[NCAP-Discuss] NCAP notes: 22 February 2023

James Galvin galvin at elistx.com
Thu Mar 2 16:37:12 UTC 2023


Two comments.

First, any editorial suggestions you have for how to make the point are 
most welcome.

Second, I think we’re talking past each other and in fact we are in 
violent agreement.  I surmise that the problem is how we are each 
defining “user notification”.

When I define user I’m imagining an actual physical person.  The 
question, in my mind, is whether or not that actual physical person is 
going to understand what is happening when a name collision happens and 
thus be able to take direct action to resolve the “problem” they are 
having.

So, is controlled interruption (CI) disruptive? Yes.

Is CI impactful to users?  Yes.

Does CI leave helpful “breadcrumbs” for users?  Yes.

Can users follow those “breadcrumbs” and get help with their issue?  
Yes.

Are users likely to see those “breadcrumbs” and thus actually use 
them?  No.

In my opinion, it is self-evident that the answer to the last question 
is “no”.  You may have a different opinion.

In my opinion, based on 5 decades of experience with technology and 
people who know nothing about technology except maybe how to use it, if 
you don’t actually put instructions in front of people you get very 
little reaction.  I don’t think it takes any form of academic research 
to accept and believe that is true, i.e., it is self-evident.  CI does 
not put instructions in front of people.  It leaves breadcrumbs that may 
or may not be seen and followed.  In contrast, the proposed enhancements 
seek to put actual instructions in front of users in a few select cases. 
  The proposed enhancements will still leave breadcrumbs, like CI, in 
many cases, but in a few select cases they have a higher probability of 
getting instructions to users.

CI is not effective at user notification because it does not directly 
reach the user.  It leaves “breadcrumbs”, which you could make the 
case are a form of user notification.  However, if user is a physical 
person, then CI is simply not effective.  You may have a different 
opinion.


In conclusion, CI is certainly a choice for ACA.  This study is simply 
proposing enhancements, adding features to the particular CI 
implementation choice made in 2012 (which personally I believe were 
great choices in 2012), that are certainly no worse than CI and 
absolutely improve its effectiveness in response to the changed DNS 
infrastructure of today.  You may have a different opinion.


Please propose text for the study final report.


Jim



On 1 Mar 2023, at 14:34, Jeff Schmidt wrote:

> Googling “127.0.53.53” yields 14,600+ results right now:
>
> + 70+ threads from stackoverflow.com (common IT forum)
> + 162+ threads from serverfault.com (another common IT forum)
> + Microsoft’s technet forum
> + Google’s chromium forum
> + ICANN’s own information
>
> Compare this to the truly microscopic sample of research conducted 
> based on reports to ICANN.
>
> Any statement that CI is somehow “not effective for user 
> notification” is simply wrong and not supported quantitatively or 
> qualitatively.
>
> Sure we all want things to be “better” but these blanket 
> statements are unhelpful, factually wrong, and disingenuous.
>
> Jeff
>
>
>
>
> From: NCAP-Discuss <ncap-discuss-bounces at icann.org> On Behalf Of Casey 
> Deccio
> Sent: Wednesday, March 1, 2023 1:14 PM
> To: James Galvin <galvin at elistx.com>
> Cc: ncap-discuss at icann.org
> Subject: Re: [NCAP-Discuss] NCAP notes: 22 February 2023
>
> Jim,
>
> Part of our disagreement is that we are understanding terms very 
> differently.
>
> To me, "user notification" is ambiguous.  It might refer to either or 
> both of the following: disruption, which falls under the "effective 
> alerting coverage" category (i.e., "something is wrong"); or root 
> cause identification, which leads to the user to know what caused the 
> issue.  This is why the root causes analysis uses both "disruption" 
> and "root cause identification".
>
> Additionally, the finding quoted below has been quoted in isolation.  
> Please see other findings for more context to support this.  For 
> example: "Usage of private DNS suffixes colliding with newly delegated 
> TLDs has decreased over time."  The analysis shows that private use of 
> DNS suffixes has decreased over time, and the only mechanism that has 
> been deployed thus far is controlled interruption.  I would not 
> therefore call that "ineffective."
>
> Precision in language is important, particularly as we are 
> categorically evaluating past and future methods.
>
> Casey
>
>
> On Mar 1, 2023, at 11:41 AM, James Galvin 
> <galvin at elistx.com<mailto:galvin at elistx.com>> wrote:
>
> These notes do not capture an important point that I made during the 
> meeting.
>
> These notes say:
> Finding E.a: Controlled Interruption is not effective for user 
> notification: Casey believes this is a misrepresentation and noted the 
> root cause analysis data supports his statement on this.
>
> The notes do not capture the point I made:
> This finding is an accurate reflection supported by the Root Cause 
> Analysis research.
>
> It would seem that Casey and I are drawing different conclusions from 
> the report. However, in partial support of my support for the Study 2 
> Finding I submit the following Root Cause Analysis Finding (page 47):
> Controlled interruption is effective at disruption, but not at root 
> cause identification.
> Controlled interruption has shown to be good at disruption, but not at 
> helping affected users identify the cause of the problem—at least 
> not in the way that was intended. Evidences. Of the survey respondents 
> that indicated that they used of TLDs, 70% reported having experienced 
> technical issues related to their suffix. Of those, 43% experienced 
> the problems within days of delegation of the TLD. Over two-thirds 
> (71%) of organizations experiencing technical problems indicated that 
> they knew that the issues were related to TLD delegation before the 
> problem was resolved. It appears that most of the ineffectiveness was 
> due to the controlled interruption IP address not even being observed, 
> which occurred in 71% of cases, according to the survey. However, when 
> the controlled interruption IP address was observed, the success rate 
> in identifying ICANN and controlled interruption as the cause was 
> between 50% and 76%, according to the survey results and the Web 
> search results analysis, respectively.
>
> I also made the point during the meeting that it seemed to me the 
> issue being debated was simply the wording of the Study 2 Finding, not 
> its factual assertion. I said then and I’m repeating now that I 
> welcome suggestions for how to restate the Study 2 Finding.
>
> Thanks,
> Jim
>
> On 23 Feb 2023, at 6:02, Jennifer Bryce wrote:
> Dear NCAP Discussion Group members,
>
> The notes from the 22 February NCAP Discussion Group meeting are 
> attached and will be posted to the meeting record on the wiki: 
> https://community.icann.org/x/4YTKDQ.
>
> The recording can be directly accessed here: 
> https://icann.zoom.us/rec/play/sbcwTpyP5v0lmz_OTQFZOsWgFe056FPBSFGAo0pkQjKZ3WEmrCnLCmvgqEwLbFLTiQ619ysohCmhR35l.oNOIneK13LjTRyFh?continueMode=true&_x_zm_rtaid=69f-25JgT9uQd9f13bYzDw.1677121850114.64d0c334f967482c6f176722421c11dd&_x_zm_rhtaid=110
>
> One action item was captured:
>
> Action item: Discussion Group members should review Section 4: 
> Findings<https://docs.google.com/document/d/1H89gyy31dGVXQjn304PEGv85EKIpHUAR3vPm76YQMcc/edit> 
> and make comments in the document to highlight the areas where they 
> have concerns. This will aid discussion next week.
>
>
> Best,
> Jennifer
> --
> Jennifer Bryce
> Project Manager, Office of the Chief Technology Officer (OCTO)
> Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
>
> Skype: jennifer.bryce.icann
> Email: jennifer.bryce at icann.org<mailto:jennifer.bryce at icann.org>
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