[CWG-Stewardship] My concerns with the draft proposal and an alternative option

[Guru Acharya]

I think most of Alan's concerns about integratability with other proposals,
acceptability by USG, nature of PRT etc have been addressed by multiple
people.

What remains un-answered are Alan's concerns about (i) Contract Co becoming
a target for litigation; (ii) source of funding of Contract Co; (iii)
jurisdiction of Contract Co; and (iv) accountability of Contract Co.

I agree that these are substantial concerns.

The Contract Co can be the subject of litigation for multiple reasons
including wrongful termination of a IANA contract; or any cause of action
related to a failed bid for a IANA contract. It can also be reasonable to
assume that Contract Co will be made a party to all cases that are against
ICANN in the future. For example, a case similar to the recent 'Iran/Iraq
ccTLD as attachable property' will definitely make Contract Co a respondent
along with ICANN.

Therefore, Contract Co will need a substantial litigation war chest. There
will also be substantial costs involved in contract drafting; negotiation;
preparation of RFPs etc. This needs to be addressed. Greg suggested the
possibility of a litigation indemnification mechanism. A mechanism to deal
with unforeseen non-litigation expenses should also be explored.

@Allan & Olivier: What accountability mechanisms do you suggest should be
built into the Contract Co by-laws?


On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:46 PM, Avri Doria <avri at acm.org> wrote:

>
> On 01-Dec-14 17:02, Alan Greenberg wrote:
>
> But my main reason for opposition is that I am far from convinced that all
> of the questions I and others have can be viably answered.
>
>
> As far as I can tell they have been answered.  You just have not accepted
> the answers you have been given.
> which is of course your right.  But from my reading they have been
> answered multiple times in different ways.
>
> My answer invovled the parallel with the  BCP 101 from the IETF. where the
> administrator of contracting Co is just that an administrator, acting like
> the lawyer who only does what she has been instructed to do by the PRT.
> With the PRT being the multistakeholders of ICANN and perhaps beyond that
> we are used to , but unfettered by the ability of the Board to overrule
> their decisions. And the PRT being awoken periodically and whenever the CSC
> felt there was a crisis for them to handle.
>
> You seem to have an issue with them not being a standing committee.  The
> reason for that is to avoid them becoming ICANN like and acquiring new
> functions because they were bored when they had nothing else to do.
> Standing committees with nothing to do, find new stuff to do.  Hence the
> CSC as an alarm to bring them into existence whenever necessary out of
> period.
>
>
> I think that using the transition to force accountability with respect to
> policy IS out of scope. But I also think that SOME transition models will
> have the incidental benefit of better policy-making accountability.
>
>
> It is not out of scope with forcing accountability for IANA.  A periodic
> RFP is repsnsible for forcing IANA accountability whether it is at ICANN or
> elsewhere.  And IANA accountability is in our charter.
>
> avri
>
>
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>
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