[gnso-rds-pdp-wg] On interoperation and policy (was Re: Contactability)

[Dotzero]

Comment at the bottom.

On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 12:28 PM, Andrew Sullivan <ajs at anvilwalrusden.com>
wrote:

> Dear colleagues,
>
> On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 06:21:16PM +0100, Volker Greimann wrote:
> > suffice it to say that I do
> > not consider their publications evidence. "Domains seen" indeed...
> Ignoring
> > them is the better options unless they develop better methodologies _and_
> > start sharing them for peer examination.
>
> > Am 29.11.2017 um 18:03 schrieb allison nixon:
>
> > > Love them or hate them, you can't ignore them. If Spamhaus listed an IP
> > > range, that range would suffer severe connectivity issues across the
> > > entire Internet. When it comes to interoperability, Spamhaus's lists
> > > effectively matter more than ICANN's accreditation.
>
> I think that the above two snippets neatly describe the point I, at
> least, have been trying to make about the Internet's operational
> reality.
>
> Volker's assertion appears to be that the right thing according to the
> agreed-upon evaluation criteria is what ought to be guiding us.
>
> Allison's claim, however, is that there are operational realities on
> the Internet, and that operators are going to do whatever they do and
> that the ICANN community policies had better take those interests into
> account, or find that the policies are irrelevant.
>
> I would go further even than Allison does, because in my opinion she
> is describing the _design_ of the Internet: it's _inter_networking,
> and the only basis upon which it happens is the voluntary
> interoperation by operators.  On my network, I get to decide what I'm
> willing to accept.  That might not include everything on the Internet.
>
> Best regards,
>
> A
>

To further make the point that Allison and Andrew have voiced, on Monday we
blocked traffic from 5 /17s and 1 /19 assigned to one particular company
(hosting/connectivity for downstream customers) due to widespread and
aggressive malicious traffic originating from their ASNs. Even cursory
checking indicated that this organization has a not very good reputation
and that reaching out to them would not be a good use of my time. This was
confirmed from various people I know and trust.  While this is IP based
rather than DNS based, it reinforces that people will take steps to protect
their customers and resources when they encounter badness. We use lots of
inputs for making these sorts of decisions. Loss of visibility from
whois/RDS means that we may end up using blunter tools like blocking based
on registry/registrar reputation.

Mike
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