[RSSAC Caucus] Rogue Operator Work Party Summary (26 Jan 2021)

[Di Ma]

Hi, Ken,

Thanks for summarizing this meeting.

I suggest this WP make recommendation of increasing the diversity of RSO instance in a given country or area in avoidance of that the users in that area heavily rely on one or two RSOs which could be rogue. I hope this recommendation will encourage more RSOs to deploy instances as more as possible with local partners worldwide.

Since I am not a native English speaker, I hope some member in this WP could draft this piece of recommendation if this suggestion would make senses :-)

Di

> 2021年1月27日 01:32，Renard, Kenneth D CTR USARMY CCDC C5ISR (USA) via rssac-caucus <rssac-caucus at icann.org> 写道：
> 
> Summary of Rogue Operator Work Party meeting on 26 Jan 2021
>  
> 	• The new Introduction section was generally well received which sets a new tone for the document.  Instead of trying to set a strict definition of a rogue operator with specific, measurable artifacts, this document will serve to inform the future governance body on examples of rogue operations.
> 	• Since the target audience is a future governance body versus the general community, the background section does not seem necessary, as the governance body should have the requisite knowledge.
> 	• The guiding principles of RSSAC037 are referenced and seem generally important to root operations.  The work party is asking the RSSAC if they would like to publish the guiding principles in an independent document that can be referenced and will highlight the importance of these principles.
> 	• While we reference rogue operations in terms of the guiding principles at the beginning of section 3, there are no other direct references.  Do we need some form of mapping of each example to [subsets of] principles?  (i.e. “this action violates at least principle X and Y”)
> 	• The subjective example that talks about “undermining trust in the root server system” needs work to go beyond just the example of an RSO disparaging another RSO.  Duane W. will write something up about that.  (Duane, we will try really hard not to throw that new text away :-) 
> 	• Section 5: detection and mitigation.  We will likely remove this section from the document.  Since we are focusing more on describing rogue actions and leaving observation and determination of rogue-ness up to the future governing body, this is not strictly necessary.
> 	• We ask WP participants or *any* RSSAC Caucus members to contribute thoughts (to mail list or in the google doc as comments or suggestions) on what a Recommendation or Conclusion section would look like or contain.
>  
> Link to WP document:
>  
>                 https://docs.google.com/document/d/1XS2dIl_Sv1f7e4pA19QHnHEmLgRSkgEI2-zD7Tp0hog/edit#
>  
>  
>  
> Ken Renard
> S&TCD Contractor – ICF
> Sustaining Base Network Assurance Branch 
> C5ISR Center, Space and Terrestrial Communications Directorate
> Office:  443-395-7809
> kenneth.d.renard.ctr at mail.mil
>  
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