case”.
>>> > >>> Regards
>>> > >>> Michele
>>> > >>> --
>>> > >>> Mr Michele Neylon
>>> > >>> Blacknight Solutions
>>> > >>> Hosting, Colocation & Domains
>>> > >>> https://www.blacknight.com/
>>> > >>> http://blacknight.blog/
>>> > >>> Intl. +353 (0) 59 9183072
>>> > >>> Direct Dial: +353 (0)59 9183090
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>>> > >>> Some thoughts: http://ceo.hosting/
>>> > >>> -------------------------------
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>>> > >>> --
>>> > >>> *--------------------------------------------*
>>> > >>> "It is a disgrace to be rich and honoured
>>> > >>> in an unjust state" -Confucius
>>> > >>> ----------------------------------------------
>>> > >>> Dr Sam Lanfranco (Prof Emeritus & Senior Scholar)
>>> > >>> Econ, York U., Toronto, Ontario, CANADA - M3J 1P3
>>> > >>> YorkU email: Lanfran at Yorku.ca Skype: slanfranco
>>> > >>> blog: http://samlanfranco.blogspot.com
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>>> > Note to self: Pillage BEFORE burning.
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