[gtld-tech] Draft RDAP Operational Profile for gTLD Registries and Registrars

[Andrew Newton]

So I believe that is addressed in Andrew's proposal.

What we don't want is for the PDP to make a recommendation only to
have people say, "but the gTLD profile doesn't support tiered access."

-andy

On Thu, Jan 7, 2016 at 8:48 PM, Francisco Arias
<francisco.arias at icann.org> wrote:
> Hi Andy,
>
> Defining what should or should not be shown is probably better suited for the new Policy Development Process on Next-Generation gTLD Registration Directory Service. There is a call for volunteers (and observers) at https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2016-01-04-en
>
> Regards,
>
> --
> Francisco
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On 1/7/16, 2:21 PM, "gtld-tech-bounces at icann.org on behalf of Andrew Newton" <gtld-tech-bounces at icann.org on behalf of andy at hxr.us> wrote:
>
>>First, is it right of me to assume that commenting here is sufficient
>>to be considered providing feedback for this:
>>https://www.icann.org/public-comments/rdap-profile-2015-12-03-en ?
>>
>>I agree with the general aim and direction of this proposal. Comments in-line:
>>
>>On Thu, Nov 19, 2015 at 5:57 PM, Andrew Sullivan <asullivan at dyn.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> I understand the difficulty of specifying a profile where the possible
>>> future policy options are not known, but I believe that RDAP was
>>> designed with the goal of being able to deliver selectively any field
>>> at all depending on the identity of the querying party.  Therefore, I
>>> think the profile could specify at least three roles: public1,
>>> authenticated-full, authenticated-test.
>>>
>>
>>I would call these authorization profiles, not authentication profiles.
>>
>>>     RDAP services MUST provide a form of authentication service as
>>>     described in RFC 7481.  RDAP services MAY use any of the federated
>>>     authentication models described in RFC 7481, section 3.2.1.
>>>
>>>     RDAP services MUST provide differentiated access based on
>>>     authorization, as described in RFC 7481, section 3.3.  RDAP
>>>     services MUST provide a minimum of three different authorized
>>>     levels of access, called public1, authenticated-full, and
>>>     authenticated-test.  In the sections that follow, members
>>>     appropriate to the public1 and authenticated-full roles are marked
>>>     as appropriate to either or both.  Any member not explicitly
>>>     marked is assumed to appropriate to the authenticated-full role
>>>     only The authenticated-test role is for testing, and is used to
>>>     demonstrate the ability to selectively disable response for some
>>>     field at test time.
>>>
>>>     RDAP services MAY NOT implement additional differentiated
>>>     responses based on authorization except as contemplated by ICANN
>>>     policy or under agreement with ICANN under the RSEP process.
>>>
>>> Then, each member mentioned should be marked as "public1",
>>> "authenticated-full", or both.  I think only the following fields are
>>> part of the public1 list:
>>>
>>> for domain objects:
>>>
>>>     objectClassName
>>>     ldhName
>>>     unicodeName
>>>     variants (all of it)
>>>     nameservers
>>>     publicIDs, but only when it's used for a registrar
>>>     secureDNS
>>>     status
>>>
>>> for nameserver objects:
>>>
>>>     objectClassName
>>>     ldhName
>>>     unicodeName
>>>     ipAddresses
>>>
>>> Nothing else goes in public1.  I've called this public1 to make it
>>> clear that it is but one possible interpretation of what "public
>>> access" could be in the future; I'm not wedded to the name.
>>
>>I would include handle and any remarks the registrant intended for
>>public consumption.
>>
>>>
>>> Now, the final bit is to make it clear that access that is
>>> _un_authenticated will use the authenticated-full role until ICANN
>>> policy changes.
>>>
>>> The point of all this is to have differentiated role functionality
>>> sitting there and ready to go as soon as the ICANN policy changes, and
>>> to include in the RDAP deployment policy now all the mechanisms
>>> necessary to implement whatever policy the PDP comes up with.  By
>>> doing it this way, the current policy can be respected while yet
>>> laying the ground for the just-launched PDP to do something sane.
>>>
>>> I hope this is useful.  Apologies again for the long time to send it.
>>> If you have further questions, obviously, please don't hesitate to
>>> poke me.
>>>
>>
>>I don't know if this is the right place, but it would be nice if
>>something like draft-hollenbeck-weirds-rdap-openid could be
>>implemented as well, say 6 months after it is published as an RFC.
>>
>>-andy