[gtld-tech] Draft RDAP Operational Profile for gTLD Registries and Registrars

Francisco Arias francisco.arias at icann.org
Fri Jan 8 01:48:33 UTC 2016

Hi Andy,

Defining what should or should not be shown is probably better suited for the new Policy Development Process on Next-Generation gTLD Registration Directory Service. There is a call for volunteers (and observers) at https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2016-01-04-en



On 1/7/16, 2:21 PM, "gtld-tech-bounces at icann.org on behalf of Andrew Newton" <gtld-tech-bounces at icann.org on behalf of andy at hxr.us> wrote:

>First, is it right of me to assume that commenting here is sufficient
>to be considered providing feedback for this:
>https://www.icann.org/public-comments/rdap-profile-2015-12-03-en ?
>I agree with the general aim and direction of this proposal. Comments in-line:
>On Thu, Nov 19, 2015 at 5:57 PM, Andrew Sullivan <asullivan at dyn.com> wrote:
>> I understand the difficulty of specifying a profile where the possible
>> future policy options are not known, but I believe that RDAP was
>> designed with the goal of being able to deliver selectively any field
>> at all depending on the identity of the querying party.  Therefore, I
>> think the profile could specify at least three roles: public1,
>> authenticated-full, authenticated-test.
>I would call these authorization profiles, not authentication profiles.
>>     RDAP services MUST provide a form of authentication service as
>>     described in RFC 7481.  RDAP services MAY use any of the federated
>>     authentication models described in RFC 7481, section 3.2.1.
>>     RDAP services MUST provide differentiated access based on
>>     authorization, as described in RFC 7481, section 3.3.  RDAP
>>     services MUST provide a minimum of three different authorized
>>     levels of access, called public1, authenticated-full, and
>>     authenticated-test.  In the sections that follow, members
>>     appropriate to the public1 and authenticated-full roles are marked
>>     as appropriate to either or both.  Any member not explicitly
>>     marked is assumed to appropriate to the authenticated-full role
>>     only The authenticated-test role is for testing, and is used to
>>     demonstrate the ability to selectively disable response for some
>>     field at test time.
>>     RDAP services MAY NOT implement additional differentiated
>>     responses based on authorization except as contemplated by ICANN
>>     policy or under agreement with ICANN under the RSEP process.
>> Then, each member mentioned should be marked as "public1",
>> "authenticated-full", or both.  I think only the following fields are
>> part of the public1 list:
>> for domain objects:
>>     objectClassName
>>     ldhName
>>     unicodeName
>>     variants (all of it)
>>     nameservers
>>     publicIDs, but only when it's used for a registrar
>>     secureDNS
>>     status
>> for nameserver objects:
>>     objectClassName
>>     ldhName
>>     unicodeName
>>     ipAddresses
>> Nothing else goes in public1.  I've called this public1 to make it
>> clear that it is but one possible interpretation of what "public
>> access" could be in the future; I'm not wedded to the name.
>I would include handle and any remarks the registrant intended for
>public consumption.
>> Now, the final bit is to make it clear that access that is
>> _un_authenticated will use the authenticated-full role until ICANN
>> policy changes.
>> The point of all this is to have differentiated role functionality
>> sitting there and ready to go as soon as the ICANN policy changes, and
>> to include in the RDAP deployment policy now all the mechanisms
>> necessary to implement whatever policy the PDP comes up with.  By
>> doing it this way, the current policy can be respected while yet
>> laying the ground for the just-launched PDP to do something sane.
>> I hope this is useful.  Apologies again for the long time to send it.
>> If you have further questions, obviously, please don't hesitate to
>> poke me.
>I don't know if this is the right place, but it would be nice if
>something like draft-hollenbeck-weirds-rdap-openid could be
>implemented as well, say 6 months after it is published as an RFC.
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