[CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities

Wed Oct 29 20:57:24 UTC 2014

In my opinion, while "day to day oversight" is technical/operational; any "major review oversight" will involve policy issues.

It depends on what you mean  by “policy issues.”  I would disagree that the choice of an IANA operator is a way to make global policy for the DNS. What you call “major review oversight” is, I think, nothing more than the power to change the IANA functions operator.

Milton L. Mueller
Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor
Syracuse University School of Information Studies
http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/mueller/Home.html

I agree with Becky that "day to day oversight" only involves the registeries.

I however strongly feel that "major review oversight" involves the GAC and ALAC and other stakeholder groups from GNSO such as NCSG.

Establishing a "separate mechanism" for "major review oversight" appears to be cumbersome. Therefore i disagree with Alan and Milton.

I feel it is simpler to include all ACs and SGs in the "Oversight Council" to deal with "major review oversight".

On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 9:20 PM, Olivier MJ Crepin-Leblond <ocl at gih.com<mailto:ocl at gih.com>> wrote:
Hello all,

irrespective of whether an "Oversight Council" is a desirable thing or not (I have not yet made up my mind about this, only having very basic information about it), I see a serious conflict of Interest where only the directly affected parties oversee operations that concern them directly.
There was much discussion about the GAC having seats. Although I have not asked them, I am pretty much sure that end users, as affected parties, would need a number of seats too.

Kind regards,

Olivier

On 29/10/2014 14:33, Burr, Becky wrote:
I’d envisioned the “Oversight Council” to be elected by registries (ccs and gs) organized in some fashion outside of the ICANN umbrella – so the IANA Oversight Inc. or other association we were talking about the other day.  It seems to me that the duties and authority of the Council would be determined by the membership of the organization (I.e., the registries) – so these questions would be resolved as part of structuring Oversight, Inc.  Let’s not create yet another separate mechanism.  Instead, figure out a way for the views of all stakeholders with respect to major decisions can be collected by Oversight, Inc. and taken into account in the process of developing major proposals.

J. Beckwith Burr
Neustar, Inc. / Deputy General Counsel and Chief Privacy Officer
1775 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006
Office: + 1.202.533.2932  Mobile:  +1.202.352.6367  / becky.burr at neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr at neustar.biz> / www.neustar.biz<http://www.neustar.biz>

From: Guru Acharya <gurcharya at gmail.com<mailto:gurcharya at gmail.com>>
Date: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 at 9:35 AM
To: Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray at cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray at cira.ca>>
Cc: Becky Burr <becky.burr at neustar.biz<mailto:becky.burr at neustar.biz>>, "cwg-stewardship at icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship at icann.org>" <cwg-stewardship at icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship at icann.org>>, "Lindeberg, Elise" <elise.lindeberg at npt.no<mailto:elise.lindeberg at npt.no>>
Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities

Postulates emerging from Allan's remarks:

The Oversight Council will monitor compliance with day to day technical SLA type requirements.

Even though the final contracting authority of changing the IANA operator will rest with the Oversight Council:

1) There will be a "separate mechanism" for recommending any major decision to the Oversight Council, including change of IANA operator

2) The Oversight Council will be bound to accept/implement the decision of the "separate mechanism".

3) That "separate mechanism" will necessarily involve the views of the GAC.

4) That "separate mechanism" will be at an arms length from ICANN so that the ICANN board can not interfere since ICANN is the present IANA operator.

How do we intend to codify these characteristics of the "separate mechanism" so that the GAC can be assured that they will be consulted in case of change of the IANA operator? Maybe as part of a MOU between the Oversight Council and GAC+ALAC+GNSO+CCSNO?

On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 6:32 PM, Allan MacGillivray <allan.macgillivray at cira.ca<mailto:allan.macgillivray at cira.ca>> wrote:
I see the “oversight council” as being a body that deals with IANA compliance with day-to-day SLA-type responsibilities e.g. the current performance metric that 80% of root zone file and WHOIS database change requests be completed within 21 days.  I would not expect that governments (other than those that are ccTLD operators) would have much interest in this. However, were there to be major review of these functions, such as that which the NTIA initiated in 2011 with its NOI, or to change the operator, then I would expect that the responsibility for conducting such a review would not fall on the ‘oversight council’ alone and that in whatever mechanism that would be established, there could be a role for governments.

From:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org> [mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship-bounces at icann.org>] On Behalf Of Guru Acharya
Sent: October-29-14 8:32 AM
To: Becky Burr
Cc: cwg-stewardship at icann.org<mailto:cwg-stewardship at icann.org>; Lindeberg, Elise
Subject: Re: [CWG-Stewardship] [IANA-issues] Fwd: Names Community vs the other two communities

Becky. I agree with your initial assessment that the "oversight council" would focus on "technical and operational issues" (as opposed to policy issues); and therefore GAC participation in the council will not be required even though GAC participation at an equal footing will not be inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model.

However, I think GAC participation in the council might be essential in the scenario where the oversight council decides to change the IANA operator in the future. If the council decides to contract a different operator (different from ICANN) in the future, would it not lead to various policy issues such as jurisdiction of the new IANA operator, financing of the new IANA operator etc - where the insight of the GAC may be beneficial?

Therefore I think GAC should be a part of the oversight council.

Regards,
Guru

On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:47 PM, Burr, Becky <Becky.Burr at neustar.biz<mailto:Becky.Burr at neustar.biz>> wrote:
Thanks Elise, very helpful.  I was thinking that the “oversight counsel” would focus on technical and operational issues as opposed to policy issues ... But policy for IANA would remain in existing ICANN processes.  Could you help me understand which technical/operational IANA services might raise “public interest” concerns?  I agree with you that having some GAC reps on a Oversight Counsel would not be inconsistent with the Strickling view, but I am curious about why GAC might want to participate in that kind of counsel.

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