[gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Fwd: Equifax hack worse than previously thought: Biz kissed goodbye to card expiry dates, tax IDs etc

Tue Feb 13 17:43:49 UTC 2018

I am mystified as to why some people in this group don't recognize that
while (that's US for "whilst," for my European friends!) legitimate
business may do that -- and indeed, may be required to in Ireland and Japan
and a few other countries, a) there is no requirement in other locations to
do so, and b) the bad actors either don't publish it or put falsified
information on their website...but the Whois record, whether accurate or
falsified (and sometimes even with privacy protection) is helpful in
anti-money laundering, consumer protection, certification, anti abuse and
trust and safety. Let's all acknowledge that we live in a world where there
are many, many legitimate e-commerce businesses but many illicit ones as
well! Our solutions have to accommodate for all of the above.

John Horton
President and CEO, LegitScript

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<http://www.linkedin.com/company/legitscript-com>  |  Facebook
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On Tue, Feb 13, 2018 at 9:33 AM, Volker Greimann <vgreimann at key-systems.net>
wrote:

> John, if businesses want to publish their information, they should do it
> on their website, as they are legally required to (at least over here). No
> need for whois for that. So that purpose is out the window already.
>
> Volker
>
> Am 13.02.2018 um 18:07 schrieb John Bambenek via gnso-rds-pdp-wg:
>
> No it doesn't because there are large incentives for institution and
> individuals to continue to publish information. Businesses, for instance,
> WANT to be contacted. If you want mail delivered, certain best practices
> are imposed.
>
> If consent is not the solution, YOU are deciding what the rest of the
> world can and cannot do with their data. Who exactly made ICANN the arbiter
> of what I can do with my data?
>
> On 2/13/2018 11:04 AM, Volker Greimann wrote:
>
> I am not sure you want that, because that means completely dark whois.
>
> I'd prefer an approach where we do not need to rely on consent (but can
> still offer it as an option). The hard bit is finding the right principles
> of who gets access to what and how even when there is no consent.
>
> Consent is not the solution.
>
> Am 13.02.2018 um 18:00 schrieb John Bambenek via gnso-rds-pdp-wg:
>
> Ok, so you agree with my in principle and we're just haggling over the
> details now. Flip a coin for all I care, opt-in/opt-out and move forward.
>
> So let's do that. When can we implement?
>
> On 2/13/2018 10:58 AM, Volker Greimann wrote:
>
> You are still looking at the wrong end of the horse. Privacy is not the
> choice, it is the default. Divulging data is the choice.
>
> Am 13.02.2018 um 17:57 schrieb John Bambenek via gnso-rds-pdp-wg:
>
> Exactly right. As far as I'm concerned if we made privacy a free choice,
> make the fields optional for all I care, and whatever they do make is
> public... we have solved this problem.
>
> People who ACTUALLY protect society against privacy threats have the data
> to do their jobs, consumers who want privacy have a free option for it, and
> registrars can be in compliance with the law.
>
> On 2/13/2018 10:54 AM, DANIEL NANGHAKA wrote:
>
> This is just an example but there is a lot of damage that can be caused
> with data being exposed. In our case we have phone numbers, addresses,
> emails which is required to verification.
>
> This takes us to issue of consent.
>
> On Tuesday, February 13, 2018, John Bambenek via gnso-rds-pdp-wg <
> gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org> wrote:
>
>> Let's be honest here, we're talking about phone numbers and email
>> addresses. The threat model is RADICALLY different with the data we are
>> talking about.
>>
>> On 2/13/2018 10:45 AM, Stephanie Perrin wrote:
>>
>> Undeterred by the fact that noone has responded to my last post, I offer
>> the following update to the Equifax breach to further illustrate my point.
>> As many companies have found out, you don't find out what you've got till
>> it's gone.....a further reason for data minimization and short retention
>> periods.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> To:
>>
>> http://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/02/13/equifax_security_breach_bad/
>>
>>
>> *Equifax hack worse than previously thought: Biz kissed goodbye to card
>> expiry dates, tax IDs etc*
>> Pwned credit-score biz quietly admits more info lost
>> By Iain Thomson in San Francisco 13 Feb 2018 at 02:13
>>
>> Last year, Equifax admitted
>> https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/09/07/143m_american_equif
>> ax_customers_exposed/
>> hackers stole sensitive personal records on 145 million Americans and
>> hundreds of thousands in the UK
>> https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/10/10/equifax_uk_records_update/
>> and Canada.
>>
>> The outfit already said cyber-crooks "primarily" took names, social
>> security numbers, birth dates, home addresses, credit-score dispute forms,
>> and, in some instances, credit card numbers and driver license numbers. Now
>> the credit-checking giant reckons the intruders snatched even more
>> information from its databases.
>>
>> According to documents provided by Equifax to the US Senate Banking
>> Committee,
>> and *revealed this month by Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA)*,
>> https://apnews.com/2a51e3e5f9a945978df4ad96246b8ecc
>> the attackers also grabbed taxpayer identification numbers, phone
>> numbers, email addresses, and credit card expiry dates belonging to some
>> Equifax customers.
>>
>> Like social security numbers, taxpayer ID numbers are useful for
>> fraudsters seeking to steal people's identities or their tax rebates, and
>> the expiry dates are similarly useful for online crooks when linked with
>> credit card numbers and other personal information.
>>
>>
>> *Contradictory*
>>
>> "As your company continues to issue incomplete, confusing and
>> contradictory statements and hide information from Congress and the public,
>> it is clear that five months after the breach was publicly announced,
>> Equifax has yet to answer this simple question in full: what was the
>> precise extent of the breach?" Warren fumed in a missive late last week.
>> https://www.warren.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=2317
>>
>> Equifax spokeswoman Meredith Griffanti stressed to The Register today
>> that the extra information snatched by hackers, as revealed by Senator
>> Warren, belonged to "some" Equifax customers. In other words, not everyone
>> had their phone numbers, email addresses, and so on, slurped by crooks just
>> some. How much is some? Equifax isn't saying, hence Warren's (and everyone
>> else's) growing frustration.
>>
>> The senator is a cosponsor of the *proposed Data Breach Prevention and
>> Compensation Act, *
>> https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/01/10/credit_reporting_agencies_fines/
>> which, if passed, would impose computer security regulations on credit
>> reporting agencies, with mandatory fines that would have led to Equifax
>> coughing up $1.5bn for its IT blunder.
>>
>> Some regulation or punishment is obviously needed.
>>
>> No senior Equifax executives were fired over the attack instead the CEO,
>> CSO and CIO were all allowed to retire with multi-million dollar golden
>> parachutes. The US government's Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
>> promised a full investigation into the Equifax affair, and then gave up. On
>> February 7, an open letter [PDF]
>> https://www.schatz.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CFPB%20Equifax%2
>> 0Letter%202-7-18.pdf
>> from 32 senators to the bureau asked why the probe was dropped, and the
>> gang has yet to receive a response. ®
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing listgnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.orghttps://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg
>>
>>
>> --
>> --
>>
>> John Bambenek
>>
>>
>
> --
>
> Regards
> Nanghaka Daniel K.
> Executive Director - ILICIT Africa / Chair - FOSSFA / Community Lead -
> ISOC Uganda Chapter / Geo4Africa Lead / Organising Team - FOSS4G2018
> Mobile +256 772 898298 <+256%20772%20898298> (Uganda)
> Skype: daniel.nanghaka
>
> ----------------------------------------- *"Working for Africa" *
> -----------------------------------------
>
>
>
>
> --
> --
>
> John Bambenek
>
>
>
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>
> John Bambenek
>
>
>
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> --
> --
>
> John Bambenek
>
>
>
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