[gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Why the thin data is necessary
Richard Leaning
rleaning at ripe.net
Wed Jun 7 14:21:49 UTC 2017
I agree we Greg, even though I haven't been very active recently I have made sure that I followed the list closely. We need to speed up as a group, otherwise by the time we ever come to a conclusion the world would of changed again.
Richard Leaning
RIPE NCC
External Relations
(Sent by iPhone)
> On 7 Jun 2017, at 17:13, Greg Aaron <gca at icginc.com> wrote:
>
> Yes. Our Working Group has:
> defined what the thin fields are,
> has heard excellent reasons to publish it,
> has not heard any compelling reasons to withhold the thin data from publication.
> Had decent consensus that any kind of authentication or gating for access to thin data is not desirable.
>
> The discussion of the above has been pretty exhaustive. I suggest to the leadership that confirming and moving on from these issues is very important by Johannesburg. This WG has been open for one-and-a-half years now, needs to show some progress, and the endless re-opening of issues is not fair to any of the volunteers.
>
> All best,
> --Greg
>
>
>
> From: gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org [mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of jonathan matkowsky
> Sent: Wednesday, June 7, 2017 8:32 AM
> To: Volker Greimann <vgreimann at key-systems.net>
> Cc: RDS PDP WG <gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org>
> Subject: Re: [gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Why the thin data is necessary
>
> The problem with is that we are unable to make progress if we keep having to re-define the terms subject to discussion upon which such progress is predicated. For example, we spent time talking about the ins and outs of privacy in relation to thin data--the overwhelming majority agreed there were no privacy concerns in relation thereto--and then we went ahead and said let's now start re-defining what thin data is. Now we are talking about re-defining authentication. I would say that user authentication is a fairly basic universal concept of validation that a person has been provided with access to a resource. That concept by definition requires knowing something about them. It's basically a form of identity management.
>
> We need to keep in mind that when domains expire is critical title information for the public. Unlike land which generally doesn't expire, domain names exist only from when they are created to when they expire. This is the most basic property identification possible.
>
> When domains were created and when they are set to expire is the most basic information for the public to have the ability to engage with the Internet to make informed choices about information held by the registrars. The accuracy of title to a domain is determined by when it is set to expire and when it was created. If the public is to have confidence in their investments in the Internet, this basic information is important considerations when undertaking any kind of transaction online. The ability to acquire and disseminate information and to control its flow is a source of institutional power that is also potentially abused.
>
> Transparency and accessibility
>
> are
>
> principles of good governance
>
> that
>
> help
> the public
> become and
> remain engaged with
> the Internet
> and remain aware of how
> it
> functions
> .
>
> Accessibility to
> title
> information
> over the Internet
> is in the public interest because it promotes equality
>
> . Accessibility to
> this information is a necessary condition for transparency to exist. Authentication is by definition, a barrier to access. Certain court documents are in the open because it's in the public interest to remain effectively engaged in, and with, the legal system while holding it to public account. The same is true for the existence of locations where people travel online or visit. Access prevents misconduct and exposes deficiencies to careful public scrutiny. Authentication should not be used just for the sake of practical obscurity, which is a principle that information in public records is effectively protected from disclosure as the result of practical barriers to access.
>
> The arguments I am hearing that records will still be available even if authentication is required does not mean there is no practical obscurity if the public's ability to access them
> is limited by practical constraints that come from authentication. The authentication may very well translate into barriers that prevent records from being readily accessible on a large scale.
>
> The existence of domain names (defined by their creation and expiry dates) is reliable information related to locations on the public Internet, which creates for a stable atmosphere for ownership and transfer of places on the Internet, as well as for visiting or doing business at these places online. The public has the right to know without any barriers to entry the most basic facts about places online, like when they were created and when they won't exist unless renewed according to the authoritative data. It also gives property holders the most basic information about their title and some insurance if they suffer a loss due to a lack of care by the registrar of the record. This is also important for investor confidence for the public doing business online. It is the most very basic of identifying information about the public property--when it was created and when it will cease to exist, as well as when it was last updated. This basic information should never have a barrier to entry in order to promote the transparent and accessible handling of such information.
>
> Expectations of privacy must be balanced with freedom of access to the public Internet. There is no guaranteed right to anonymity or complete privacy online. No government can possibly guarantee that to their citizens, and it's not an unalienable right. The efficient availability of this information is the PRIMARY goal even if we build certain safeguards for personal privacy as long as we are not placing unnecessary barriers to access at the registry or registrar levels in the process of information dissemination.
>
> You can see an example discussed of how this balance has worked for land titles. But domains are a bit different since they cease to exist if not renewed on certain dates. Hence, it's even more important to have public access.
>
>
> Jonathan Matkowsky,
> VP – IP & Brand Security
> USA:: 1.347.467.1193 | Office:: +972-(0)8-926-2766
> Emergency mobile:: +972-(0)54-924-0831
> Company Reg. No. 514805332
> 11/1 Nachal Chever, Modiin Israel
> Website
> RiskIQ Technologies Ltd. (wholly-owned by RiskIQ, Inc.)
>
> On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 2:13 PM, Volker Greimann <vgreimann at key-systems.net> wrote:
> I think you are getting a step ahead of our target. As we have not yet defined how authentification would look like, you are making a presumption that may not be correct. We have not yet determined that authentification needs to be personal. If may very well be, but lets look at our verification and authntification options when we get to that point.
>
> Volker
>
>
> Am 07.06.2017 um 13:04 schrieb jonathan matkowsky:
> Volker, I am sorry but for privacy reasons, I am advocating that there has to be a basis for authentication. Once you authenticate, you are requiring personal information to be disclosed. If there is no personal information to protect in doing so, than you would be encroaching on privacy for no legitimate reason--thereby violating the proportionality principle.
>
> Jonathan Matkowsky,
> VP – IP & Brand Security
> USA:: 1.347.467.1193 | Office:: +972-(0)8-926-2766
> Emergency mobile:: +972-(0)54-924-0831
> Company Reg. No. 514805332
> 11/1 Nachal Chever, Modiin Israel
> Website
> RiskIQ Technologies Ltd. (wholly-owned by RiskIQ, Inc.)
>
> On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 1:05 PM, Paul Keating <paul at law.es> wrote:
> Sorry but your position keeps changing. You clearly favor restrictions on access. You appear to have abandoned the privacy angle as justification and are now relying upon an anti-abuse rationale. This last position is rather useless. We all know that captcha and other gates easily overcome. Thus the abuse you note will continue. Unless you are going to impose downstream use restrictions - which will largely if not entirely be unenforceable from a practical standpoint - there would be nothing to prevent a spammer to authenticate him/her self using any number of fake entities and thereafter publish the same data freely to others.
>
> I am left to conclude that what you really want is to preclude harvesting of data so that it can be controlled at the registry/registrar level.
>
> Sent from my iPad
>
> On 7 Jun 2017, at 10:31, Volker Greimann <vgreimann at key-systems.net> wrote:
>
> Hi Jonathan,
>
> and I have no issue with the public being able to get that information. Still, there is no reason why the requester should not authenticate himself when making that inquiry. Remember the access levels do not block access, they just require further authentification. So the public would be able to find out when a domain is expected to become available. This is no argument against gated access.
>
> Best,
>
> Volker
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Am 07.06.2017 um 11:23 schrieb jonathan matkowsky:
> The public has the right to know when a domain is expected to become available. They might need to place a backorder. All UDRPs require the provider to check whether the domain is set to expire during the proceeding. The fake renewal notices and SEO scams will continue based on the existence of the domain. I have seen countless such scams where the domain is not set to expire for years, and where it wasn't even recently created--which supports keeping the creation and expiration dates ungated so that companies can verify that the scams are not bona fide.
>
> On Wed, 7 Jun 2017 at 11:54 Volker Greimann <vgreimann at key-systems.net> wrote:
> It is remarkable how much of the spam that we see on a regular basis that is tied to the domain lifecycle. Fake renewal notices, SEO offers, the lot.
> Anything that would reduce this is a basis for restricting access somewhat. I do not really see any harm in such restrictions either.
>
> Best,
> Volker
>
>
> Am 07.06.2017 um 10:27 schrieb jonathan matkowsky:
> There is no basis for restricting ungated access any more so than the domain's existence or the string of characters registered.
>
> On Wed, 7 Jun 2017 at 11:22 Volker Greimann <vgreimann at key-systems.net> wrote:
> I have no objections against having this data available and accessible.
> The question is whether it should be as accessible as it is now or
> whether there could be certain restrictions. A tiered access system as
> has been proposed would solve this beautifully.
>
> In this case, the dates would be on the second tier (the first tier
> being full unhindered access), which would entail some form of
> authentification and bulk access restrictions. Every single one of the
> uses Andrew desribes would remain possible and unproblematic, but the
> data would no longer be in as much danger of being abused as it is today.
>
> Best,
>
> Volker
>
>
> Am 06.06.2017 um 22:07 schrieb Michael Peddemors:
> > +1 as well..
> >
> > .. but with so many +1's on having that data publicly accessible, it
> > would be interesting to take a straw poll, to a wider audience on that
> > simple question..
> >
> > It would be also nice to see what category the parties in each camp
> > lie? We know that everyone involved in making the internet a safer and
> > better place (security companies, law enforcement et al) want it
> > available, and to define 'thin data' as wide as possible, and I can
> > understand that some consideration to privacy be considered so that it
> > doesn't go too wide, but not really certain I understand the position
> > of those that want it as 'thin' as possible, or non-existant, and/or
> > the parties behind that position and their numbers.
> >
> > And of course the ever present question for both camps, is the opinion
> > coming from a place where there are financial motivations (not that
> > necessarily there is anything wrong with that <sic>) that have formed
> > the basis of that opinion. (eg, if the money equation was removed,
> > would you still have that opinion, or even be in the conversation?)
> >
> > For all we know, the privacy camp are in very small numbers in this
> > conversation, and while they might hold legitimate positions, maybe it
> > isn't enough to affect the directions/positions of ICANN as a group
> > going forward.
> >
> > And IMHO, even if it was 50/50 split, if it came down to two camps, eg
> > 'the ones keeping us safe' and 'it affects/risks our pocketbooks', I
> > would err on policies that would aid the former..
> >
> > Don't want 'politics' to affect such important decisions..
> >
> >
> >
> > On 17-06-06 11:22 AM, Andrew Sullivan wrote:
> >> Hi,
> >>
> >> On the call today there were arguments being made about why certain
> >> fields should not be publicly accessible. In effect, what we are now
> >> arguing about, in talking about what should be considered "thin data",
> >> is the definition of the set of data to which unauthenticated access
> >> should be permitted. (Let us please not get distracted by what is
> >> actually required by the RAA or anything like that just now, since the
> >> outcome of this policy discussion might change that.)
> >>
> >> There were several arguments put forth about whether the created on,
> >> updated on, and expiry dates should be included. Similarly, people
> >> discussed whether the domain status values should be included. I
> >> believe they must be.
> >>
> >> The Internet is unlike many other technologies because of its radical
> >> decentralization. That is not some sort of political choice, but
> >> instead a fundamental part of the design of the Internet: it's a
> >> network of networks (of networks…) formed by voluntary interoperation
> >> among the participants. Participants in the Internet interoperate
> >> without setting up formal contractual arrangements between all the
> >> participating parties. This feature is part of what has made the
> >> Internet so successful compared to other telecommunications systems,
> >> because the barrier to entry is really low. But that design comes at
> >> a cost.
> >>
> >> The cost is that there's not always a party to speak to, with whom one
> >> has a pre-existing relationship. If communications break down between
> >> two telephone customers, they know whom to call: the phone company.
> >> The phone company also has contractual (or sometimes treaty)
> >> relationships to other phone companies.
> >>
> >> The Internet doesn't work that way. If you and I are communicating
> >> over the Internet, there is no guarantee of direct contractual
> >> relationships all the way along the transit path: that's what open
> >> peering policies ensure. The way we make this work in fact is by
> >> placing the responsibility for troubleshooting out at the edges. And
> >> because of that, when I need to troubleshoot my site I need to have
> >> tools with which to do that.
> >>
> >> In domain-based communications (such as email, IP telephony, websites,
> >> money transfer, and thousands of other applications), when I encounter
> >> a problem with the communication I need to answer whether the problem
> >> is in _my_ network operation, or in the other end. Important data to
> >> rule out "the other end" is in the thin RDS data.
> >>
> >> Obviously, the nameserver and DNSSEC information in the RDS will allow
> >> me to tell whether what is in the global DNS is what ought to be
> >> there. For instance, if the RDS has one value for the name servers,
> >> but the DNS returns something else, there is a problem.
> >>
> >> Less obvious but just as important are the status values. If a name
> >> is on Hold or is pendingTransfer or something like that, it can tell
> >> me that something is up. A name that doesn't appear in the DNS but
> >> has a full complement of name servers in the RDS, for example, might
> >> be on hold; and I can't tell that without seeing the status values.
> >>
> >> In the same way, the dates in the RDS allow a troubleshooter to
> >> understand what might be wrong when things are broken. If a name is
> >> set to expire in a day and you're getting a parking page on the
> >> website, you have a clue about what is going on. Most of the examples
> >> cited in
> >> https://whoapi.com/blog/1582/5-all-time-domain-expirations-in-internets-history/
> >>
> >> were trivial to understand for help desks that could see that a name
> >> that should have existed for some time was just hours old, because the
> >> created_on date was available. And if you start having trouble and
> >> see a domain was updated about the same time the trouble started, you
> >> have a pretty good clue that the problem is most likely at the target
> >> domain, and not in your own network.
> >>
> >> As for the question of why the global Internet infrastructure needs to
> >> help with this, the answer is that _that's what the infrastructure is
> >> for_. We have registrars and registries in order to co-ordinate these
> >> assignments and make those assignments available, in support of the
> >> distributed administration and operation of the Internet. If the
> >> infrastructure isn't providing this kind of information in order to
> >> help administrators of various Internet administrators, then it isn't
> >> doing its job.
> >>
> >> The Internet is a distributed system. If you want to make distributed
> >> systems work, you have to allow the operators to have enough
> >> information to do their jobs independently of one another. So,
> >> regardless of where one lands on whether any of this data is personal
> >> data, it makes no difference. If you want the domain name system to
> >> continue to work reliably, you have to publish this data.
> >> Centralization and locking the data up for just registrars simply
> >> won't scale.
> >>
> >> Best regards,
> >>
> >> A
> >>
> >
> >
> >
>
> --
> Bei weiteren Fragen stehen wir Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung.
>
> Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
>
> Volker A. Greimann
> - Rechtsabteilung -
>
> Key-Systems GmbH
> Im Oberen Werk 1
> 66386 St. Ingbert
> Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
> Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
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>
> --------------------------------------------
>
> Should you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Volker A. Greimann
> - legal department -
>
> Key-Systems GmbH
> Im Oberen Werk 1
> 66386 St. Ingbert
> Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
> Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
> Email: vgreimann at key-systems.net
>
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>
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> --
> jonathan matkowsky, vp - ip & head of global brand threat mitigation
>
>
> --
> Bei weiteren Fragen stehen wir Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung.
>
> Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
>
> Volker A. Greimann
> - Rechtsabteilung -
>
> Key-Systems GmbH
> Im Oberen Werk 1
> 66386 St. Ingbert
> Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
> Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
> Email: vgreimann at key-systems.net
>
> Web: www.key-systems.net / www.RRPproxy.net
> www.domaindiscount24.com / www.BrandShelter.com
>
> Folgen Sie uns bei Twitter oder werden Sie unser Fan bei Facebook:
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>
> Geschäftsführer: Alexander Siffrin
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> Umsatzsteuer ID.: DE211006534
>
> Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP
> www.keydrive.lu
>
> Der Inhalt dieser Nachricht ist vertraulich und nur für den angegebenen Empfänger bestimmt. Jede Form der Kenntnisgabe, Veröffentlichung oder Weitergabe an Dritte durch den Empfänger ist unzulässig. Sollte diese Nachricht nicht für Sie bestimmt sein, so bitten wir Sie, sich mit uns per E-Mail oder telefonisch in Verbindung zu setzen.
>
> --------------------------------------------
>
> Should you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Volker A. Greimann
> - legal department -
>
> Key-Systems GmbH
> Im Oberen Werk 1
> 66386 St. Ingbert
> Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
> Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
> Email: vgreimann at key-systems.net
>
> Web: www.key-systems.net / www.RRPproxy.net
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>
> Follow us on Twitter or join our fan community on Facebook and stay updated:
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>
> CEO: Alexander Siffrin
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> V.A.T. ID.: DE211006534
>
> Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP
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>
> This e-mail and its attachments is intended only for the person to whom it is addressed. Furthermore it is not permitted to publish any content of this email. You must not use, disclose, copy, print or rely on this e-mail. If an addressing or transmission error has misdirected this e-mail, kindly notify the author by replying to this e-mail or contacting us by telephone.
>
>
>
> --
> jonathan matkowsky, vp - ip & head of global brand threat mitigation
>
>
> --
> Bei weiteren Fragen stehen wir Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung.
>
> Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
>
> Volker A. Greimann
> - Rechtsabteilung -
>
> Key-Systems GmbH
> Im Oberen Werk 1
> 66386 St. Ingbert
> Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
> Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
> Email: vgreimann at key-systems.net
>
> Web: www.key-systems.net / www.RRPproxy.net
> www.domaindiscount24.com / www.BrandShelter.com
>
> Folgen Sie uns bei Twitter oder werden Sie unser Fan bei Facebook:
> www.facebook.com/KeySystems
> www.twitter.com/key_systems
>
> Geschäftsführer: Alexander Siffrin
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> Umsatzsteuer ID.: DE211006534
>
> Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP
> www.keydrive.lu
>
> Der Inhalt dieser Nachricht ist vertraulich und nur für den angegebenen Empfänger bestimmt. Jede Form der Kenntnisgabe, Veröffentlichung oder Weitergabe an Dritte durch den Empfänger ist unzulässig. Sollte diese Nachricht nicht für Sie bestimmt sein, so bitten wir Sie, sich mit uns per E-Mail oder telefonisch in Verbindung zu setzen.
>
> --------------------------------------------
>
> Should you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Volker A. Greimann
> - legal department -
>
> Key-Systems GmbH
> Im Oberen Werk 1
> 66386 St. Ingbert
> Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
> Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
> Email: vgreimann at key-systems.net
>
> Web: www.key-systems.net / www.RRPproxy.net
> www.domaindiscount24.com / www.BrandShelter.com
>
> Follow us on Twitter or join our fan community on Facebook and stay updated:
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> www.twitter.com/key_systems
>
> CEO: Alexander Siffrin
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> V.A.T. ID.: DE211006534
>
> Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP
> www.keydrive.lu
>
> This e-mail and its attachments is intended only for the person to whom it is addressed. Furthermore it is not permitted to publish any content of this email. You must not use, disclose, copy, print or rely on this e-mail. If an addressing or transmission error has misdirected this e-mail, kindly notify the author by replying to this e-mail or contacting us by telephone.
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>
>
>
> --
> Bei weiteren Fragen stehen wir Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung.
>
> Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
>
> Volker A. Greimann
> - Rechtsabteilung -
>
> Key-Systems GmbH
> Im Oberen Werk 1
> 66386 St. Ingbert
> Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
> Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
> Email: vgreimann at key-systems.net
>
> Web: www.key-systems.net / www.RRPproxy.net
> www.domaindiscount24.com / www.BrandShelter.com
>
> Folgen Sie uns bei Twitter oder werden Sie unser Fan bei Facebook:
> www.facebook.com/KeySystems
> www.twitter.com/key_systems
>
> Geschäftsführer: Alexander Siffrin
> Handelsregister Nr.: HR B 18835 - Saarbruecken
> Umsatzsteuer ID.: DE211006534
>
> Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP
> www.keydrive.lu
>
> Der Inhalt dieser Nachricht ist vertraulich und nur für den angegebenen Empfänger bestimmt. Jede Form der Kenntnisgabe, Veröffentlichung oder Weitergabe an Dritte durch den Empfänger ist unzulässig. Sollte diese Nachricht nicht für Sie bestimmt sein, so bitten wir Sie, sich mit uns per E-Mail oder telefonisch in Verbindung zu setzen.
>
> --------------------------------------------
>
> Should you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Volker A. Greimann
> - legal department -
>
> Key-Systems GmbH
> Im Oberen Werk 1
> 66386 St. Ingbert
> Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
> Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
> Email: vgreimann at key-systems.net
>
> Web: www.key-systems.net / www.RRPproxy.net
> www.domaindiscount24.com / www.BrandShelter.com
>
> Follow us on Twitter or join our fan community on Facebook and stay updated:
> www.facebook.com/KeySystems
> www.twitter.com/key_systems
>
> CEO: Alexander Siffrin
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> V.A.T. ID.: DE211006534
>
> Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP
> www.keydrive.lu
>
> This e-mail and its attachments is intended only for the person to whom it is addressed. Furthermore it is not permitted to publish any content of this email. You must not use, disclose, copy, print or rely on this e-mail. If an addressing or transmission error has misdirected this e-mail, kindly notify the author by replying to this e-mail or contacting us by telephone.
>
>
>
>
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