[NCAP-Discuss] Honeypot refresher

[Patrik Fältström]

On 30 Apr 2020, at 16:35, Jeff Schmidt via NCAP-Discuss wrote:

> Some suggest (repeatedly) that Controlled Interruption was designed the way it was because we don’t like data and honeypots (redirecting colliding lookups to some Internet host controlled by “good guys”) would generate the data panacea we always wanted but never had.  Suddenly all of our questions would be answered, toast would never burn, and the coronavirus would be cured.  This is wrong.  Honeypots create significant new risks; we concluded that the risks created by a honeypot approach were worse than the rewards and suggested (Recommendation 12) alternative approaches to gathering more data.

With all due respect, at time of this was discussed, JAS came to one conclusion, SSAC a different one. See SAC-066 for an analysis by SSAC, specifically Appendix A.

<https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/sac-066-en.pdf>

   Patrik
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